

A Guide to US, UK and EU Sanctions and Export Controls on Russia and Belarus

September 19, 2025

In response to Russia's February 24, 2022, invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing conflict, the United States ("US"), the United Kingdom ("UK") and the European Union ("EU"), along with other countries (e.g., Australia, Canada, Japan and Switzerland), have imposed various sanctions and export controls targeting Russia and Belarus.

The future of the conflict remains uncertain, and UK and EU sanctions and export control measures continue to expand, with the purpose of eroding the Russian economy's ability to support the war. In addition, certain leaders of the Group of Seven ("G7") have emphasized their continued focus on preventing and responding to sanctions evasion, including through facilitators and third-country providers that may help Russia evade Western sanctions or replenish military supplies. We are continuing to monitor US, UK and EU sanctions developments, including the implications of potential divergence between the US, UK and EU sanctions regimes.

Below is an overview of the sanctions and export controls imposed by the US, UK and EU as of 9:00 a.m. EDT September 19, 2025. **Updates since the May 28, 2025, publication are indicated in red.**

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US Sanctions

Since February 2022, the United States has implemented an extensive array of sanctions and export controls in response to the war.¹ These measures, developed primarily under the Biden Administration, remain in effect under the second Trump Administration. **The scope of any future sanctions measures remains uncertain, although the administration has signaled other tools may be used (e.g., tariffs imposed on India in August 2025 over its continued purchases of Russian oil) to pressure Russia in an attempt to end the war.**

Current sanctions measures can be broadly categorized as follows:

- **Investment prohibition:** prohibition on making new investments in Russia, including purchases of debt or equity securities issued by any entity in the Russian Federation.
- **Services prohibition:** prohibition on providing various services to persons located in Russia, including accounting, trust and corporate formation and management consulting services, quantum computing services, certain services related to the maritime transportation of Russian oil and petroleum products, architecture and engineering services, services for the acquisition of aluminum, copper or nickel of Russian Federation origin and information technology (“IT”) and software services.
- **Import and export restrictions:** prohibition on import into the United States of certain products of Russian origin (including Russian energy products, gold, certain other metals and diamonds) or export, reexport, sale or supply from the United States or by a US person of certain luxury goods to any person in Russia.
- **Blocking sanctions:** sanctions targeting Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Russian political figures, prominent Russian businessmen, Russian financial institutions, Russian securities registrars, Russia’s financial infrastructure, Russian state-owned institutions and their management and third-country actors facilitating Russia’s evasion of sanctions and export controls. Blocking sanctions have also been imposed on certain Belarusian persons related to Belarus’s support for and facilitation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as well as prominent Belarusian businessmen with close ties to Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka.

¹ On February 23, 2024, the US Departments of Commerce, the Treasury and State released an official business advisory, titled *Risks and Considerations for Doing Business in the Russian Federation and Russia-Occupied Territories of Ukraine*, to provide a high-level overview of these measures and some of the legal, financial and reputational risks associated with doing business in Russia. The advisory is available [here](#).

- **Secondary sanctions:** authorizing the US government to target non-US persons determined to have provided material assistance or support for persons blocked pursuant to Executive Order (“E.O.”) 14024, issued in April 2021,² or certain activities for or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, the Russian government, as well as non-US financial institutions determined to engage in certain activities involving Russia’s military-industrial base. In addition, mandatory secondary sanctions apply to non-US persons, including foreign (non-US) financial institutions (“FFIs”), determined to knowingly facilitate certain significant transactions for or on behalf of Russian individuals or entities designated under E.O. 13662, and to certain transactions related to trade in Russian gold.
- **Financial sanctions:** including prohibitions pursuant to E.O. 14024 on transactions involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and related entities and correspondent and payable-through account sanctions on one Russian bank and various of its subsidiaries.
- **Transport restrictions:** prohibition on Russian-affiliated vessels from entering into US ports.
- **Comprehensive sanctions:** on the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic regions of Ukraine.
- **Export controls:** restrictions on access by Russia and Belarus, and blocked persons designated under one of seven sanctions program identifiers maintained by the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) related to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, to certain US goods, software and technologies.

² 86 Fed. Reg. 20249 (Apr. 19, 2021). On March 1, 2022, OFAC published the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations (“RuHSR”) to implement E.O. 14024. 31 CFR part 587, *available* [here](#).

Russia

Prohibition on New Investment in and Provision of Certain Services to Russia

On April 6, 2022, then-President Joe Biden signed E.O. 14071 prohibiting:

- All new investment in Russia by US persons.³
- The exportation, reexportation, sale or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a US person, to any “person located in the Russian Federation”⁴ of any category of services the Secretary of the US Treasury Department (“Treasury”) may determine.
- Any approval, financing, facilitation or guarantee by a US person of a transaction by a foreign person that would be prohibited by the executive order if performed by a US person or within the United States.⁵

New Investment Prohibition: In a series of FAQs, OFAC provided guidance on how it will interpret “new investment.”⁶ FAQ 1049 defines “new investment” as the commitment of capital or other assets for the purpose of generating returns or appreciation, made on or after the effective date of the relevant new investment prohibition. New investments include: (i) the purchase or acquisition of real estate in Russia (other than for noncommercial, personal use); (ii) entry into an agreement requiring the commitment of capital or other assets for the establishment or expansion of projects or operations in Russia, including the formation of joint ventures or other corporate entities in Russia; (iii) entry into an agreement providing for participation in royalties or ongoing profits in Russia; (iv) the lending of funds to persons located in Russia for commercial purposes, including when such funds are intended to be used to fund a new or expanded project or operation in Russia; (v) the purchase of an equity interest in an entity located in Russia; (vi) the purchase or acquisition of rights to natural resources or exploitation thereof in Russia; and (vii) the commitment of capital or other assets pursuant to the exercise of rights under an agreement entered into *before* the effective date of the relevant

³ Prior to this broad investment prohibition, on March 8, 2022, President Biden signed E.O. 14066 prohibiting new investments in the energy sector. A few days later, President Biden signed E.O. 14068, which prohibited, among other things, new investment by a US person in any sector of the Russian economy as may be determined by the Secretary of the Treasury.

⁴ OFAC interprets this phrase to include persons in the Russian Federation, individuals ordinarily resident in the Russian Federation and entities incorporated or organized under the laws of the Russian Federation or any jurisdiction within the Russian Federation. OFAC Frequently Asked Question (“FAQ”) 1058.

⁵ 87 Fed. Reg. 20999 (Apr. 8, 2022). In addition, any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions of the executive order, and any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions of the order, are prohibited. This prohibition applies to all of the executive orders and to directives issued under E.O. 14024 discussed below.

⁶ See FAQs 1049-1055.

new investment prohibition, where such commitment is made on or after the effective date of the prohibition.

New investment does *not* include: (i) the maintenance of an investment made prior to the effective date of the new investment prohibition;⁷ (ii) entry into, performance of or financing of a contract, pursuant to ordinary commercial sales terms, to sell or purchase goods, services or technology to or from an entity in Russia; or (iii) wind down or divestment of a pre-existing investment, such as a pre-existing investment in an entity, project or operation, including any associated tangible property, located in Russia.

In addition, OFAC provided guidance indicating that US persons are prohibited from purchasing new and existing debt and equity securities issued by an entity in Russia. Under OFAC's guidance, US persons are not prohibited from selling or divesting, or facilitating the sale or divestment of, debt or equity securities issued by an entity in Russia to a non-US person;⁸ however, subsequently imposed sanctions on Russia's financial infrastructure, including numerous Russian securities registrars, discussed below, impact the ability of US persons to effect such divestments. US persons are not required to divest such securities and may continue to hold such previously acquired securities.

FAQ 1055 clarifies that US persons are not prohibited from lending funds to or purchasing a debt or equity interest in entities located outside of Russia, provided that: (i) such funds are not specifically intended for new projects or operations in Russia; and (ii) the entity located outside Russia derives less than 50% of its revenues from its investments in Russia. For purposes of assessing the foregoing, US persons may reasonably rely on the information available to them in the ordinary course of business, including publicly available information such as an entity's most recent quarterly or annual report. For purposes of determining the percentage of revenues derived from investments in Russia, revenues derived from the commercial sale of goods or services by an entity located outside of Russia to persons in Russia should not be included.

Services Prohibition: Treasury has issued several determinations pursuant to E.O. 14071 prohibiting the exportation, reexportation, sale or supply, directly or

⁷ "Maintenance" of investments generally includes all transactions ordinarily incident to performing under an agreement in effect prior to the prohibition's effective date, provided that such transactions are consistent with previously established practices and support pre-existing projects or operations. Maintenance includes: (i) transactions to ensure continuity of pre-existing projects or operations located in Russia (including payments to employees, suppliers, landlords, lenders and partners); (ii) the preservation and upkeep of pre-existing tangible property in Russia; and (iii) activities associated with maintaining pre-existing capital investments or equity investments. Maintenance activities do not include the expansion of pre-existing projects or operations beyond those in effect prior to the effective date of the new investment prohibition. FAQ 1050.

⁸ FAQ 1054.

indirectly, from the United States or by a US person of certain services to any person located in Russia.

To date, the following services have been the subject of such determinations:

- Accounting,⁹ trust and corporate formation¹⁰ and management consulting services,¹¹ effective as of June 7, 2022.¹²
- Quantum computing services,¹³ effective as of October 15, 2022.¹⁴
- Services related to the maritime transport of crude oil and petroleum products of Russian Federation origin, effective as of December 5, 2022, and February 5, 2023, respectively, as discussed below.¹⁵

⁹ “Accounting services” include the measurement, processing and evaluation of financial data about economic entities. FAQ 1034.

¹⁰ “Trust and corporate formation services” include assisting persons in forming or structuring legal persons, such as trusts and corporations; acting or arranging for other persons to act as directors, secretaries, administrative trustees, trust fiduciaries, registered agents or nominee shareholders of legal persons; providing a registered office, business address, correspondence address or administrative address for legal persons; and providing administrative services for trusts. *Id.*

¹¹ “Management consulting services” include strategic business advice; organizational and systems planning, evaluation and selection; development or evaluation of marketing programs or implementation; mergers, acquisitions and organizational structure; staff augmentation and human resources policies and practices; brand management; and executive search and vetting services. *Id.*; FAQ 1064.

¹² OFAC, Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 14071, *Prohibitions Related to Certain Accounting, Trust and Corporate Formation, and Management Consulting Services* (May 8, 2022), available [here](#).

¹³ “Quantum computing services” include any of the following services when related to quantum computing, quantum computers, electronic assemblies thereof or cryogenic refrigeration systems related to quantum computing: infrastructure, web hosting or data processing services; custom computer programming services; computer systems integration design services; computer systems and data processing facilities management services; computing infrastructure, data processing services, web hosting services and related services; repairing computer, computer peripherals or communication equipment; other computer-related services; as well as services related to the exportation, reexportation, sale or supply, directly or indirectly, of quantum computing, quantum computers, electronic assemblies thereof or cryogenic refrigeration systems related to quantum computing to any person located in Russia. FAQ 1084.

¹⁴ OFAC, Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 14071, *Prohibitions Related to Certain Quantum Computing Services* (Sept. 15, 2022), available [here](#).

¹⁵ US Department of the Treasury, Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 14071, *Prohibition on Certain Services as They Relate to the Maritime Transport of Crude Oil of Russian Federation Origin* (Nov. 21, 2022), available [here](#); US Department of the Treasury, Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 14071, *Prohibition on Certain Services as They Relate to the Maritime Transport of Petroleum Products of Russian Federation Origin* (Feb. 3, 2023), available [here](#).

- Architecture services¹⁶ and engineering services,¹⁷ effective as of June 18, 2023.¹⁸
- Services for the acquisition of aluminum, copper or nickel of Russian Federation origin,¹⁹ effective as of April 12, 2024 (the “Metals Services Determination”).²⁰
- IT and software services, effective as of September 12, 2024 (the “IT and Software Services Determination”),²¹ specifically (i) IT consultancy and

¹⁶ “Architecture services” include advisory services; pre-design services; design services, including schematic design, design development and final design; contract administration services; combined architectural design and contract administration services, including post construction services; and all other services requiring the expertise of architects. The prohibition applies to such services as they relate to residential, institutional, leisure, commercial and industrial buildings and structures; recreational areas; transportation infrastructure; and land subdivisions; and in all cases not necessarily related to a new construction project. The term also includes urban planning services (*i.e.*, land use, site selection and servicing of land for systemic, coordinated urban development) and landscape architectural services. FAQ 1129.

¹⁷ “Engineering services” include assistance, advisory, consultative, design and recommendation services concerning engineering matters or during any phase of an engineering project. Engineering design services may be for: the construction of foundations and building structures (*i.e.*, structural engineering); mechanical and electrical installations for buildings; the construction of civil engineering works; industrial processes and production; or other engineering designs, such as those for acoustics, vibration, traffic control systems, or prototype development for new products. The term additionally includes geotechnical, groundwater and corrosion engineering services; integrated engineering services, such as those for transportation infrastructure or other projects; engineering-related scientific and technical consulting services, including geological, geophysical, geochemical, surface or subsurface surveying and map making services; testing and analysis services of chemical, biological and physical properties of materials or of integrated mechanical and electrical systems; and technical inspection services. FAQ 1128.

¹⁸ OFAC, Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 14071, *Prohibitions Related to Architecture Services and Engineering Services* (May 19, 2023), available [here](#).

¹⁹ The covered metals acquisition services include “warranting services for aluminum, copper, or nickel of Russian Federation origin on a global metal exchange; and services to acquire aluminum, copper, or nickel of Russian Federation origin as part of the physical settlement of a derivative contract.” FAQ 1169.

²⁰ OFAC, Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 14071, *Prohibitions on Certain Services for the Acquisition of Aluminum, Copper, or Nickel of Russian Federation Origin* (Apr. 12, 2024), available [here](#).

²¹ OFAC, Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 14071, *Prohibition on Certain Information Technology and Software Services* (June 12, 2024), available [here](#).

design services²² and (ii) IT support services²³ and cloud-based services²⁴ for the following categories of software: enterprise management software²⁵ and design and manufacturing software.²⁶

- Petroleum services,²⁷ effective as of February 27, 2025, (the “Petroleum Services Determination”).²⁸

²² “IT consultancy and design services” include both IT consulting services and IT design and development services for applications, and which terms are defined consistently with United Nations’ Central Product Classification (CPC) Codes 83131 and 83141, respectively. IT consultancy services include providing advice or expert opinion on technical matters related to the use of information technology, such as: (a) advice on matters such as hardware and software requirements and procurement; (b) systems integration; (c) systems security; and (d) provision of expert testimony on IT-related issues. IT design and development services for applications include services of designing the structure and/or writing the computer code necessary to create and/or implement a software application, such as: (a) designing the structure of a web page and/or writing the computer code necessary to create and implement a web page; (b) designing the structure and content of a database and/or writing the computer code necessary to create and implement a database; (c) designing the structure and writing the computer code necessary to design and develop a custom software application; and (d) customization and integration, adapting (modifying, configuring, etc.) and installing an existing application so that it is functional within the clients’ information system environment. FAQ 1187.

²³ The term “information technology support services” is defined consistently with the United Nations’ Central Product Classification (CPC) Code 83132 to include: (1) providing technical expertise to solve problems for the client in using software, hardware or an entire computer system, such as: (a) providing customer support in using or troubleshooting the software; (b) upgrading services and the provision of patches and updates; (c) providing customer support in using or troubleshooting the computer hardware, including testing and cleaning on a routine basis and repair of IT equipment; (d) technical assistance in moving a client’s computer system to a new location; and (e) providing customer support in using or troubleshooting the computer hardware and software in combination; as well as (2) providing technical expertise to solve specialized problems for the client in using a computer system, such as: (a) auditing or assessing computer operations without providing advice or other follow-up action, including auditing, assessing and documenting a server, network or process for components, capabilities, performance or security; (b) data recovery services, *i.e.*, retrieving a client’s data from a damaged or unstable hard drive or other storage medium, or providing standby computer equipment and duplicate software in a separate location to enable a client to relocate regular staff to resume and maintain routine computerized operations in event of a disaster such as a fire or flood; and (c) other IT technical support services not elsewhere classified. *Id.*

²⁴ Cloud-based services include the delivery of software via the internet or over the cloud, including through Software-as-a-Service (“SaaS”), or SaaS cloud services in relation to such software. *Id.*

²⁵ Enterprise management software means the following types of software: enterprise resource planning, customer relationship management, business intelligence, supply chain management, enterprise data warehouse, computerized maintenance management system, project management and product lifecycle management software. *Id.*

²⁶ Design and manufacturing software means the following types of software: building information modelling, computer-aided design, computer-aided manufacturing and engineer to order software. *Id.*

²⁷ Petroleum services include “services related to the exploration, drilling, well completion, production, refining, processing, storage, maintenance, transportation, purchase, acquisition, testing, inspection, transfer, sale, trade, distribution, or marketing of petroleum, including crude oil and petroleum products, as well as any activities that contribute to Russia’s ability to develop its domestic petroleum resources, or the maintenance or expansion of Russia’s domestic production and refining. This would include services related to natural gas as a byproduct of oil production in Russia.” FAQ 1216.

²⁸ OFAC, Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 14071, *Prohibitions on Petroleum Services* (Jan. 10, 2025), available [here](#).

Notably, for the aforementioned accounting, trust and corporate formation, management consulting, quantum computing, architecture, engineering and IT and software services, these services prohibitions do not apply to: (i) any service to an entity located in Russia that is owned or controlled (directly or indirectly) by a US person; and (ii) any service in connection with the wind down or divestiture of an entity located in Russia that is not owned or controlled (directly or indirectly) by a Russian person. In addition, for these services, OFAC clarified that the prohibitions do not extend to persons located outside of Russia that are owned or controlled by persons located in Russia, provided that the services are not an indirect export to a person located in Russia (i.e., the benefit of the services may not be ultimately received by a person located in Russia); however, such prohibitions do apply to services provided to a parent company in Russia by its US subsidiary.²⁹ The IT and Software Services Determination also does not prohibit any service for software that would be eligible for a license exception or otherwise is authorized for export, reexport or transfer (in-country) to Russia by the Department of Commerce.

The Petroleum Services Determination does not prohibit: (i) transactions related to operations of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, Sakhalin II or Tengizchevroil projects; (ii) any petroleum services related to isotopes derived from petroleum manufacturing that are used for medical, agricultural or environmental purposes, such as Carbon-13; (iii) certain covered services related to the maritime transport of crude oil and petroleum products of Russian Federation origin purchased at or below the relevant price cap; or (iv) any service in connection with the wind down or divestiture of an entity located in the Russian Federation that is not owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a Russian person.³⁰

Russian-Origin Crude Oil and Petroleum Products: To implement a price cap on Russian-origin crude oil³¹ (“Russian oil”) and petroleum products³² (“Russian petroleum”) agreed by the G7 leaders, the EU and Australia,³³ on November 21, 2022, the Secretary of the Treasury issued a determination prohibiting the exportation, reexportation, sale or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by a US person of certain services related to the maritime transportation of Russian oil to any person located in Russia, if the Russian oil is purchased above the

²⁹ FAQs 1059, 1188, 1062 (noting FAQ 1062 does not reference the IT and Software Services Determination, but OFAC has not updated this FAQ since May 19, 2023).

³⁰ OFAC, Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 14071, *Prohibitions on Petroleum Services*, *supra*; General License 124; FAQ 1216.

³¹ “Crude oil” is defined at Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”) subheading 2709.00. See OFAC, *Guidance on Implementation of the Price Cap Policy for Crude Oil and Petroleum Products of Russian Federation Origin* (Feb. 3, 2023, revised Dec. 20, 2023), available [here](#) (the “Price Cap Policy Guidance”).

³² “Petroleum products” is defined at HTSUS subheading 2710. *Id.*

³³ Press Release of the US Department of the Treasury dated June 28, 2022, available [here](#).

price cap.³⁴ The determination took effect on December 5, 2022, and the price cap was set at \$60/barrel.³⁵

In addition, on February 3, 2023, the Secretary of the Treasury issued a determination imposing equivalent prohibitions with respect to Russian petroleum, which took effect on February 5, 2023.³⁶ The price cap was set at \$45/barrel for “Discount to Crude”³⁷ Russian petroleum and at \$100/barrel for “Premium to Crude”³⁸ Russian petroleum.³⁹

OFAC prohibited the following services as they relate to the maritime transport of Russian oil and Russian petroleum sold above the relevant price cap:⁴⁰

- **Trading/commodities brokering:** Buying, selling or trading commodities and/or brokering the sale, purchase or trade of commodities on behalf of other buyers or sellers.
- **Financing:** Providing a commitment for the provision or disbursement of any debt, equity, funds or economic resources, including grants, loans, guarantees, suretyships, bonds, letters of credit, supplier credits, buyer credits and import or export advances.
 - The processing or clearing of payments by an intermediary bank is not considered “financing” for the purposes of this prohibition if the bank: (i) is operating solely as an intermediary; and (ii) does not have any direct relationship with the person providing services related to the maritime transport of the Russian oil or Russian petroleum as it relates to the transaction.
- **Shipping:** Owning or operating a ship for the purpose of carrying or delivering cargo and/or freight transportation; chartering or sub-chartering ships to deliver

³⁴ US Department of the Treasury, Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 14071, *Prohibition on Certain Services as They Relate to the Maritime Transport of Crude Oil of Russian Federation Origin* (Nov. 21, 2022), available [here](#).

³⁵ US Department of the Treasury, Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(ii), 1(b) and 5 of E.O. 14071, *Price Cap on Crude Oil of Russian Federation Origin* (Dec. 5, 2022), available [here](#).

³⁶ US Department of the Treasury, Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 14071, *Prohibition on Certain Services as They Relate to the Maritime Transport of Petroleum Products of Russian Federation Origin* (Feb. 3, 2023), available [here](#).

³⁷ Articles subject to the Discount to Crude price cap include naphtha, residual fuel oil and waste oils. See Price Cap Policy Guidance.

³⁸ Articles subject to the Premium to Crude price cap include gasoline, motor fuel blending stock, gasoil and diesel fuel, kerosene and kerosene-type jet fuel and vacuum gas oil. *Id.*

³⁹ US Department of the Treasury, Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(ii), 1(b) and 5 of E.O. 14071, *Price Cap on Petroleum Products of Russian Federation Origin* (Feb. 3, 2023), available [here](#).

⁴⁰ See Price Cap Policy Guidance.

cargo or transport freight; brokering between shipowners and charterers; and serving as a shipping/vessel agent.

- **Insurance:** Providing insurance, reinsurance or protection and indemnity (“P&I”) services; satisfying claims related to underwriting insurance policies that protect policyholders against losses that may occur as a result of property damage or liability; assuming all or part of the risk associated with existing insurance policies originally underwritten by other insurance carriers, including the reinsurance of a non-US insurance carrier by a US person; and providing liability insurance for maritime liability risks associated with the operation of a vessel, including cargo, hull, vessel, P&I and charterer’s liability.
- **Flagging:** Registering or maintaining the registration of a vessel with a country’s national registry of vessels. This definition does not include the deflagging of vessels transporting Russian oil or Russian petroleum sold above the relevant price cap.
- **Customs brokering:** Assisting importers and exporters in meeting requirements governing imports and exports. This definition does not include legal services or assisting importers and exporters in meeting the requirements of US sanctions.

Shipping, freight, customs and insurance costs are not included in the price caps and must be invoiced separately and at commercially reasonable rates. OFAC has stated that it would view the billing of commercially unreasonable shipping, freight, customs or insurance costs as a sign of potential evasion of the relevant price cap.⁴¹

OFAC provided US service providers with a safe harbor from enforcement so that they can provide covered services without concern that they will be penalized for inadvertently violating US law or regulation, provided that they comply in good faith with a recordkeeping and attestation process. To meet the requirements of the safe harbor, US service providers must ensure that refiners or other purchasers in third countries that have not prohibited the import of Russian oil or Russian petroleum provide documentation showing that the Russian oil or Russian petroleum was purchased at or below the relevant price cap. OFAC published guidance by “tier” of actor describing the diligence each type of actor must undertake to be afforded the safe harbor and updated that guidance on December 20, 2023, to include new expectations for service providers to (i) receive attestations within a specified timeframe for each lifting or loading of Russian oil or Russian petroleum products, and (ii) retain, provide or receive itemized ancillary cost information as required.⁴² US persons may reasonably rely on a certificate of origin

⁴¹ *Id.*

⁴² *Id.*

but should exercise caution if they have reason to believe such certificate has been falsified or is otherwise erroneous.⁴³

Prohibition on Certain Imports and Exports

On March 8, 2022, President Biden signed E.O. 14066 prohibiting the importation into the United States of the following products of “Russian Federation origin”:⁴⁴ crude oil; petroleum; petroleum fuels, oils and products of their distillation; liquefied natural gas; coal; and coal products. The prohibition does not apply to imports that are not of Russian Federation origin, even if such items transit through or depart from the Russian Federation.⁴⁵

Furthermore, on March 11, 2022, President Biden signed E.O. 14068 prohibiting, among other things:

- Imports into the United States of the following products of Russian origin: fish, seafood and preparations thereof; alcoholic beverages; non-industrial diamonds; and any other products of Russian Federation origin as may be determined by the Secretary of the Treasury. On June 28, 2022, gold was added to the list of prohibited Russian-origin goods imports.⁴⁶
- Export, reexport, sale or supply from the United States or by a US person of luxury goods, and any other items as may be determined by the Secretary of Commerce, to any person in Russia. The list of US-origin luxury goods issued by the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) of the US Department of Commerce includes certain spirits, tobacco products, clothing items, jewelry, vehicles and antique goods.⁴⁷
- Export, reexport, sale or supply (directly or indirectly) from the United States or by a US person of US dollar-denominated banknotes to the Russian government or any person in Russia.

On December 22, 2023, President Biden issued E.O. 14114, which, among other things, amended and expanded trade sanctions noted above that target the import of Russian-origin fish, seafood, alcoholic beverages and non-industrial diamonds into

⁴³ *Id.*

⁴⁴ OFAC anticipates publishing regulations defining “Russian Federation origin” as “goods produced, manufactured, extracted, or processed in the Russian Federation, excluding any Russian Federation origin good that has been incorporated or substantially transformed into a foreign-made product.” FAQ 1019.

⁴⁵ FAQ 1020.

⁴⁶ OFAC, Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(i)(A) of E.O. 14068, *Prohibitions Related to Imports of Gold of Russian Federation Origin* (Dec. 22, 2023), available [here](#). This determination made technical, non-substantive changes to a prior version of the determination, dated June 28, 2022, in light of an amendment to E.O. 14068. The prohibition excludes gold of Russian Federation origin that was located outside of the Russian Federation prior to June 28, 2022 (see FAQ 1070).

⁴⁷ For additional information, see “Luxury Products” subsection under “Export Controls” below.

the United States.⁴⁸ Specifically, products that were “mined, extracted, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in Russia, or harvested in Russian waters or by Russia-flagged vessels, notwithstanding whether such products have been incorporated or substantially transformed into other products outside of the Russian Federation” may now be targeted by the restriction. OFAC concurrently issued a new determination identifying salmon, cod, pollock or crab produced wholly or in part in Russia or harvested in waters under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation or by Russia-flagged vessels as subject to this broader restriction.⁴⁹

On February 8, 2024, in coordination with G7 leaders, OFAC published two determinations applying E.O. 14068 prohibitions to certain diamonds:

- Effective March 1, 2024, for diamonds of 1.0 carat weight or greater and September 1, 2024, for diamonds of 0.5 carat weight or greater, the importation and entry into the United States of non-industrial diamonds mined, extracted, produced or manufactured in Russia are prohibited (the “Diamonds Determination”).⁵⁰
- Effective March 1, 2024, the importation and entry into the United States of diamond jewelry and unsorted diamonds of either Russian origin or exported from Russia are prohibited (the “Diamond Jewelry and Unsorted Diamonds Determination”).⁵¹

On April 12, 2024, in coordination with the UK, OFAC published a determination applying E.O. 14068 prohibitions to Russian-origin aluminum, copper and nickel produced on or after April 13, 2024 (the “Metals Import Determination”).⁵²

Any approval, financing, facilitation or guarantee by a US person of a transaction by a foreign person that would be prohibited if performed by a US person or within the United States is also prohibited.⁵³

⁴⁸ Executive Order 14114, “Taking Additional Steps With Respect to the Russian Federation’s Harmful Activities” (Dec. 22, 2023), available [here](#).

⁴⁹ OFAC, Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(i)(B) of E.O. 14068, *Prohibitions Related to Imports of Certain Categories of Fish, Seafood, and Preparations Thereof* (Dec. 22, 2023), available [here](#).

⁵⁰ OFAC, Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(i)(B) of E.O. 14068, *Prohibitions Related to Imports of Certain Categories of Diamonds* (Feb. 8, 2024), available [here](#). See also [FAQ 1165](#) explaining this determination and [FAQ 1027](#) for the definition of non-industrial diamonds.

⁵¹ OFAC, Determination Pursuant to Sections 1(a)(i)(A) and 1(a)(i)(D) of E.O. 14068, *Prohibitions Related to Imports of Diamond Jewelry and Unsorted Diamonds of Russian Federation Origin and Diamond Jewelry and Unsorted Diamonds Exported From the Russian Federation* (Feb. 8, 2024), available [here](#). See also [FAQ 1166](#) explaining this determination; [FAQ 1027](#) for the definition of diamond jewelry; and [FAQ 1019](#) for the definition of Russian Federation origin.

⁵² OFAC, Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(i)(A) of Executive Order 14068, *Prohibitions Related to Imports of Aluminum, Copper, and Nickel of Russian Federation Origin* (Apr. 12, 2024), available [here](#).

⁵³ 87 Fed. Reg. 14381 (Mar. 15, 2022).

Full Blocking Sanctions

E.O. 14024 authorizes blocking sanctions on persons determined to operate or to have operated in the technology and defense and related materiel sectors of the Russian economy and any other sectors as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury.

Treasury has expanded the scope of E.O. 14024⁵⁴ under this provision to cover Russia's financial services sector;⁵⁵ aerospace, marine and electronics sectors;⁵⁶ accounting, trust and corporate formation services and management consulting sectors;⁵⁷ quantum computing sector;⁵⁸ metals and mining sector;⁵⁹ architecture, engineering, construction, manufacturing and transportation sectors;⁶⁰ and energy sector.⁶¹

On November 21, 2024, OFAC issued guidance warning that any FFI that joins or has already joined the Russian financial messaging system Sistema Peredachi Finansovyykh Soobscheniy or "System for Transfer of Financial Messages" ("SPFS") may be designated for operating or having operated in the financial services sector of the Russian economy, and indicating that OFAC views joining SPFS as a red flag and is prepared to more aggressively target FFIs that take such action.⁶²

Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List: OFAC and the US Department of State have imposed full blocking sanctions under E.O. 14024 and other sanctions authorities by placing numerous entities and individuals on OFAC's List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons ("SDN List"). Since February 2022, OFAC has added over 3,800 Russia-related targets to the SDN List. Within a week of Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the United States had sanctioned financial institutions representing over 80% of Russia's banking sector by

⁵⁴ E.O. 14114 also amended E.O. 14024 to, among other things, cover the construction, aerospace or manufacturing sectors of Russia's economy, or other such sectors as may be determined to support Russia's military-industrial base by the Secretary of the Treasury.

⁵⁵ US Department of the Treasury, Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024 (Feb. 22, 2022), available [here](#).

⁵⁶ US Department of the Treasury, Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024 (Mar. 31, 2022), available [here](#).

⁵⁷ OFAC, Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024 (May 8, 2022), available [here](#).

⁵⁸ OFAC, Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024 (Sept. 15, 2022), available [here](#).

⁵⁹ OFAC, Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, *Metals and Mining Sector of the Russian Federation Economy* (Feb. 24, 2023), available [here](#).

⁶⁰ OFAC, Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, *Architecture, Engineering, Construction, Manufacturing, and Transportation Sectors of the Russian Federation Economy* (May 19, 2023), available [here](#).

⁶¹ US Department of the Treasury, Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, *Energy Sector of the Russian Federation Economy* (Jan. 10, 2025), available [here](#). OFAC's Russia-related General License ("GL") 8L, which authorized all transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 involving certain entities that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction related to energy, expired on March 12, 2025.

⁶² See OFAC, *OFAC Alert: Sanctions Risk for Foreign Financial Institutions that Join Russian Financial Messaging System, System for Transfer of Financial Messages* (Nov. 21, 2024), available [here](#).

assets. US blocking sanctions target the top Russian state-owned banks, many securities registrars, state-owned enterprises, political figures, prominent business figures and others. Persons from various third countries connected to Russia's sanctions evasion efforts also have been targeted. Below is a non-exhaustive list of entities and individuals on the SDN List:

Financial Institutions ⁶³	State-Owned Enterprises ⁶⁴	Prominent Business Figures ⁶⁵	Political Figures ⁶⁶	Other
Expobank Joint Stock Company ("Expobank")	Rosoboronexport OAO	Zarakh Iliev	Vladimir Putin (and daughters)	Limited Liability Company Arctic LNG 2
Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Obedinnaya Investitsionnaya Gruppy ("JSC Investment Group")	NPK Tekhmash OAO	Petr Aven	All members of the State Duma	Russian Aerospace Forces
Settlement Non Bank Credit Organization Metallurg ("SNCO Metallurg")	JSC National Aviation Service Company	Mikhail Fridman	Senior Russian defense officials	Russian manufacturing and construction firms
Obshchestvo s Ogranichennoi Otvetstvennostyu Signal Invest ("Signal Invest OOO")	JSC Aerospace Defense Concern Almaz-Antey	German Khan	All members of the Russian Federation Council	Russia-based electronics and technology companies
Public Joint Stock Company Saint Petersburg Exchange ("Saint Petersburg Exchange")	JSC Promising Industrial and Infrastructure Technologies	Alexey Kuzmichev	All members of the Russian Security Council	Entities assisting Russia with completion of key future energy projects and entities engaged in exploratory drilling in Russia
Commercial Bank Absolut Bank PAO ("Absolut Bank PAO")	JSC State Transportation Leasing Company	Vladimir Potanin (and family members)	The Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation	Russia-based investment firm investing in Russia's extractive industries
Blanc Bank Limited Liability Company ("Blanc Bank LLC")	State Corporation Rostec ("Rostec")	Alexey Mordashov (and family members)	Federal Security Service ("FSB") ⁶⁷	Russia's manufacturers of equipment and chemicals for the energy industry
Home Credit & Finance Bank Limited Liability Company ("Home Credit & Finance Bank")	Three state-owned television stations	Alisher Usmanov (and network)	47 Russian governors	Entities operating in Russian metals and mining sector (e.g., OOO Metallurg-Tulamash)
Joint Stock Company Post Bank ("Post Bank")	PJSC Alrosa ("Alrosa")	Sergei Kogogin	Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (and family)	Russian and non-Russian entities importing dual-use technology
Publichnoe Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo	JSC United Shipbuilding Corporation ("United Shipbuilding Corporation")	Gennady Timchenko (and family members)	Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin (and family)	Ten Russian naval entities
	Russian Direct Investment Fund ("RDIF") and its management company (JSC RDIF)	Andrei Melnichenko	Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (and wife and daughter)	
	Tactical Missiles Corporation JSC	Victor Rashnikov	Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Novak	
		Viktor Vekselberg	Deputy Prime Minister Dmitriy Grigorenko	
		Andrei Guriev (and son)		
		Andrei Skoch		
		Suleiman Kerimov (and son)		
		27 Gazprombank board members		
		Aleksandr Valeryevich Dyukov (CEO of Gazprom Neft)		

⁶³ Bank Rossiya was previously designated by OFAC. Bank Rossiya is described in the "EU Sanctions" section as subject to sanctions imposed by the EU.

⁶⁴ UralVagonZavod was previously designated by OFAC. UralVagonZavod is described in the "EU Sanctions" and "UK Sanctions" sections as subject to sanctions imposed by the EU and UK.

⁶⁵ For further information on Russian billionaires who have been sanctioned, see our Russian Billionaires Table at [Annex A](#).

⁶⁶ This chart does not include political figures who have been designated for human rights violations related to the war.

⁶⁷ Re-designated June 28, 2022, pursuant to E.O. 14024.

Financial Institutions ⁶³	State-Owned Enterprises ⁶⁴	Prominent Business Figures ⁶⁵	Political Figures ⁶⁶	Other
Kommercheski Bank Russki Regionalny Bank ("Russki Regionalny Bank")	("Tactical Missiles Corporation")	Vadim Nikolaevich Vorobyev (CEO of Lukoil OAO)	Ministers of Defense, Transport, Economic Development, Construction and Housing	Russian paramilitary groups (e.g., Private Military Company Wagner ("Wagner Group")), Task Force Rusich, Private Military Company Redut)
Joint Stock Company Russian Regional Development Bank ("Russian Regional Development Bank")	Advanced Research Foundation	Vladimir Leonidovich Bogdanov (CEO of Surgutneftegas)	Head of Russian National Guard	Private defense and security firms (e.g., Promtekhlogiya LLC, RSB-Group)
Joint Stock Company Russian Standard Bank ("Russian Standard Bank")	Subsidiaries and entities associated with State Atomic Energy Corporation ("Rosatom")	Vladimir Nikolaevich Chernov (CEO of Bashneft)	Three head prison officials of the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia in connection with the death of Aleksey Navalny	Companies developing, manufacturing or procuring technology for Russian military or defense (e.g., Radioavtomatika, Novostream Limited, AO PKK Milandr, UMATEX)
East West United Bank SA ("East West United Bank")	Limited Liability Company Safedata	Sergei Ivanovich Kudryashov (CEO of Zarubezhneft)	Central Bank of the Russian Federation Governor Elvira Naibullina, First Deputy Governor Olga Skorobogatova and 11 other Central Bank of the Russian Federation officials	Russian financial technocrats (e.g., CEO of the National Payment Card System JSC ("NSPK"))
Joint Stock Commercial Bank Ak Bars PJSC ("Ak Bars Bank")	JSC Foreign Economic Association Almazyuvelirexport	Nail Ulfatovich Maganov (General Director of Tatneft)	Leading officials at the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation	Nord Stream 2 AG (halted pipeline)
Obshchestvo s Ogranichennoi Otvetstvennostyu Kommercheski Bank Sinko Bank ("Sinko Bank")	National Payment Card System Joint Stock Company ("NSPK"), operator of the Mir National Payment System			Eight Russian maritime-related companies
Joint Stock Company Locko Bank ("Locko Bank")	Joint Stock Company Sovcomflot ("Sovcomflot") and 83 tankers			Crypto services provider Bitriver AG
Joint Stock Company Petersburg Social Commercial Bank ("Petersburg SC Bank")	Rossiia Segodnya			Over 200 entities and individuals that have assisted Russia in evading sanctions
Joint Stock Company Commercial Bank Solidarnost ("Solidarnost")	Gazprom Neft			Railway operator OOO Transoil and rolling stock manufacturer Transmashholding JSC
JSC Tinkoff Bank ("Tinkoff Bank")				Seven Russian media outlets and websites
Unistream Commercial Bank JSC ("Unistream Bank")				Over 100 Russian defense and defense-related entities (including aerospace)
Bank Zenit PJSC ("Bank Zenit")				Third-country suppliers and manufacturers of military or defense-related goods and services
PJSC Bank Uralsib ("Bank Uralsib")				Foreign Intelligence Service
PJSC Ural Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("UBRD")				
SDM-Bank PJSC				
JS Commercial Bank Primorye				
Bank Saint-Petersburg PJSC ("Bank Saint-Petersburg")				

Financial Institutions ⁶³	State-Owned Enterprises ⁶⁴	Prominent Business Figures ⁶⁵	Political Figures ⁶⁶	Other
Novosibirsk Social Commercial Bank Levoberezhny PJSC PJSC MTS Bank ("MTS Bank") PJSC Commercial Bank Metallurgical Investment Bank ("Metallinvest Bank") JSC Commercial Bank Lanta Bank Credit Bank of Moscow PJSC ("Credit Bank of Moscow") PJSC Rosbank ("Rosbank") JSC Moscow Industrial Bank ("Moscow Industrial Bank") PJSC Transkapitalbank ("TKB") Public Joint Stock Company Sberbank of Russia ("Sberbank") Alfa-Bank JSC ("Alfa-Bank") SMP Bank VTB Bank PJSC ("VTB") PJSC Bank Financial Corporation Otkritie ("Otkritie") OJSC Sovcombank ("Sovcombank") JS Commercial Bank Novikombank ("Novikombank") Vnesheconombank ("VEB") Promsvyazbank ("PSB") Moscow Exchange ("MOEX") National Clearing Center ("NCC") Non-Bank Credit Institution Joint Stock Company National Settlement Depository ("NSD") Gas Industry Insurance Company ("Sogaz") Joint Stock Company Russian National				International Investment Bank ("IIB") and related entities Russian energy-related educational research institutions (e.g., Federal State Budget Educational Institution of Higher Education Saint-Petersburg Mining University, Gazprom VNIIGAZ, OOO) Russian drilling and mining equipment companies (e.g., Gazpromneft NNGGF, Mashoil LLC) Investment firms in Russia's energy sector (e.g., UT IT Novaya Industriya OOO) Transport logistics and cargo transportation providers (e.g., JSC SUEK) Metal manufacturers, including Russia's top steel producer, Publichnoe Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Mechel Financial technology companies (e.g., Centre of Financial Technologies Group and Diasoft Ltd) RT (formerly "Russia Today") executives and employees Federal State Budgetary Institution Marine Rescue Service Surgutneftegas 183 vessels engaged in the Russian oil trade, largely tankers that are part of Russia's so-called "shadow fleet"

Financial Institutions ⁶³	State-Owned Enterprises ⁶⁴	Prominent Business Figures ⁶⁵	Political Figures ⁶⁶	Other
Reinsurance Company ("RNRC") Russian Financial Corporation Bank JSC Timer Bank, AO TSMRBank, OOO Gazprombank JSC ("Gazprombank") Joint Stock Company Bank Dom RF Surgutneftegasbank Keremet Bank OJSC				

Additionally, all entities that are owned 50% or more (directly or indirectly) by any of these entities or individuals are subject to blocking, even if not identified by OFAC.⁶⁸

Generally, US persons are prohibited from any dealings with, and are required to block and freeze the assets of, persons placed on the SDN List and any entities that are owned (directly or indirectly) 50% or more by such persons. These restrictions also prohibit making any contribution or provision of funds, goods or services by, to or for the benefit of any blocked person and receiving any contribution or provision of funds, goods or services from any such person.

US persons may not buy, sell or otherwise engage in transactions related to debt or equity of persons placed on the SDN List or entities owned 50% or more by such persons and must block such holdings unless exempted or otherwise authorized by OFAC. However, a US fund that contains such blocked holdings generally is not itself considered a blocked entity as long as the blocked holdings represent less than a 50% share by value of the fund. As a result, US persons may continue to invest in the fund, and the fund may continue to operate (subject to compliance with other sanctions measures, such as the restrictions on new investment in Russia). The fund may divest itself of blocked holdings to the extent authorized by OFAC.⁶⁹

Secondary Sanctions

The United States has authority to apply "secondary sanctions" on non-US persons that have "materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of" persons blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024 or certain activities for or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, the Russian government (including malicious cyber-enabled activities, interference in a US or other foreign government election, actions or policies that undermine

⁶⁸ This is the so-called "50% Rule," which states that the property and interests in property of entities directly or indirectly owned 50% or more in the aggregate by one or more blocked persons are considered blocked.

⁶⁹ FAQ 982.

democratic processes or institutions and other specified malign activities).⁷⁰ As a general matter, secondary sanctions do not impose direct compliance obligations but instead seek to discourage non-US persons from engaging in targeted activities by threatening the imposition of certain penalties.

As amended by E.O. 14114, E.O. 14024 subjects FFIs that engage in certain activities involving Russia's military-industrial base to heightened secondary sanctions risks, including in relation to expanded restrictions on certain Russian goods imports. Specifically, under the new authorities, an FFI may be targeted by secondary sanctions if US authorities determine that the FFI has:

- conducted or facilitated a "significant" transaction for or on behalf of a person already targeted by US blocking sanctions for operating or having operated in the technology, defense and related materiel, construction, aerospace or manufacturing sectors of the Russian Federation economy (or other sectors determined in the future to support Russia's military-industrial base); or
- (i) conducted or facilitated a "significant" transaction or (ii) provided any service involving Russia's military-industrial base, including the sale to Russia, directly or indirectly, of items specified in a related determination, including items related to Russia's production of advanced precision-guided weapons and other critical items.⁷¹

While the transactions covered in the first prong were already targeted by the provisions of the existing executive orders aimed at preventing transactions with designated parties, the second prong is new and particularly broad because it exposes FFIs to sanctions risks based on the facilitation of transactions with unsanctioned parties. Such transactions may not be identified through screening for transactions involving entities included on OFAC's SDN List.

Moreover, the new authorities authorize the imposition of secondary sanctions on an FFI not only for direct support to Russia's military-industrial base, which is defined broadly to include any person blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024, and dealings with sanctioned Russian clients, but also for indirect touchpoints, such as facilitating a non-Russian customer's dealings or providing services to a non-Russian customer in furtherance of a transaction related to Russia's military-industrial base, including for transactions in currencies other than US dollars.⁷² E.O. 14114 authorizes the imposition of full blocking sanctions, as well as correspondent account or payable-

⁷⁰ E.O. 14024 section 1(a)(vi).

⁷¹ OFAC, Determination Pursuant to Section 11(a)(ii) of Executive Order 14024 (Dec. 22, 2023), [available here](#) (listing certain machine tools and manufacturing equipment; manufacturing materials for semiconductors and related electronics; electronic test equipment; propellants, chemical precursors for propellants and explosives; lubricants and lubricant additives; bearings; advanced optical systems; and navigation instruments); FAQ 1150.

⁷² FAQ 1152.

through account (so-called “CAPTA”) sanctions, which would prohibit US financial institutions from providing correspondent account services to a targeted FFI, effectively cutting that FFI out of participation (as originator, beneficiary or intermediary) in any USD funds transfers.

OFAC provides guidance for several of the key terms used in E.O. 14114, generally following definitions used for earlier Russia-focused secondary sanctions (*e.g.*, Section 228 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (“CAATSA”)): ⁷³

- “Russia’s military-industrial base” includes (but is not limited to) “all persons blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024, as well as any person operating in the technology, defense and related materiel, construction, aerospace and manufacturing sectors of the Russian Federation economy (and other sectors as may be determined pursuant to E.O. 14024)” and may also include “individuals and entities that support the sale, supply, or transfer of critical items identified in determinations pursuant to subsection 11(a)(ii) of E.O. 14024.”
- A “significant transaction or transactions” will, in general, be considered in light of “(a) the size, number and frequency of the transaction(s); (b) the nature of the transaction(s); (c) the level of awareness of management and whether the transactions are part of a pattern of conduct; (d) the nexus of the transaction(s) to persons sanctioned pursuant to E.O. 14024, or to persons operating in Russia’s military-industrial base; (e) whether the transaction(s) involve deceptive practices; (f) the impact of the transaction(s) on US national security objectives; and (g) such other relevant factors that OFAC deems relevant.”

OFAC further provides related guidance for FFIs, as updated on June 12, 2024, to address, *inter alia*, the revised definition of “Russia’s military-industrial base” to include all persons blocked under E.O. 14024 (the “Updated Sanctions Advisory”). The Updated Sanctions Advisory contains examples of activities that could expose FFIs to sanctions risk, as well as recommendations for developing and maintaining a risk-based sanctions compliance program. ⁷⁴ Because the secondary sanctions risks under E.O. 14114 are not limited to those FFIs that “knowingly” engage in the significant transactions covered by the executive order, the Updated Sanctions Advisory also outlines several recommendations that FFIs should follow to identify their exposure to activity involving Russia’s military-industrial base and to mitigate related risk.

At the end of the Biden Administration in January 2025, OFAC designated or re-designated under E.O. 13662 hundreds of Russian individuals and entities, including nearly 100 major entities across Russia’s financial services, energy and defense and

⁷³ FAQ 1151.

⁷⁴ OFAC Sanctions Advisory, “Updated Guidance for Foreign Financial Institutions on OFAC Sanctions Authorities Targeting Support to Russia’s Military-Industrial Base” (June 12, 2024), available [here](#).

related material sectors that were already designated pursuant to E.O. 14024. Non-US persons, including FFIs, that knowingly facilitate significant transactions for or on behalf of individuals or entities designated under E.O. 13662 could be subject to certain mandatory secondary sanctions. Specifically, under Section 226 of CAATSA and implementing regulations, CAPTA sanctions are required to be imposed on an FFI determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to knowingly facilitate a significant transaction on behalf of any Russian person included on OFAC's SDN List under certain authorities, including E.O. 13662. In addition, Section 228 of CAATSA and implementing regulations require blocking sanctions to be imposed on any foreign person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to knowingly (i) materially violate, attempt to violate, conspire to violate or cause a violation of any license, order, regulation or prohibition contained in or issued pursuant to certain authorities, including E.O. 13662; or (ii) facilitate a significant transaction or transactions for or on behalf of persons subject to sanctions imposed by the United States with respect to the Russian Federation under certain authorities, including E.O. 13662, or their child, spouse, parent or sibling.⁷⁵

In order to waive or terminate sanctions imposed on a person designated pursuant to E.O. 13662, CAATSA requires the President to submit a report for Congressional review describing the proposed action and the reasons for it. The President may not take the proposed action during a Congressional review period of at least 30 days, or until Congress passes a joint resolution of approval, and may also be prohibited from taking action if Congress passes a joint resolution of disapproval.

Expanded Secondary Sanctions Related to Trade in Russian Gold: The Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act ("NDAA"), enacted December 23, 2022, includes provisions directing the President to impose sanctions related to trade in Russian gold.

Specifically, Section 5590 of the NDAA requires that the President submit periodic reports to Congress identifying foreign persons that knowingly participated in a significant transaction for the sale, supply or transfer (including transportation) of gold, directly or indirectly, to or from (i) Russia or (ii) the government of Russia, including from reserves of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation held outside of Russia. The reports must also identify foreign persons who knowingly participated in a significant transaction that otherwise involved gold in which the Russian government had any interest.

The President is authorized to impose blocking sanctions, and may impose visa sanctions, against those persons identified in the reports.

⁷⁵ See FAQs 541-546, 574.

Prohibition on Transactions with the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, Sovereign Debt and NSD

Directive 4 under E.O. 14024, “Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation,” prohibits US persons from engaging in any transaction involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation or the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation (“Directive 4 Entities”), including any transfer of assets to such entities or any foreign exchange transaction for or on behalf of such entities.⁷⁶

Because the directive’s prohibition covers direct and indirect involvement of the Directive 4 Entities,⁷⁷ OFAC has urged US persons to be cautious of nonroutine foreign exchange transactions that may indirectly involve Directive 4 Entities. OFAC also noted that US persons should exercise caution in engaging in foreign exchange transactions on MOEX given the heightened risk that the Central Bank of the Russian Federation could be a counterparty to such transactions.⁷⁸ Following the subsequent imposition of June 2024 blocking sanctions on MOEX pursuant to E.O. 14024, US persons can no longer engage in any transactions on MOEX, absent an OFAC license.

OFAC clarified that its “50% Rule” does not apply to this directive⁷⁹ and that US persons are not required to block transactions involving Directive 4 Entities but must only reject such transactions.⁸⁰

Effective May 19, 2023, Directive 4 imposes a reporting requirement on US persons in possession or control of property in which any of the Directive 4 Entities has a direct or indirect interest. Reporting to OFAC is required by June 30 every year.

Directive 1A, “Prohibitions Related to Certain Sovereign Debt of the Russian Federation” (the “Russia-related Sovereign Debt Directive”), prohibits US financial institutions from participating in the secondary market for bonds issued after March 1, 2022, by the Directive 4 Entities (prohibitions on participation in primary market and lending had been introduced earlier).⁸¹ Subsequently, the new

⁷⁶ OFAC, Directive 4 (as amended) under Executive Order 14024, *Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation* (May 19, 2023), available [here](#). A prior version of this Directive, which was issued on February 28, 2022, is superseded by this version.

⁷⁷ FAQ 998.

⁷⁸ FAQ 981, 1002.

⁷⁹ FAQ 1001.

⁸⁰ FAQ 1004.

⁸¹ OFAC, Directive 1A under Executive Order 14024, *Prohibitions Related to Certain Sovereign Debt of the Russian Federation* (February 22, 2022), available [here](#). A prior version of this Directive, which was issued on April 15, 2021 and which is replaced and superseded by this version, prohibited the same activities with respect to participation in the primary market for ruble or non-ruble denominated bonds issued after June

investment prohibition of E.O. 14071 prohibited US persons from purchasing debt and equity securities issued by any entity in Russia, including bonds issued by Directive 4 Entities. Entities determined to be subject to the prohibitions of Directive 1A or Directive 4 are listed on OFAC's Non-SDN Menu-Based Sanctions List.

Further, June 2024 blocking sanctions imposed on MOEX, NCC and NSD pursuant to E.O. 14024 prohibit US persons from selling or divesting debt and equity securities if such transactions involve MOEX, NCC or NSD, or any entity in which one of these entities owns, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50% or greater interest. These designations, among other impacts, effectively required US persons to block the securities held through NSD upon expiration of OFAC general licenses authorizing certain wind-down and divestment transactions. On October 2, 2024, the President of the Russian Federation enacted Decree No. 840, which required the transfer of shares held by foreign investors from "hostile states" from their local custodians' accounts at NSD to accounts for such custodians opened directly with the Russian issuers' local registrars by October 12, 2024, the expiration date of OFAC's general licenses.⁸² OFAC, in response, issued and subsequently updated FAQ 1197, which describes Decree No. 840 as an attempt to evade or avoid OFAC sanctions. The FAQ cautions US persons that transfers pursuant to Decree No. 840 may be considered null and void pursuant to OFAC's regulations and may involve other blocked persons, including more than 40 local Russian registrars designated by OFAC pursuant to E.O. 14024. OFAC indicated further that US persons should continue to treat securities transferred from NSD pursuant to Decree No. 840, as well as securities in the possession or control of SDN Russian registrars (and any dividends or income received via NSD or SDN Russian registrars), as blocked.

Correspondent and Payable-Through Account Sanctions on Sberbank

Prior to the imposition of full blocking sanctions on Sberbank and its subsidiaries on April 6, 2022, OFAC imposed restrictions on Sberbank and 25 FFI subsidiaries that are 50% or more owned, directly or indirectly, by Sberbank pursuant to Directive 2 under E.O. 14024.

14, 2021 by the entities determined to be subject to the Directive, and with respect to lending ruble or non-ruble denominated funds to the entities determined to be subject to the Directive.

⁸² See Debevoise Update, "NSD's Removal from Russian Custody Infrastructure: Sanctions Implications" (Oct. 23, 2024), available [here](#).

Directive 2, “Prohibitions Related to Correspondent or Payable-Through Accounts and Processing of Transactions Involving Certain Foreign Financial Institutions,”⁸³ prohibits US financial institutions⁸⁴ from:

- opening or maintaining a correspondent account⁸⁵ or payable-through account⁸⁶ for or on behalf of FFIs determined to be subject to the prohibitions of the directive, or their property or interests in property; and
- processing a transaction involving such FFIs or their property or interests in property.

OFAC clarified that the prohibitions of Directive 2 apply with respect to any currency, not just transactions denominated in US dollars.⁸⁷

For FFIs determined to be subject to Directive 2, the prohibitions of the directive would take effect 30 days after the date of such determination. Entities determined to be subject to the prohibitions of this directive will be listed on OFAC’s CAPTA List.

Debt and Equity Prohibitions

Prior to the implementation of the new investment prohibition under E.O. 14071, which by its broad mandate covers transactions under Directive 3, and subsequent blocking sanctions imposed on MOEX, NCC and NSD, Directive 3 prohibited US persons and persons within the United States from all transactions in, provision of financing for and other dealings in: (i) new debt of longer than 14 days’ maturity; and (ii) new equity, in each case of entities determined to be subject to the prohibitions of the directive or their property or interests in property and entities owned 50% or more owned by them, and irrespective of currency denomination.⁸⁸

OFAC determined 13 entities were subject to the prohibitions under Directive 3, some of which (*i.e.*, Sberbank, Alfa-Bank, Alrosa, Credit Bank of Moscow,

⁸³ OFAC, Directive 2 under Executive Order 14024, *Prohibitions Related to Correspondent or Payable-Through Accounts and Processing of Transactions Involving Certain Foreign Financial Institutions* (February 24, 2022), available [here](#).

⁸⁴ The prohibition only applies to US financial institutions and does not apply to foreign subsidiaries of US financial institutions (*see* FAQ 972). US individuals and companies that are not “US financial institutions” can process transactions involving FFIs subject to the directive. *See* FAQ 973.

⁸⁵ Directive 2 defines “correspondent account” as “an account established by a US financial institution for [an FFI] to receive deposits from, or to make payments on behalf of, the [FFI], or to handle other financial transactions related to such [FFI].”

⁸⁶ The term “payable-through account” is defined as “a correspondent account maintained by a US financial institution for [an FFI] by means of which the [FFI] permits its customers to engage, either directly or through a subaccount, in banking activities usual in connection with the business of banking in the United States.”

⁸⁷ FAQ 971.

⁸⁸ OFAC, Directive 3 under Executive Order 14024, *Prohibitions Related to New Debt and Equity of Certain Russia-related Entities* (February 24, 2022), available [here](#).

Sovcomflot, Gazprombank and Gazprom Neft) later became subject to full blocking sanctions.⁸⁹ Prohibitions took effect on March 26, 2022, for these entities and their 50% or more owned subsidiaries.⁹⁰

For any entity later determined to be subject to Directive 3, the prohibitions of the directive would take effect 30 days after the date of such determination. Entities determined to be subject to the prohibitions of this directive will be listed on OFAC's Non-SDN Menu-Based Sanctions List.

Prohibition on Russian-Affiliated Vessels Entering US Ports

On April 22, 2022, President Biden issued Proclamation 10371 prohibiting Russian-affiliated vessels from entering into US ports.⁹¹ "Russian-affiliated vessels" means: (i) vessels of Russian registry (*i.e.*, the vessel is Russian flagged); (ii) vessels that are Russian owned (*i.e.*, the legal title of ownership of the vessel that appears on the ship's registration documents is the government of the Russian Federation or a Russian company, citizen, or permanent resident); or (iii) vessels that are Russian operated (*i.e.*, a Russian company, citizen or permanent resident is responsible for the commercial decisions concerning the employment of a ship and decides how and where that asset is employed).

The prohibition does not apply in two scenarios:

- Russian-affiliated vessels used in the transport of source material,⁹² special nuclear material⁹³ and nuclear byproduct material⁹⁴ for which, and for such time as, the Secretary of Energy determines that no viable source of supply is available that would not require transport by Russian-affiliated vessels; and
- Russian-affiliated vessels requesting only to enter US ports due to force majeure, solely to allow seafarers of any nationality to disembark or embark for purposes of conducting crew changes, emergency medical care or for other humanitarian need.

⁸⁹ The entities determined to be subject to Directive 3 were PJSC Sberbank, JSC Alfa-Bank, PJSC Alrosa, Credit Bank of Moscow PJSC, Gazprombank JSC, JSC Russian Agricultural Bank, PJSC Gazprom, PJSC Gazprom Neft, OJSC Russian Railways, PJSC Transneft, PJSC Rostelecom, PJSC RusHydro and JSC Sovcomflot.

⁹⁰ Subsequently, and as noted above, the new investment prohibition of E.O. 14071 prohibited US persons from purchasing debt and equity securities issued by any entity in Russia, including securities issued by Directive 3 entities.

⁹¹ 87 Fed. Reg. 24265 (Apr. 22, 2022).

⁹² The term "source material" has the same meaning given to that term in section 11(z) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) ([42 U.S.C. 2014\(z\)](#)).

⁹³ The term "special nuclear material" has the same meaning given to that term in section 11(aa) of the AEA ([42 U.S.C. 2014\(aa\)](#)).

⁹⁴ The term "byproduct material" has the same meaning given to that term in section 11(e) of the AEA ([42 U.S.C. 2014\(e\)](#)).

The prohibition went into effect on April 28, 2022.

General Licenses

For the purpose of minimizing unintended consequences on third parties, OFAC issued a number of GLs in connection with the foregoing actions. Below is a list of GLs in effect as of the publication date of this document.

GL 1B: Activities Involving Federal State Budgetary Institution Marine Rescue Service⁹⁵

GL 1B authorizes all transactions prohibited by E.O. 14039, E.O. 14024 or the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act of 2019, 22 U.S.C. 9526 note, as amended, involving Federal State Budgetary Institution Marine Rescue Service ("MRS"), or any entity in which MRS owns, directly or indirectly, a 50% or greater interest, that are not related to the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, the TurkStream pipeline project or any project that is a successor to either such project.

GL 1B does not authorize any transactions or activities with any vessels identified on OFAC's SDN List as blocked property of MRS, including vessels identified as blocked property of any entity in which MRS owns, directly or indirectly, a 50% or greater interest.⁹⁶

GL 2: Servicing Transactions Involving VEB

GL 2 authorizes all transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 involving VEB and its subsidiaries that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the servicing of bonds issued before March 1, 2022, by the Directive 4 Entities.

GL 6D: Transactions Related to Agricultural Commodities, Medicine, Medical Devices, the COVID-19 Pandemic or Clinical Trials⁹⁷

GL 6D authorizes transactions related to (1) the production, manufacturing, sale, transport or provision of agricultural commodities,⁹⁸ agricultural equipment, medicine,⁹⁹ medical devices,¹⁰⁰ replacement parts and components for medical devices or software updates for medical devices; (2) the prevention, diagnosis or treatment of COVID-19 (including research or clinical studies relating to COVID-19); or (3) clinical trials and other medical research activities.

⁹⁵ Effective December 18, 2024, GL 1B replaces and supersedes GL 1A, issued August 20, 2021.

⁹⁶ See OFAC FAQ 894.

⁹⁷ Effective June 12, 2024, GL 6D replaces and supersedes GL 6C, issued January 17, 2023.

⁹⁸ Agricultural commodities are products that fall within the term "agricultural commodity" as defined in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602) and are intended for use as: (i) food for humans (including raw, processed and packaged foods; live animals; vitamins and minerals; food additives or supplements; and bottled drinking water) or animals (including animal feeds); (ii) seeds for food crops; (iii) fertilizers or organic fertilizers; or (iv) reproductive materials (such as live animals, fertilized eggs, embryos and semen) for the production of food animals.

⁹⁹ Medicine is an item that falls within the definition of the term "drug" in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

¹⁰⁰ A medical device is an item that falls within the definition of "device" in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.

GL 6D authorizes certain services that would otherwise be prohibited under the determination of May 8, 2022, made pursuant to E.O. 14071, which prohibited certain accounting, trust and corporate formation and management consulting services, or the IT and Software Services Determination.

OFAC clarified that, for a US financial institution to engage in transactions authorized under GL 6D, all funds transfers must be processed indirectly through a non-sanctioned, non-US financial institution.¹⁰¹

GL 7A: Transactions Related to Overflight and Emergency Landings¹⁰²

GL 7A authorizes transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to: (i) the receipt of, and payment of charges for, services rendered in connection with overflights of the Russian Federation or emergency landings in the Russian Federation by aircraft registered in the United States or owned or controlled by, or chartered to, US persons; and (ii) provide air ambulance and related medical services, including medical evacuation, to individuals in the Russian Federation.

OFAC clarified that, for a US financial institution to engage in transactions authorized under GL 7A, all funds transfers must be processed indirectly through a non-sanctioned, non-US financial institution.¹⁰³

GL 13N: Certain Administrative Transactions Prohibited by Directive 4¹⁰⁴

GL 13N authorizes US persons or entities owned or controlled (directly or indirectly) by a US person, through 12:01 a.m. EDT on October 9, 2025, to pay taxes, fees or import duties, and purchase or receive permits, licenses, registrations, certifications or tax refunds, to the extent such transactions are prohibited by Directive 4, provided such transactions are ordinarily incident and necessary to such persons' day-to-day operations in the Russian Federation.

GL 13N does not authorize transactions that involve the payment of "exit tax," which the Russian government may require prior to the divestment of assets located in the Russian Federation.¹⁰⁵

GL 14: Clearing and Settlement Transactions Prohibited by Directive 4

GL 14 authorizes all transactions prohibited by Directive 4 involving the Directive 4 Entities, where the Directive 4 Entity's sole function in the transaction is to act as an operator of a clearing and settlement system, provided that: (i) there is no transfer of assets to or from any Directive 4 Entity, unless separately authorized; and (ii) no

¹⁰¹ FAQ 978. Throughout this document, we refer to the most recent versions of GLs that have been amended, even if the FAQs have not yet been updated to reflect the new GL number.

¹⁰² Effective May 5, 2022, GL 7A replaces and supersedes GL 7, issued February 24, 2022.

¹⁰³ FAQ 978.

¹⁰⁴ Effective July 8, 2025, GL 13N replaces and supersedes GL 13M issued April 7, 2025.

¹⁰⁵ FAQ 1118.

Directive 4 Entity is either a counterparty or a beneficiary to the transaction (unless separately authorized).

GL 18: Transactions Related to US Dollar-Denominated Banknote Noncommercial, Personal Remittances Prohibited by E.O. 14068

GL 18 authorizes all transactions prohibited by E.O. 14068 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the transfer of US dollar-denominated banknote noncommercial, personal remittances¹⁰⁶ from: (i) the United States or a US person, wherever located, to an individual located in the Russian Federation; or (ii) a US person who is an individual located in the Russian Federation. Noncommercial, personal remittances do not include charitable donations to or for the benefit of an entity or funds transfers for use in supporting or operating a business, including a family-owned business.

Transferring institutions may rely on the originator of a funds transfer with regard to compliance with GL 18, provided that the transferring institution does not know or have reason to know that the funds transfer is not in compliance with GL 18.

GL 19: Transactions Related to Personal Maintenance of US Individuals Located in the Russian Federation Prohibited by E.O. 14068

GL 19 authorizes individuals who are US persons located in the Russian Federation to engage in all transactions prohibited by E.O. 14068 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to their personal maintenance within the Russian Federation, including payment of housing expenses, acquisition of goods or services for personal use, payment of taxes or fees and purchase or receipt of permits, licenses or public utility services.

GL 20: Third-Country Diplomatic and Consular Funds Transfers

GL 20 authorizes US persons to engage in all transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the official business of third-country diplomatic or consular missions located in Russia that are prohibited by E.O. 14024 or section 1(a)(iv) of E.O. 14068.

GL 25G: Transactions Related to Telecommunications and Certain Internet-Based Communications¹⁰⁷

GL 25G authorizes all transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the receipt or transmission of telecommunications involving the Russian Federation. In addition, the exportation or reexportation, sale or supply (directly or indirectly) from the United States or by US persons (wherever located) to the Russian Federation of services incident to the exchange of communications over the internet (e.g., chat and email, social networking, sharing of photos and movies, web browsing, blogging, social media platforms, collaboration platforms, video conferencing, e-

¹⁰⁶ Noncommercial, personal remittances do not include charitable donations to or for the benefit of an entity or funds transfers for use in supporting or operating a business, including a family-owned business.

¹⁰⁷ Effective October 30, 2024, GL 25G replaces and supersedes GL 25F, dated September 13, 2024.

gaming, e-learning platforms, automated translation, web maps, user authentication services, web hosting and domain name registration services) is authorized.

GL 25G also authorizes software, hardware or technology exportation or reexportation, sale or supply (directly or indirectly) from the United States or by US persons to the Russian Federation of software, hardware or technology incident to the exchange of communications over the internet, provided that the exportation, reexportation, sale or supply to the Russian Federation of such software, hardware or technology is licensed or otherwise authorized by the Department of Commerce pursuant to the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) if the software, hardware or technology is subject to the EAR or, if the software, hardware or technology is not subject to the EAR, would be eligible for a license exception or otherwise authorized by the Department of Commerce if it were subject to the EAR.

OFAC clarified that GL 25G does not authorize any transactions involving JSC Channel One Russia, JSC NTV Broadcasting Company, Television Station Russia-1, LLC Algoritm, New Eastern Outlook, Oriental Review, Garantex Europe OU, Autonomous Non-Profit Organization Dialog, Autonomous Non-Profit Organization Dialog Regions, Federal State Unitary Enterprise International Information Agency Rossiya Segodnya, Autonomous Non Profit Organization TV Novosti, XH Smart Tech China Co Ltd or CJSC Perspective Technologies Agency, unless separately authorized.

GL 27: Certain Transactions in Support of Nongovernmental Organizations’ Activities

GL 27 authorizes all transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to certain activities¹⁰⁸ by nongovernmental organizations, provided that the only involvement of blocked persons is the processing of funds by financial institutions blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024.

GL 31: Transactions Related to Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights

GL 31 authorizes the following transactions in connection with a patent, trademark, copyright or other form of intellectual property protection (“IP protection”) in the United States or Russia: (i) the filing and prosecution of any application to obtain IP

¹⁰⁸ The authorized activities are those that: (1) support humanitarian projects to meet basic human needs in Ukraine or Russia, including drought and flood relief; food, nutrition and medicine distribution; the provision of health services; assistance for vulnerable or displaced populations, including individuals with disabilities and the elderly; and environmental programs; (2) support democracy building in Ukraine or Russia, including activities to support rule of law, citizen participation, government accountability and transparency, human rights and fundamental freedoms, access to information and civil society development projects; (3) support education in Ukraine or Russia, including combating illiteracy, increasing access to education, international exchanges and assisting education reform projects; (4) support non-commercial development projects directly benefiting the people of Ukraine or Russia, including those related to health, food security and water and sanitation; and (5) support environmental and natural resource protection in Ukraine or Russia, including the preservation and protection of threatened or endangered species, responsible and transparent management of natural resources and the remediation of pollution or other environmental damage.

protection; (ii) the receipt of IP protection; (iii) the renewal or maintenance of IP protection; and (iv) the filing and prosecution of any opposition or infringement proceeding with respect to IP protection or the entrance of a defense to any such proceeding.

GL 38A: Transactions Related to Pension Payments¹⁰⁹

GL 38A authorizes all transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the processing of pension payments to: (i) US persons; or (ii) non-US persons not located in Russia that are prohibited by E.O. 14024, provided that the only involvement of blocked persons is the processing of funds by financial institutions blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024.

GL 40C: Transactions Related to Civil Aviation Safety¹¹⁰

GL 40C authorizes all transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the provision, exportation or reexportation of goods, technology or services to ensure the safety of civil aviation involving one or more of the blocked entities listed in the annex to GL 40C and that are prohibited by E.O. 14024.

However, the aircraft must be registered in a jurisdiction solely outside of the Russian Federation and the goods, technology or services that are provided, exported or reexported must be for use on aircraft operated solely for civil aviation purposes.

GL 42: Transactions with the Federal Security Service

GL 42 authorizes all transactions involving the FSB prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary for: (1) requesting, receiving, utilizing, paying for or dealing in licenses, permits, certifications or notifications issued or registered by the FSB for the importation, distribution or use of information technology products in the Russian Federation, provided that (i) the exportation, reexportation or provision of any goods or technology that are subject to the EAR is licensed or otherwise authorized by the Department of Commerce, and (ii) the payment of any fees to the FSB for such licenses, permits, certifications or notifications does not exceed \$5,000 in any calendar year; (2) complying with law enforcement or administrative actions or investigations involving the FSB; and (3) complying with rules and regulations administered by the FSB.

GL 44: Export or Reexport of Certain Accounting Services to US Individuals in Russia

GL 44 authorizes all transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the exportation, reexportation, sale or supply (directly or indirectly) from the United States or by a US person of tax preparation or filing services to any individual who is a US person located in the Russian Federation.

¹⁰⁹ Effective August 19, 2022, GL 38A replaces and supersedes GL38, issued June 2, 2022.

¹¹⁰ Effective November 14, 2022, GL 40C replaces and supersedes GL40B, issued August 3, 2022.

GL 46: Transactions in Support of an Auction Process to Settle Certain Credit Derivative Transactions Prohibited by the New Investment Prohibition

GL 46 authorizes all transactions related to the establishment, administration, participation in and execution of an auction process as announced by the EMEA Credit Derivatives Determination Committee to settle credit derivative transactions with a reference entity of “the Russian Federation” and prohibited by the new investment prohibition in E.O. 14071.

The purchase or receipt of debt obligations of the Russian Federation by US persons is authorized for the period beginning two business days prior to the announced date of the auction and ending eight business days after the conclusion of the auction. All transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to facilitating, clearing and settling transactions authorized under this license are also authorized.

GL 50: Closing of Individual Accounts at Blocked Financial Institutions

GL 50 authorizes all transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to (i) the closing of an account of an individual (wherever located) who is not a blocked person (the “account holder”), held at a financial institution blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024 and (ii) the unblocking and lump sum transfer of all remaining funds and other assets in the account to the account holder, including to an account of the account holder held at a non-blocked financial institution.

GL 52: Journalistic Activities and Establishment of News Bureaus

GL 52 authorizes US news reporting organizations or US individuals who are journalists, photojournalists or broadcast or technical personnel to engage in a variety of transactions to the extent such transactions are ordinarily incident and necessary to journalistic activities or to establish or operate a news bureau. Any transactions involving Joint Stock Company Channel One Russia, Joint Stock Company NTV Broadcasting Company, Television Station Russia-1, LLC Algoritm, New Eastern Outlook or Oriental Review remain prohibited, unless separately authorized.

GL 53A: Transactions for Diplomatic Missions of the Russian Federation Involving Gazprombank Joint Stock Company or Prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024¹¹¹

GL 53A authorizes US persons to engage in all transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the official business of diplomatic or consular missions of the government of the Russian Federation (“Russian missions”) that are prohibited by E.O. 14024 and involve Gazprombank, or any entity in which Gazprombank owns, directly or indirectly, a 50% or greater interest, or that would otherwise be prohibited by Directive 4, including the compensation of employees of Russian missions.

¹¹¹ Effective November 21, 2024, GL 53A replaced and superseded GL 53, issued November 10, 2022.

OFAC confirmed that the GL 53A authorization applies to transactions related to Russian missions located in or outside the United States and that non-US persons may engage in transactions authorized for US persons under GL 53A without risk of sanctions under E.O. 14024.¹¹²

GL 54A: Certain Transactions Involving VEON Ltd. or VEON Holdings B.V.¹¹³

GL 54A authorizes all transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to (i) the purchase or receipt of any debt or equity securities of VEON Ltd. or VEON Holdings B.V. that are prohibited by the new investment prohibition of E.O. 14071, provided that the debt or equity securities were issued prior to June 6, 2022, and (ii) facilitating, clearing and settling of such transactions.

GL 55D: Certain Services Related to Sakhalin-2¹¹⁴

GL 55D authorizes, through 12:01 a.m. EST on December 19, 2025, (i) all transactions related to the maritime transport of crude oil originating from the Sakhalin-2 project that would otherwise be prohibited by the Russian oil price cap determination of November 21, 2022, provided that the Sakhalin-2 byproduct is solely for importation into Japan, (ii) all transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 involving Gazprombank or any entity in which Gazprombank owns, directly or indirectly, a 50% or greater interest, that are related to the Sakhalin-2 project, including such transactions involving Sakhalin Energy LLC, and (iii) all transactions prohibited by the Petroleum Services Determination described above that are related to the Sakhalin-2 project.

GL 56A: Certain Services with Respect to the EU¹¹⁵

GL 56 authorizes all transactions related to the importation of Russian oil or Russian petroleum that would be prohibited by the price cap on Russian oil or Russian petroleum into the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Croatia or landlocked EU Member States as described in Council Regulation (EU) 2022/879 of June 3, 2022.

GL 57A: Certain Services Related to Vessel Emergencies¹¹⁶

GL 57A authorizes all transactions otherwise prohibited by the price cap on Russian oil or Russian petroleum that are ordinarily incident and necessary to addressing vessel emergencies related to the health or safety of the crew or environmental protection, including safe docking or anchoring, emergency repairs or salvage operations.

GL 57A does not authorize any transactions related to the sale of Russian oil or Russian petroleum.

¹¹² FAQ 1096.

¹¹³ Effective January 17, 2023, GL 54A replaced and superseded GL 54, issued November 18, 2022.

¹¹⁴ Effective June 18, 2025, GL 55D replaced and superseded GL 55C, issued November 21, 2024.

¹¹⁵ Effective February 3, 2023, GL 56A replaced and superseded GL 56, issued November 22, 2022.

¹¹⁶ Effective February 3, 2023, GL 57A replaced and superseded GL 57, issued November 22, 2022.

GL 64: Certain Transactions Involving Kommersant

GL 64 authorizes all transactions involving Joint Stock Company Kommersant or any entity in which Joint Stock Company Kommersant owns, directly or indirectly, a 50% or greater interest, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the operations of the newspaper *Kommersant*.

GL 65: Certain Transactions Involving Megafon or Digital Invest Limited Liability Company

GL 65 authorizes all transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the receipt or transmission of telecommunications involving (i) Megafon or Digital Invest Limited Liability Company (“Digital Invest”) or any entity in which Megafon or Digital Invest owns, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50% or greater interest, and (ii) Tajikistan or Uzbekistan.

GL 65 does not authorize: (i) the opening or maintaining of a correspondent or payable-through account for or on behalf of any entity subject to Directive 2; (ii) any debit to an account on the books of a US financial institution of any Directive 4 Entities; or (iii) any transactions prohibited by E.O. 14066 or E.O. 14068.

GL 84: Transactions Related to Closing a Correspondent or Payable-Through Account

GL 84 authorizes, during a 10-day period beginning on the effective date of the imposition of the prohibition, US financial institutions that maintain correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts for any FFI subject to the CAPTA prohibition of section 11(b)(i) of E.O. 14024, as amended, to engage in the following transactions: (i) processing only those transactions through the account, or permitting the foreign financial institution to execute only those transactions through the account, for the purpose of, and necessary for, closing the account; and (ii) transferring the funds remaining in the correspondent account or the payable-through account to an account of the foreign financial institution located outside of the United States and closing of the correspondent account or the payable-through account.

GL 94: Transactions Involving OWH SE i.L. (Formerly Known as VTB Bank Europe SE)

GL 94 authorizes all transactions prohibited by the RuHSR, or the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 589, involving OWH SE i.L. (formerly known as VTB Bank Europe SE), or any entity in which OWH SE i.L. owns, directly or indirectly, a 50% or greater interest (“OWH SE i.L. Entities”). GL 94 also provides that all property and interests in property of OWH SE i.L. Entities are unblocked.

GL 103: Transactions Related to Imports of Certain Diamond Jewelry Prohibited by E.O. 14068

GL 103 authorizes all transactions prohibited by the Diamond Jewelry and Unsorted Diamonds Determination that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the importation and entry into the United States, including importation for admission

into a foreign trade zone located in the United States, of diamond jewelry that was physically located outside of the Russian Federation prior to March 1, 2024, and not exported or reexported from the Russian Federation on or after March 1, 2024.

GL 104A: Transactions Related to Imports of Certain Diamonds Prohibited by E.O. 14068¹¹⁷

GL 104A authorizes, through 12:01 a.m. EDT on **September 1, 2026**, all transactions prohibited by the Diamonds Determination that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the importation and entry into the United States, including importation for admission into a foreign trade zone located in the United States, of the following categories of diamonds, provided that the diamonds were physically located outside of the Russian Federation before, and were not exported or reexported from the Russian Federation since: (i) March 1, 2024, for non-industrial diamonds with a weight of 1.0 carat or greater; or (ii) September 1, 2024, for non-industrial diamonds with a weight of 0.5 carats or greater.

Note that the importation and entry into the United States, including importation for admission into a foreign trade zone located in the United States, of non-industrial diamonds of Russian Federation origin remains prohibited pursuant to the Diamond Jewelry and Unsorted Diamonds Determination.

GL 115B: Certain Transactions Related to Civil Nuclear Energy¹¹⁸

GL 115B authorizes, through 12:01 a.m. EST on **December 19, 2025**, all transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 involving one or more of the following entities that are related to civil nuclear energy: (1) Gazprombank; (2) Vnesheconombank; (3) Otkritie; (4) Sovcombank; (5) Sberbank; (6) VTB; (7) Alfa-Bank; (8) Rosbank; (9) Bank Zenit; (10) Bank Saint-Petersburg; (11) NCC; (12) any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50% or greater interest; or (13) the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.¹¹⁹

The term “related to civil nuclear energy” means transactions undertaken solely to maintain or support civil nuclear projects initiated before November 21, 2024.

GL 124: Petroleum Services Related to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium and Tengizchevroil Projects

GL 124 authorizes all transactions prohibited by the Petroleum Services Determination that are related to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium or Tengizchevroil projects.

¹¹⁷ Effective August 27, 2025, GL 104A replaced and superseded GL 104, issued August 23, 2024.

¹¹⁸ Effective June 27, 2025, GL 115B replaced and superseded GL 115A, issued January 10, 2025.

¹¹⁹ See OFAC FAQ 1203.

FAQs

OFAC's Frequently Asked Questions provide further guidance on these sanctions. Below is a non-exhaustive list of these FAQs, some of which are addressed in the preceding discussion, as applicable.

- Provide an overview of actions related to Russia's financial services sector pursuant to E.O. 14024 (FAQs 966, 974).
- Explain the wind-down requirements for dealings with relevant banks and note that not all newly sanctioned banks are covered by a wind-down period (e.g., PSB or Novikombank) (FAQ 975).
- Address questions related to Directive 2 (FAQs 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972), including:
 - FAQ 967 explains that Directive 2 does not impose blocking sanctions and, thus, does not require US financial institutions to block the assets of FFIs subject to the prohibitions of the directive. Instead, the directive requires that US financial institutions reject any transaction involving any such FFI or its property or interests in property. This includes rejecting transactions related to any securities (including depositary receipts) issued by such FFI, including secondary market trading, or custodied by such FFI.
 - FAQ 969 explains that all FFIs that are 50% or more owned by a designated entity are covered. However, OFAC also clarified that the prohibitions do not apply to subsidiaries that are not FFIs, even if those non-FFI subsidiaries are 50% or more owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, by one or more FFIs determined to be subject to the directive.
 - FAQ 971 cautions that Directive 2's restrictions apply to all currencies, not just US dollar transactions.
 - FAQ 972 notes that non-US financial institutions are not within the scope of Directive 2's restrictions regarding Sberbank, but FAQ 970 further explains that non-US financial institutions may not use their own accounts to process US dollar or other transactions on behalf of Sberbank at a US financial institution.
- Address authorized transactions for official business of an international organization, humanitarian-related trade or the response to the COVID-19 pandemic (FAQ 979).
- Explain compliant payment flows for certain licensed transactions under GLs 6D, 7A and 115B (FAQ 978).

- Note that non-US persons face the risk of being sanctioned themselves if US authorities determine that they have materially assisted, sponsored or provided financial, material or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, a Russian company blocked under the new sanctions (FAQ 980).
- Address debt and equity restrictions under Directive 3 (FAQs 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989).
- Provide that debits to blocked accounts are only permitted if expressly authorized (FAQ 990).
- Address questions related to Directive 4 (FAQs 998, 999, 1001, 1002, 1003, 1004, 1005), including:
 - FAQs 998 and 1002 clarify that direct and indirect transactions involving Directive 4 Entities are prohibited and warn US persons of nonroutine foreign exchange transactions that may indirectly involve Directive 4 Entities. On May 19, 2023, FAQ 998 was updated to reflect a Directive 4 amendment that imposed a reporting requirement on US persons in possession or control of property in which any of the Directive 4 Entities has an interest.
 - FAQ 999 explains what authorizations exist for Directive 4 Entities.
 - FAQ 1001 confirms that OFAC's "50% Rule" does not apply to Directive 4.
 - FAQ 1004 clarifies that US persons are not required to block transactions involving Directive 4 Entities.
 - FAQ 1005 confirms that Directive 4 does not prohibit trading in the secondary markets for debt or equity of Directive 4 Entities, provided that no Directive 4 Entity is a counterparty to such transaction. However, FAQ 1005 clarifies that the new investment restrictions prohibit US persons from purchasing debt and equity securities issued by an entity in the Russian Federation.
- Provide that, for purposes of the importation prohibitions on products of "Russian Federation origin" under E.O. 14066, E.O. 14068 and the Metals Services Determination, OFAC anticipates publishing regulations defining the term "Russian Federation origin" to include goods produced, manufactured, extracted or processed in the Russian Federation, excluding any Russian Federation origin good that has been incorporated or substantially transformed into a foreign-made product (FAQ 1019).
- Affirm that E.O. 14024 and other Russia-related sanctions extend to virtual currency and digital assets and that (i) US persons, including virtual currency

exchanges, virtual wallet hosts and other service providers, are prohibited from engaging in or facilitating prohibited transactions, and (ii) US financial institutions are prohibited from processing prohibited virtual currency transactions (FAQ 1021).

- Address questions related to E.O. 14068, including:
 - FAQ 1022 provides an overview of the new Russia-related prohibitions on certain imports, exports and new investment.
 - FAQ 1025 confirms that GL 6C¹²⁰ remains valid and authorizes, among other things, transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the exportation or reexportation of agricultural commodities (including products such as fish, seafood or preparations thereof) to, from or transiting the Russian Federation, provided that such transactions are not for the importation of these Russian-origin products into the United States, as prohibited by E.O. 14068.
 - FAQ 1026 explains that non-US persons are not exposed to sanctions under E.O. 14068 for the import of prohibited Russian origin products to jurisdictions outside the United States, provided that such import does not involve a sanctioned person or otherwise prohibited transaction.
 - FAQ 1027 clarifies that definitions of “fish, seafood and preparations thereof,” “alcoholic beverages” and “non-industrial diamonds” are derived from Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States articles.
 - FAQ 1028 confirms that GL 18 authorizes certain transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the transfer of US dollar-denominated banknotes for noncommercial, personal remittances from: (i) the United States or a US person, to an individual located in the Russian Federation; or (ii) a US person who is an individual located in the Russian Federation. GL 18 also authorizes methods of payment including withdrawals of US dollar-denominated banknotes via automated teller machines and the hand carrying of US dollar-denominated banknotes.
- Address the impact of E.O. 14024, the June 28, 2022, determination issued pursuant to E.O. 14068 and other Russia-related sanctions on gold-related transactions or persons participating in the gold market (FAQ 1029).
- Clarify that US persons, including US operators of credit card systems and US acquirers, are prohibited from processing transactions involving certain sanctioned FFIs. Non-US operators of credit card systems whose payment cards

¹²⁰ The currently operative license is GL 6D. OFAC has not updated this FAQ since February 23, 2024.

are issued by sanctioned FFIs may also be in violation of sanctions if they allow those cards to be used in the United States (FAQ 1030).

- Clarify that GL 25G explicitly excludes from the authorization any transactions involving JSC Channel One Russia, Television Station Russia-1, JSC NTV Broadcasting Company, New Eastern Outlook, Oriental Review, Garantex Europe OU, Autonomous Non-Profit Organization Dialog, Autonomous Non-Profit Organization Dialog Regions, Federal State Unitary Enterprise International Information Agency Rossiya Segodnya, Autonomous Non-Profit Organization TV Novosti, XH Smart Tech China Co Ltd or CJSC Perspective Technologies Agency (FAQ 1040).
- Confirm that transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the exportation or reexportation of agricultural commodities to, from or transiting Russia that involve Agropromyshlenniy Kompleks Voronezhskii OOO, Anninskii Elevator OOO and Azovskaya Zernovaya Kompaniya OOO¹²¹ are authorized under GL 6B¹²² (FAQ 1039).
- Address questions related to the May 8, 2022, actions targeting certain accounting, trust and corporate formation and management consulting services (FAQs 1033, 1034, 1035, 1036, 1038), including:
 - FAQ 1038 provides definitions, for the purposes of the May 8, 2022, determination made pursuant to E.O. 14024, of “accounting sector,” “trust and corporate formation services sector” and “management consulting sector.”
 - FAQ 1035 provides definitions of “credit rating services” and “auditing services.”
 - FAQ 1034 provides definitions, for the purposes of the May 8, 2022, determination made pursuant to E.O. 14071, of “accounting,” “trust and corporate formation” and “management consulting” services.
- Address questions related to the new investment prohibition (FAQs 1049-1055), including:
 - FAQ 1049 defines “new investment” as the commitment of capital or other assets for the purpose of generating returns or appreciation, made on or after the effective date of the relevant new investment prohibition.
 - New investments include: (i) the purchase or acquisition of real estate in Russia (other than for noncommercial, personal use); (ii) entry into an

¹²¹ These entities were designated for being owned or controlled by, or for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, JSC Moscow Industrial Bank.

¹²² The currently operative license is GL 6D. OFAC has not updated this FAQ since July 14, 2022.

agreement requiring the commitment of capital or other assets for the establishment or expansion of projects or operations in Russia, including the formation of joint ventures or other corporate entities in Russia; (iii) entry into an agreement providing for the participation in royalties or ongoing profits in Russia; (iv) the lending of funds to persons located in Russia for commercial purposes, including when such funds are intended to be used to fund a new or expanded project or operation in Russia; (v) the purchase of an equity interest in an entity located in Russia; and (vi) the purchase or acquisition of rights to natural resources or exploitation thereof in Russia.

- New investment also includes such commitments pursuant to the exercise of rights under an agreement entered into before the effective date of the relevant new investment prohibition, where such commitment is made on or after the effective date of the prohibition.
- New investment does not include: (i) the maintenance of an investment made prior to the applicable effective date of the relevant new investment prohibition; (ii) entry into, performance of, or financing of a contract, pursuant to ordinary commercial sales terms, to sell or purchase goods, services or technology to or from an entity in Russia; and (iii) wind down or divestment of a pre-existing investment, such as a pre-existing investment in an entity, project or operation, including any associated tangible property, located in Russia.
- FAQ 1055 clarifies that the new investment prohibition does not prohibit US persons from lending funds to or purchasing a debt or equity interest in entities located outside of Russia, provided that: (i) such funds are not specifically intended for new projects or operations in Russia; and (ii) the entity located outside Russia derives less than 50% of its revenues from its investments in Russia. For purposes of assessing the foregoing, US persons may reasonably rely upon the information available to them in the ordinary course of business, including publicly available information such as an entity's most recent quarterly or annual report. For purposes of determining the percentage of revenues derived from investments in Russia, revenues derived from the commercial sale of goods or services by an entity located outside of Russia to persons in Russia should not be included.
- FAQ 1054 confirms that the new investment prohibition restricts US persons from purchasing new and existing debt and equity securities issued by an entity in Russia. However, it does not prohibit US persons from selling or divesting, or facilitating the sale or divestment of, debt or equity securities issued by an entity in Russia to a non-US person. US financial institutions may clear and settle, or otherwise serve as market intermediaries in, divestment transactions on the secondary market (including transactions between non-US persons).

- OFAC clarified that US persons are not required to divest such securities and may continue to hold such previously acquired securities.
- Furthermore, the purchase of shares in a US fund that contains debt or equity securities issued by entities in Russia generally would not be considered a prohibited “new investment,” so long as the fund’s holdings of debt or equity securities issued by entities in Russia represent less than a 50% share by value of the fund. As a result, US persons may continue to invest in the fund, and the fund may continue to operate. Generally, the fund may also divest itself of these prohibited holdings.
- In addition, OFAC explained that the conversion of depositary receipts to underlying local shares of non-sanctioned Russian issuers would not be considered a prohibited new investment in Russia.
- FAQ 1053 clarifies that transactions related to the divestment or the facilitation of divestment of a pre-existing investment, including a pre-existing investment in an entity, project or operation in Russia, are not prohibited by the new investment prohibition. In addition, the prohibition on a US person of approving, financing, facilitating or guaranteeing a transaction by a foreign person that would be prohibited if performed by a US person or within the United States does not prohibit US persons from facilitating the wind down or divestment of an existing investment in a project or operation in Russia.
- FAQ 1053 also clarifies that the prohibition on approval, financing, facilitation or guarantee by a US person of a transaction by a foreign person that would be prohibited if conducted by a US person does not prohibit US persons from facilitating the wind down or divestment of an existing investment in Russia, provided that such facilitation is on behalf of the selling party only.
- FAQ 1052 notes that US persons may continue to fund their subsidiaries and affiliates with projects or operations located in Russia prior to the effective date of the relevant new investment prohibition provided the use of funds by the subsidiary or affiliate is related to “maintenance” activities. The expansion of pre-existing projects or operations beyond those in effect prior to the effective date of the relevant prohibition would not be maintenance activities and thus would be prohibited.
- FAQ 1051 confirms that the new investment prohibition does not prohibit the export or import of goods, services or technology, or related sales or purchases, to or from Russia, provided that such transaction is made pursuant to ordinary commercial sales terms (e.g., a payment of an invoice for goods

made within the contracted time period, where such payment does not involve ongoing participation in royalties or ongoing profits).

- Address questions related to E.O. 14071's prohibition on certain services (FAQs 1059-1068 and 1188), including:
 - FAQs 1059 and 1188 clarify that prohibitions on certain services do not extend to persons located outside of Russia that are owned or controlled by persons located in Russia, provided that the services are not an indirect export to a person located in Russia (*i.e.*, that the benefit of the services is not ultimately received by a person located in Russia).
 - FAQ 1060 notes that the prohibition on trust and corporate formation services does not, in and of itself, prohibit US persons from serving on the board of directors of a company located in Russia. However, US persons are prohibited from providing nominee officer or director services in which a US person is contracted to serve as a nominee officer, director, shareholder or signatory of a legal person on behalf of a person located in Russia.
 - FAQ 1061 clarifies that US persons are not generally prohibited from working as employees of entities located in Russia and are only prohibited from providing the enumerated prohibited services to companies located in the Russian Federation in their capacity as employees.
 - FAQ 1062 confirms that the prohibition does apply to services provided to a parent company in Russia by its US subsidiary.
 - FAQ 1063 clarifies that the prohibition on trust and corporate formation applies to both new and existing trusts and companies, regardless of whether the services are performed as part of the formation of a new trust or company or as part of the administration or maintenance of an existing trust or company.
 - OFAC confirmed that executive search and vetting services are covered under the prohibition on "management consulting services" (FAQ 1064) and that "accounting services" include tax preparation and filing (FAQ 1068).
 - FAQ 1065 clarifies that US persons are prohibited from serving as voting trustees on behalf of, or for shares of, persons located in Russia.
 - OFAC also clarified that US persons are not prohibited from providing: (i) educational services (such as online university courses) on the subjects of accounting, management consulting or trust and corporate formation to persons located in Russia (FAQ 1066); or (ii) software related to accounting, management consulting or trust and corporate formation to persons located

in Russia, provided that such associated services do not fall within the categories of management consulting, accounting or trust and corporate formation (FAQ 1067).

- Explain that the determination issued on June 28, 2022, pursuant to E.O. 14068 prohibits the importation into the United States of gold of Russian Federation origin but does not prohibit gold of Russian Federation origin that was located outside of the Russian Federation prior to June 28, 2022 (FAQ 1070).
- Explain that GL 46 authorizes transactions such as the submission and acceptance of bids and offers and physical settlement requests by auction participants and their customers, or the delivery and acceptance of the Russian Federation debt obligations and corresponding settlement amounts. OFAC also explained that, although GL 46 authorizes US persons to purchase or receive Russian debt obligations for the period beginning two business days prior to the announced date of the auction and ending eight business days after the conclusion of the auction, the general license does not require the clearance and settlement of such transactions to be completed within eight business days after the conclusion of the auction (FAQ 1072).
- Confirm that PhosAgro PJSC, EuroChem Group AG and Sheremetyevo International Airport are not owned 50% or more by recently designated individuals and are therefore not blocked (FAQs 1073-1075).
- Explain that accounts held by US persons at any blocked Russian financial institutions (checking and savings accounts, credit cards, CDs, loans and mortgages) generally are themselves considered blocked property, unless exempt. US persons must stop utilizing such accounts and treat them as blocked. US persons are also required to file a blocking report with OFAC. Note that GL 50 authorizes all transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to close individual accounts held at a blocked financial institution (FAQ 1080).
- Confirm that individuals do not need to provide official documentation proving they have closed their account at a blocked Russian financial institution when utilizing GL 50 (FAQ 1081).
- Explain that, although the NSPK (the operator of Russia's MIR National Payment System, which clears and settles payments between consumers, merchants and banks for debit and credit card payments, primarily in Russia) is not a blocked entity, it may be used to process transactions involving other sanctioned persons, and thus non-US financial institutions that enter into or expand agreements with NSPK risk supporting Russia's efforts to evade US sanctions through the expanded use of the MIR National Payment System outside of Russia (FAQ 1082).

- Define the term “quantum computing services” (FAQ 1084).
- Confirm that non-US persons are exposed to sanctions risk for activities that would constitute material assistance, sponsorship, financial, material or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of (“material support”), sanctioned persons or sanctionable activity, particularly for providing material support for Russia’s illegal attempts to annex Ukrainian sovereign territory. However, OFAC again reiterated that sanctions will generally not be imposed on non-US persons engaging in activities that would be authorized for US persons (FAQ 1091).
- Explain that sanctions may be imposed against non-US persons that provide goods, services or other support for Russia’s military-industrial complex. OFAC reaffirmed its broad authority to block non-US persons for violating Russia-related and Ukraine-related sanctions, including the authority to block any person determined to:
 - operate in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy;
 - have materially assisted, sponsored or provided financial, material or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, sanctionable activities or persons blocked under the Russia-related sanctions; or
 - have knowingly engaged in significant transactions with companies identified on the list issued under Section 231 of CAATSA of companies operating in the Russian defense and intelligence sectors (FAQ 1092).
- Notify that, based on information available to OFAC as of December 15, 2022, Norilsk Nickel is not owned 50% or more by Vladimir Potanin and is therefore not blocked as a result of the designation of Vladimir Potanin (FAQ 1104).
- Confirm that US persons, including US financial institutions, may transfer securities issued by non-blocked Russian entities from a decedent’s estate to the account of a relevant beneficiary or beneficiaries, including a successor entity (e.g., a family trust), provided such transfers (i) are part of the ordinary course administration of the decedent’s estate, (ii) do not involve an exchange for value and (iii) have no other sanctions nexus (including the involvement of blocked persons). Blocked securities in a decedent’s estate must remain blocked unless a specific license is obtained from OFAC (FAQ 1113).
- Explain that OFAC anticipates publishing regulations defining the term “metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy” to include any act, process or industry of extracting, at the surface or underground, ores, coal,

precious stones or any other minerals or geological materials in the Russian Federation, or any act procuring, processing, manufacturing or refining such geological materials or transporting them to, from or within the Russian Federation (FAQ 1115).

- Explain that the sector determination with respect to the metals and mining sector of the Russian economy exposes persons that OFAC may identify as operating or having operated in the sector to sanctions risk, but does not, as a matter of course, automatically impose sanctions on such persons (FAQ 1116).
- Explain that OFAC does not intend to target persons for operating in the metals and mining sector where the provision of goods or services is solely for the safety and care of personnel, protection of human life, prevention of accidents or injuries, maintenance or repair necessary to avoid environmental or other significant damage or activities related to environmental mitigation or remediation (FAQ 1117).
- Clarify that GL 13N does not authorize transactions that involve the payment of “exit tax,” which the Russian government may require prior to the divestment of assets located in the Russian Federation. OFAC does not consider the “exit tax” to be ordinarily incident and necessary to day-to-day operations in the Russian Federation, and US persons whose divestment will involve an “exit tax” payment may require a license from OFAC (FAQ 1118).
- Distinguish between GL 25D, which only authorizes telecommunications-related transactions involving Russia, and GL 65, which specifies authorization for telecommunications and internet-based communications involving the covered entities and Tajikistan or Uzbekistan (FAQ 1122).¹²³
- Summarize the sectors in scope for potential sanctions pursuant to E.O. 14024 and define the following sectors of the Russian Federation economy (FAQs 1126, 1086 and 1213).
 - “Architecture sector of the Russian Federation Economy” includes activities such as advising; pre-designing; designing; preparing sketches, reports, studies, assessments, site plans, working drawings, specifications, cost estimates, as-built drawings or other materials; contract administration; site selection; and inspections concerning architectural and related matters involving the Russian Federation.
 - “Engineering sector of the Russian Federation economy” includes activities such as advising; designing; recommending; consulting; constructing;

¹²³ The currently operative license is GL 25G. OFAC has not updated this FAQ since the issuance of GL 25D on June 12, 2024.

installing; surveying; preparing studies, specifications, cost estimates, working drawings, process flow diagrams, arrangement drawings or other materials; map making; planning; testing; analysis; and inspecting for engineering and related matters involving the Russian Federation.

- “Construction sector of the Russian Federation economy” includes activities such as the production, procurement, devising, framing, design, testing, financing, distribution or transport involving the Russian Federation, of goods, services or technology to fabricate, shape, alter, maintain or form any buildings or structures, including the on-site development, assembly or construction of residential, commercial or institutional buildings or of transportation infrastructure, in the Russian Federation.
- “Manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy” includes activities such as the creation, modification, repair, testing or financing, of goods by manual labor or machinery involving the Russian Federation and any related activities, including the provision or receipt of goods, services or technology to, from or involving the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy.
- “Transportation sector of the Russian Federation economy” includes activities such as the production, manufacturing, testing, financing, distribution or transport to, from or involving the Russian Federation of any mode of transport or any goods, services or technology for the movement or conveyance of persons or property and the loading, unloading or storage incidental to the movement of such persons or property and any related activities, including the provision or receipt of goods, services or technology to, from or involving the transportation sector of the Russian Federation economy.
- “Technology sector of the Russian Federation economy” includes activities such as the production, procurement, research, development, design, engineering, testing, servicing, financing, distribution, use or transport involving the Russian Federation, of software, equipment, electronics, items, tools, materials or devices, and any components, parts or accessories of the foregoing, related to the fields of computing, engineering, applied mathematics or applied sciences involving the Russian Federation and any related activities, including the provision or receipt of goods or services involving the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy.
- “Defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy” includes military, armed forces or security forces of or within the Russian Federation; the use of arms or related materiel by military, armed forces or security forces of or within the Russian Federation; any person designing, developing, manufacturing, supplying, financing, procuring or distributing

goods, services or technology to, from or involving military, armed forces or security forces of or within the Russian Federation; and any related activities, including the provision or receipt of goods, services or technology involving the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy. The term defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy also includes acquisition, possession, procurement, research, design, development, testing, evaluation, manufacture, maintenance, upgrade or refurbishment, shipping, supply, sale, transfer or storage to, from, within, for, transiting or on behalf of the Russian Federation of arms or related materiel of all types; enablers, aggregates, components, parts, as well as related documentation and instructions for any such arms or related materiel; or training for the use of included systems, provision of simulation equipment, documentation (including training manuals, maintenance orders, or technical bulletins), prototypes, software upgrades and licensing and manufacturing agreements for such items.

- “Aerospace sector of the Russian Federation economy” includes activities such as the production, procurement, development, design, testing, servicing, financing, distribution, use or transport involving the Russian Federation and its airspace, of aircraft or any other device used or intended to be used for flight or activities in the air or in space, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, space-based vehicles, satellites, high-altitude balloons, any other device that operates above the surface of the earth and any items, components, parts or accessories intended for the foregoing; airports or any other area of land or water used or intended to be used for a purpose related to the aerospace sector of the Russian Federation; and any related activities, including the provision or receipt of goods, services or technology involving the aerospace sector of the Russian Federation economy.
- “Quantum computing sector of the Russian Federation economy” includes activities related to products and services in or involving Russia in research, development, manufacturing, assembling, maintenance, repair, sale or supply of quantum computing, quantum computers, electronic assemblies thereof or cryogenic refrigeration systems related to quantum computing (FAQ 1086).
- “Energy sector of the Russian Federation economy” includes activities such as the procurement, exploration, extraction, drilling, mining, harvesting, production, refinement, liquefaction, gasification, regasification, conversion, enrichment, fabrication, manufacturing, testing, financing, distribution, purchase or transport to, from, or involving the Russian Federation, of petroleum, including crude oil, lease condensates, unfinished oils, natural gas, liquefied natural gas, natural gas liquids, or petroleum products, or other products capable of producing energy, such as coal, wood, or agricultural products used to manufacture biofuels; the development, production, testing, generation, transmission, financing, or exchange of power, through any

means, including nuclear, electrical, thermal, and renewable, to, from, or involving the Russian Federation; and any related activities, including the provision or receipt of goods, services, or technology to, from, or involving the energy sector of the Russian Federation economy (FAQ 1213).

- Summarize the categories of services prohibited pursuant to E.O. 14071 and define the terms “architecture services,” “engineering services” and “covered metals acquisition services” (FAQ 1128).
- Clarify that State Department sanctions on Russian-based Polimetall AO apply only to this entity and any entities in which it owns, directly or indirectly, a 50% or greater interest. The blocking sanctions do not apply to the entity’s ultimate parent company, Jersey-based Polymetal International PLC, its non-blocked subsidiaries or non-blocked affiliates to the extent that the proposed dealings do not involve any blocked person or interest in property of a blocked person (FAQ 1129).
- Clarify that LETTERONE HOLDINGS S.A. is not the target of blocking sanctions as a result of the designations of Petr Aven, Mikhail Fridman, German Khan and Alexey Kuzmichev because, based on information available to OFAC, it is not owned 50% or more by blocked persons (FAQ 1131).
- Address questions related to secondary sanctions risks for FFIs for engaging in certain transactions, or providing any service, involving Russia’s military-industrial base (FAQs 1148-1152, 1181-1182), including:
 - FAQ 1181 provides that, as of June 12, 2024, Treasury updated its definition of Russia’s military-industrial base to include all persons blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024 to reflect Russia’s reorientation of its economy and government resources to support its war. OFAC notes this action means that FFIs risk being sanctioned for conducting or facilitating any significant transaction or transactions, or for providing any service, involving a person blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024.
 - FAQ 1151 notes that OFAC expects to promulgate regulations that define the term “Russia’s military-industrial base” to include all persons blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024, as well as any person operating in the technology, defense and related materiel, construction, aerospace and manufacturing sectors of the Russian Federation economy (and other sectors as may be determined pursuant to E.O. 14024).
 - FAQ 1148 clarifies that FFIs may be sanctioned for conducting any significant transaction(s) for any person that has been blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024, or maintaining accounts, transferring funds or providing other financial services to persons, either inside or outside Russia, for any person blocked pursuant to

E.O. 14024, as well as to any person operating in the following sectors of the Russian Federation economy: technology; defense and related materiel; construction; aerospace; or manufacturing. This also includes facilitating the sale, supply or transfer, directly or indirectly, to the Russian Federation of certain items critical to Russia's war effort identified in the determination of December 22, 2023, pursuant to subsection 11(a)(ii) of E.O. 14024, such as certain machine tools, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, electronic test equipment, propellants and their precursors, lubricants and lubricant additives, bearings, advanced optical systems and navigation instruments.

- FAQ 1182 clarifies that, for purposes of US secondary sanctions risk for FFIs under E.O. 14024, Treasury remains focused on counteracting activity that involves sanctions evasion or third-country support to Russia's military-industrial base, and foreign persons do not risk the imposition of sanctions for engaging in transactions authorized for US persons under general licenses issued under the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions program.
- Address questions related to prohibitions under the Metals Import Determination and the Metals Services Determination (FAQs 1168-1172), including:
 - FAQ 1168 clarifies the prohibitions under the Metals Import Determination and the Metals Services Determination do not apply to aluminum, copper or nickel of Russian Federation origin that was produced prior to April 13, 2024.
 - FAQ 1169 clarifies that aluminum, copper and nickel of Russian Federation origin that is already warranted as of April 13, 2024, on a global metal exchange can continue to be traded, and new warranting and trading can continue for aluminum, copper and nickel of Russian Federation origin that was produced prior to April 13, 2024, including through new derivatives contracts. Market participants and traders may reasonably rely on the Certificate of Analysis and Certificate of Origin of the relevant Russian metal, or other documentation available to them in the ordinary course of business, with respect to the date of production, but should exercise caution if they have reason to believe such documentation has been falsified or is otherwise erroneous. Further, a US trader that is a counterparty to a derivative contract cannot take physical delivery of covered Russian metals when it comes time to settle that contract, even if the importation of the metal would not be into the United States.
 - FAQ 1170 provides that OFAC anticipates publishing regulations defining "aluminum," "nickel" and "copper" to include articles or products defined at the following Harmonized Tariff Schedule chapter headings: (i) "Aluminum": defined at Chapter 76; (ii) "Nickel": defined at Chapter 75; and (iii) "Copper": defined at Chapter 74.

- FAQ 1171 clarifies that the Metals Import Determination and the Metals Services Determination do not apply to aluminum, copper or nickel that has been incorporated or substantially transformed into other products outside of the Russian Federation.
- FAQ 1172 clarifies that the Metals Services Determination does not prohibit the processing, clearing or sending of payments related to Russian metals by a US bank on behalf of non-US persons where the bank: (1) is operating solely as an intermediary; and (2) does not have any direct relationship with the person providing a service covered by the Metals Services Determination (*i.e.*, the person is a non-account party) as it relates to the relevant transaction.
- Address questions related to prohibitions under the IT and Software Services Determination (FAQs 1184-1188, 1192-1195), including:
 - FAQ 1184 clarifies that the aim of the IT and Software Services Determination is not to prohibit all activity relating to the provision of IT and software-related services to Russia; the measures do not prohibit internet access or the delivery of internet-based communications services; and the importation from any country, or the exportation to any country, of any information or informational materials, regardless of format or medium, is generally exempt from the scope of sanctions prohibitions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
 - FAQ 1185 clarifies that IT consultancy and design services include the development and implementation of software, as well as assistance or advice relating to the development and implementation of software, including the supply and installation of bespoke software, but do not include the retail sale of off-the-shelf software falling under United Nations' Central Product Classification (CPC) Code 63252. OFAC also provides examples of activities that would and would not be prohibited by the IT and Software Services Determination.
 - FAQ 1186 clarifies that IT support services and cloud-based services include the provision of technical expertise to solve problems for the client in using software, hardware or an entire computer system and the supply of software and associated services via the internet or the cloud, including through SaaS. OFAC provides additional examples of activities that would and would not be prohibited by the IT and Software Services Determination.
 - FAQ 1187 provides definitions for the terms "enterprise management software," "design and manufacturing software," "cloud-based services," "information technology support services," "information technology consultancy and design services," "IT consultancy services" and "IT design and development services for applications."

- FAQ 1192 clarifies that the exceptions provided under sections 3(i) and 3(ii) of the IT and Software Services Determination mean that US persons can continue to provide, for example, IT support services and cloud-based services, including SaaS, for enterprise management software and design and manufacturing software, if such software is or would be authorized or licensed by the Department of Commerce, including providing such IT support and cloud-based services for covered software that is excluded from license requirements in 15 CFR 746.8(a)(12), including for exports, reexports or transfers (in-country) to certain civil end users that are wholly owned subsidiaries, branches, sales offices or joint ventures of companies headquartered in the United States or countries from Country Group A:5 and A:6 in supplement no. 1 to part 740 of the EAR.
- FAQ 1193 clarifies that a US company with a subsidiary organized and located in Russia may provide the employees or contractors of that Russian subsidiary who are located in Russia with the services prohibited by the IT and Software Services Determination, as long as the services provided are within the employees' or contractors' scope of employment for or on behalf of the US subsidiary company located in Russia.
- FAQ 1194 clarifies that a US company with a subsidiary located in a third country (other than Russia) cannot provide an employee or contractor of that third-country subsidiary who is located in Russia with the services prohibited by the IT and Software Services Determination.
- FAQ 1195 clarifies that a US company with an employee or contractor located in Russia working directly for the US company cannot provide that employee or contractor who is located in Russia with the services prohibited by the IT and Software Services Determination.
- Clarify that, pursuant to general licenses, the Diamond Jewelry and Unsorted Diamonds Determination no longer prohibits imports of diamond jewelry that was located outside of Russia and not exported or reexported from Russia since March 1, 2024, and the Diamonds Determination no longer prohibits imports of non-industrial diamonds that meet certain parameters through 12:01 a.m. EDT on September 1, 2025 (FAQ 1189).
- Address questions related to Russian Decree No. 840, clarifying that any securities in the possession or control of US persons that are held through NSD or at SDN Russian registrars should be treated as blocked, dividends or other income received via NSD or SDN Russian registrars should be treated as blocked and US persons should continue to treat as blocked securities that were held at NSD and transferred pursuant to Decree No. 840 to a local Russian registrar. OFAC also clarifies that US persons who already filed initial blocking reports on blocked securities held at an SDN Russian registrar do not need to file amended

reports solely due to a change in local Russian registrar and can use their Annual Reports of Blocked Property to reflect any updated information if necessary (FAQ 1197).

- Address general license authorizations that exist for transactions related to US and third-country diplomatic or consular missions operating in Russia and Russian diplomatic or consular missions operating abroad (FAQ 1201).
- Clarify that personal, non-commercial remittances generally are not the target of US sanctions imposed on Russia and US and foreign financial institutions may continue to process transactions for activities, such as the facilitation of personal, non-commercial remittances, that do not involve blocked persons and are not otherwise prohibited by OFAC (FAQ 1202).
- Clarify that, for purposes of GL 115B, “civil nuclear energy” means the following activities when undertaken solely to maintain or support civil nuclear energy projects and operations initiated or under construction as of November 21, 2024: the extraction, production, refinement, conversion, enrichment, fabrication, transport or purchase of uranium in any form; the production, generation, transmission or exchange of nuclear power, fuel or waste; and the operation of civil nuclear energy projects. However, GL 115B does not authorize, for instance, transactions involving Gazprombank related to the development of new civil nuclear energy power plants after November 21, 2024, or related to the Paks II nuclear power plant project, including Paks II. Nuclear Power Plant Private Limited Company (Paks II. Ltd.), or any successor project (FAQ 1203).
- Clarify that the sector determination with respect to the energy sector of the Russian economy exposes persons that operate or have operated in the sector to sanctions risk but does not automatically impose sanctions on such persons (FAQ 1214).
- Explain that OFAC issued Ukraine GL 26A to ensure that transactions authorized or exempt under the RuHSR, including transactions authorized by a general or specific license, that involve specified persons identified in the Annex to GL 26A are also authorized under the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 589 (“URSR”), to the extent such transactions are prohibited by E.O. 13662 (FAQ 1215).
- Address questions related to prohibitions under the Petroleum Services Determination, including:
 - FAQ 1216 explains that Treasury issued the Petroleum Services Determination in line with G7 efforts to reduce Russian revenues from energy and provides a definition of petroleum services.

- FAQ 1217 clarifies that US service providers are still authorized to provide certain services relating to the maritime transport of Russian crude oil and Russian petroleum products to a non-sanctioned person operating in the energy sector of the Russian economy, so long as (i) the crude oil or petroleum products are purchased at or below the price cap and (ii) the provision of services does not involve an entity blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024 and is not otherwise prohibited by OFAC sanctions.

Embargo of Breakaway Territories

E.O. 14065 imposes an embargo, apparently modeled on E.O. 13685's embargo of Crimea, on the self-declared Donetsk People's Republic ("DPR") and Luhansk People's Republic ("LPR") regions of Ukraine (or such other regions of Ukraine as may be determined by the Secretary of the Treasury).¹²⁴

E.O. 14065 effectively prohibits new US investment in and any US trade with the regions.¹²⁵ The order authorizes future sanctions against persons determined to have operated in the DPR or LPR regions and certain other individuals and entities associated with such persons.

OFAC clarified that E.O. 14065 does not block the entire Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. In determining whether a location is within the regions subject to sanctions, one may reasonably rely on vetted information from reliable third parties (e.g., postal codes and maps).¹²⁶

General Licenses

In connection with these sanctions related to the breakaway territories, OFAC issued various general licenses:

GL 18: Transactions Related to Agricultural and Medical Commodities and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the DPR and LPR Regions

GL 18 authorizes transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to: (1) the exportation or reexportation of agricultural commodities, medicine, medical devices, replacement parts and components for medical devices or software updates for medical devices to the DPR and LPR regions or persons in other countries purchasing specifically for resale to these regions; or (2) the prevention, diagnosis or

¹²⁴ 87 Fed. Reg. 10293 (Feb. 23, 2022).

¹²⁵ E.O. 14065 prohibits the following activities in the DPR and LPR regions (the "Covered Regions"): (i) new investment in the Covered Regions by a US person, wherever located; (ii) the importation into the United States, directly or indirectly, of any goods, services or technology from the Covered Regions; (iii) the exportation, reexportation, sale or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by a US person, wherever located, of any goods, services or technology to the Covered Regions; and (iv) any approval, financing, facilitation or guarantee by a US person, wherever located, of a transaction by a foreign person that would be prohibited if performed by a US person or within the United States.

¹²⁶ OFAC FAQ 1009.

treatment of COVID-19 (including research or clinical studies relating to COVID-19) in the DPR and LPR regions.

GL 19: Telecommunications and Mail Transactions in the DPR and LPR Regions

GL 19 authorizes all transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the receipt or transmission of telecommunications in the DPR and LPR regions. The license does not authorize the provision, sale or lease of telecommunications equipment or technology or capacity on telecommunications transmission facilities.

GL 20: Official Business of Certain International Organizations in the DPR and LPR Regions

GL 20 authorizes transactions by employees, grantees or contractors for the conduct of the official business of: (i) the United Nations (including its programs, funds and other entities and bodies, as well as its specialized agencies and related organizations); (ii) the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency; (iii) the African Development Bank Group, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Inter-American Development Bank Group, including any fund entity administered or established by any of the foregoing; (iv) the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies; and (v) the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

GL 21: Noncommercial, Personal Remittances and Operation of Accounts

GL 21 authorizes all transactions that are ordinarily incident to the transfer of noncommercial, personal remittances to or from the DPR and LPR regions or for or on behalf of an individual ordinarily resident in those regions.

Transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to maintaining, operating or closing an account of an individual ordinarily resident in those regions, other than an SDN, are authorized, provided that the transactions processed through the account: (i) are of a personal nature and are not for the benefit of an entity, including supporting or operating a business; and (ii) do not involve transfers directly or indirectly to the DPR or LPR regions or for the benefit of persons ordinarily resident in the DPR or LPR regions unless the transfers are noncommercial, personal remittances.

US depository institutions, US-registered brokers or dealers in securities and US-registered money transmitters are authorized to process noncommercial, personal remittances regardless of whether the originator or beneficiary is an individual who is a US person. The license is not limited to a specific method of payment.¹²⁷

¹²⁷ FAQ 1007.

GL 22: Exportation of Certain Services and Software Incident to Internet-Based Communications

GL 22 authorizes all transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the exportation or reexportation, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by a US person, wherever located, to persons in the DPR and LPR regions of services incident to the exchange of personal communications over the internet or certain software that is necessary to enable such services.

However, this license does not authorize the exportation or reexportation, directly or indirectly, of services or software with knowledge or reason to know that such services or software are intended for any person whose property and interests in property are blocked.¹²⁸

GL 23: Certain Transactions in Support of Nongovernmental Organizations' Activities

GL 23 authorizes transactions by nongovernmental organizations that are ordinarily incident and necessary to support certain activities in the DPR or LPR regions. Such activities include humanitarian, democracy-building and educational projects; non-commercial development; and activities to support environmental and natural resource protection.

GL 24: Transactions Related to the Provision of Maritime Services

GL 24 authorizes transactions related to the provision or receipt of civil maritime services performed by individuals who are ordinarily resident in the DPR or LPR regions, provided that such services: (i) are performed outside of the DPR or LPR regions; and (ii) are not performed on behalf of any entity located in, or organized under, the laws of the DPR or LPR regions.

GL 25: Journalistic Activities and Establishment of News Bureaus in the DPR and LPR Regions

GL 25 authorizes US news reporting organizations or US individuals employed by a news reporting organization¹²⁹ (journalist, photojournalist, supporting broadcast or technical personnel) to engage in a variety of transactions in the DPR or LPR regions to the extent such transactions are ordinarily incident and necessary to journalistic activities.

GL 26A: Transactions Authorized Pursuant to the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations

GL 26A authorizes all transactions prohibited by E.O. 13662 involving one or more blocked persons listed in the Annex to GL 26A, or any entity in which those blocked persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50% or greater

¹²⁸ *Id.*

¹²⁹ "News reporting organization" means an entity whose primary purpose is the gathering and dissemination of news to the general public.

interest, that are authorized or exempt under the RuHSR, including transactions authorized by a general or specific license.

GL26A does not authorize: (i) any transaction prohibited by a directive issued pursuant to E.O. 13662, as incorporated into sections 589.202 through 589.205 of the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 589 (“URSR”); or (ii) any transaction involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR or the URSR, other than the blocked persons described in paragraph (a) of GL 26A, unless separately authorized.

Belarus

Full Blocking Sanctions

OFAC has imposed full blocking sanctions on various Belarusian entities and individuals in response to Belarus’s support for and facilitation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine as well as to target prominent Belarusian businessmen and their companies supporting President Lukashenka, including, for example:

- Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka (previously sanctioned) and his wife;
- Belarusian Bank of Development and Reconstruction Belinvestbank JSC;
- LLC Belinvest-Engineering;
- CJSC Belbizneslizing;
- Bank Dabrabyt JSC;
- Minsk Wheeled Tractor Plant (“MZKT”) and senior executives of MZKT;
- State Authority for Military Industry of the Republic of Belarus and its Chairman and Deputy Chairman;
- State Owned Foreign Trade Unitary Enterprise Belspetsvneshtekhnika;
- Belarusian Minister of Defense Viktor Khrenin;
- State Secretary of the Security Council of Belarus Aleksandr Volfovich;
- Belarusian Oil Trade House;
- OJSC Belarusian Automobile Plant (“BelAZ”);
- Sergei Nikiforovich (director of BelAZ);
- OJSC Minsk Automobile Plant (“MAZ”);
- Valery Ivankovick (director of MAZ);
- Secretary General for the Belarus Red Cross, Dzmitry Shautsou;
- Open Joint Stock Company Alevkurp;
- Planar Research and Production Holdings for Precision Engineering;

- OJSC Horizont Holding Management Company;
- OJSC Stankogomel;
- OJSC AGAT-Control Systems-Managing Company of Geoinformation Control Systems Holding;
- Aviakompaniya Rada LLC;
- UE RubiStar;
- Aviakompaniya Belkanto LLC;
- Ruzekspeditsiya LLC;
- VLATE Logistic LLC;
- Joint Stock Company Plant Legmash; and
- KB Unmanned Helicopters

Additionally, all entities that are owned 50% or more (directly or indirectly) by any of these entities or individuals are subject to blocking, even if not identified by OFAC.

As with the blocking sanctions described above, all property and interests in property of the designated individuals and entities that are in the United States or in the possession or control of US persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. All transactions by US persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons are prohibited unless authorized by OFAC or otherwise exempt.

General Licenses

In connection with these sanctions on Belarus, OFAC issued general licenses authorizing certain transactions related to:

GL 6: Official Business of the US Government

GL 6 authorizes all transactions that are for the conduct of the official business of the US government by its employees, grantees or contractors.

GL 7: Official Business of the UN and Other Organizations

GL 7 authorizes all transactions by employees, grantees or contractors for the conduct of the official business of: (i) the United Nations (including its programs, funds and other entities and bodies, as well as its specialized agencies and related organizations); (ii) the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency; (iii) the African Development Bank Group, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Inter-American Development Bank Group, including any fund entity administered or established by any of the foregoing; and (iv) the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

Export Controls

BIS now maintains several restrictions specific to Russia and Belarus.

New Licensing Requirements

On April 9, 2022, BIS expanded earlier licensing requirements for Russia and Belarus to all controlled items designated on the Commerce Control List.¹³⁰ Previously, BIS had issued the “Implementation of Sanctions Against Russia Under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR)” (“Russia Rule”) and the “Imposition of Sanctions Against Belarus Under the EAR” (“Belarus Rule” and, together with the Russia Rule, the “Rules”). The Russia Rule became effective on February 24, 2022, and the Belarus Rule on March 2, 2022. Both implemented new license requirements and licensing policies to further restrict the access of Russia and Belarus to controlled US goods, software and technologies, particularly items that Russia and Belarus rely on for their defense, aerospace and maritime industries, including semiconductors, computers, telecommunications, information security equipment, lasers and sensors.¹³¹

Beyond items on the Commerce Control List, on September 15, 2022, BIS issued a rule imposing further export controls on industrial and commercial items that can support Russian and Belarusian military aggression against Ukraine. The rule expanded the scope of export controls by, among other things, adding Belarus to the industry sector sanctions that previously applied only to Russia and expanding “military end user” and “military-intelligence end user” controls to cover six critical entities producing items for the Russian and Belarusian military and industrial sectors. In addition, the rule imposes controls on quantum computing-related hardware, software and technology, complementing the prohibition on quantum computing services to Russia.¹³² Since then, BIS has further expanded the scope of the Russian and Belarusian industry sector restrictions (oil and gas production, commercial and industrial items and chemical and biological precursors) and the sanctions on luxury goods to better align them with the controls that have been implemented by US allies and partners imposing substantially similar controls on Russia and Belarus.¹³³ BIS issued guidance noting that the expanded US export controls may be applied to third-country companies and government entities outside of Russia or Belarus attempting to provide material support for Russia’s and Belarus’s military and industrial sectors, including to replenish (“backfill”) technologies and other prohibited items.¹³⁴

¹³⁰ Press Release of the US Department of Commerce dated April 9, 2022, available [here](#).

¹³¹ 87 Fed. Reg. 12226 (Mar. 3, 2022). On March 2, 2022, BIS extended the export control policies put in place for Russia to Belarus (87 Fed. Reg. 13048 (Mar. 8, 2022)).

¹³² Press Release of the US Department of Commerce dated September 15, 2022, available [here](#); 87 Fed. Reg. 57068 (Sept. 16, 2022).

¹³³ 88 Fed. Reg. 12175 (Feb. 27, 2023).

¹³⁴ FAQ issued by the US Department of Commerce dated September 30, 2022, available [here](#).

On May 19, 2023, BIS expanded the list of items requiring licensing to (i) electronics, instruments and advanced fibers for the reinforcement of composite materials and (ii) discrete chemicals, biologics, fentanyl and its precursors and related equipment designated as items subject to the EAR but not specified on BIS's Commerce Control List ("EAR99 items").¹³⁵

On January 23, 2024, BIS further expanded the list of items to include certain chemicals, lubricants and metals, as well as aircraft, spacecraft and parts thereof. The rule also expanded controls on certain EAR99 antennas and antenna reflectors to further restrict these items from going to Iran and Russia, including when produced abroad with US technology or software.¹³⁶

On June 12, 2024, BIS again expanded the list of items requiring licensing to: (i) 522 additional Harmonized Tariff Schedule entries, intended to further undermine the Russian and Belarusian industrial bases and their ability to continue to support Russia's military aggression in Ukraine, resulting in BIS control over 22 chapters of Harmonized Tariff Schedule codes for export, reexport or transfer to or within Russia or Belarus; (ii) certain riot control agents; and (iii) certain software subject to the EAR.¹³⁷ BIS also limited the scope of eligible commodities and software that may be authorized for export, reexport or transfer (in-country) under License Exception Consumer Communications Devices ("CCD") to and within Russia and Belarus such that certain items, including lower-level graphics processing units, are no longer eligible for export to Russia or Belarus pursuant to License Exception CCD.¹³⁸

"Military End Users" and "Military End Uses"

Restrictions on Russian "military end users" and "military end uses" now cover all items subject to the EAR with exceptions for items classified as ECCN 5A992.c or 5D992.c (e.g., certain "mass market" computers and similar electronics and "mass market" software), so long as they are not for Russian "government end users" or Russian state-owned enterprises.¹³⁹

¹³⁵ Press Release of the US Department of Commerce dated May 19, 2023, available [here](#).

¹³⁶ Press Release of the US Department of Commerce dated January 23, 2024, available [here](#).

¹³⁷ 87 Fed. Reg. 51644 (June 18, 2024). The software subject to the additional license requirements includes: enterprise resource planning; customer relationship management; business intelligence; supply chain management; enterprise data warehouse; computerized maintenance management system; project management software, product lifecycle management; building information modelling; computer aided design; computer-aided manufacturing; engineering to order; and, as of August 2024, software for the operation of computer numerical control (CNC) machine tools (see 89 Fed. Reg. 68539 (Aug. 27, 2024)).

¹³⁸ 87 Fed. Reg. 51644.

¹³⁹ On June 2, 2022, BIS issued a final rule revising certain provisions of the EAR, including revising the controls for Russian and Belarussian military end uses and military end users by extending license requirements to include food and medicine designated as EAR99. License applications for such items will be subject to a case-by-case review policy. Press Release of the US Department of Commerce dated June 2, 2022, available [here](#).

On December 21, 2022, BIS imposed additional restrictions on the Wagner Group, which has been subject to US sanctions and on the Entity List since 2017 for its involvement in Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine. This action designates the Wagner Group as a Russian military end user and restricts its access to certain foreign-produced items.¹⁴⁰

BIS has also added seven Iranian entities involved in the manufacture of unmanned aerial vehicles ("UAVs") to the Entity List as Russian military end users. Marking the one-year anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, BIS added 86 entities supporting Russia's defense sector and war effort to the Entity List, with 76 of those entities being concurrently designated as Russian/Belarusian military end users.

On October 6, 2023, BIS added 13 entities to the Entity List and designated them as Russian/Belarusian military end users for supporting Russia's military through the procurement, development and proliferation of UAVs. As military end users, these entities are subject to the so-called Russia/Belarus-Military End User and Procurement Foreign Direct Product ("FDP") Rule, which subjects them to a license requirement and a license review policy of denial for all items subject to the EAR (except for food and medicine designated as EAR99). More than 50 new entities that were added to the Entity List on February 23, 2024, were concurrently designated as Russian/Belarusian military end users.¹⁴¹

New Foreign Direct Product Rules

The rules add an FDP Rule at 15 CFR 734.9(f) that is applicable to the entire countries of Russia and Belarus and another, broader new FDP rule at 15 CFR 734.9(g) directed at both Russian and Belarusian "military end users" and "Russian or Belarusian Procurement Entities" (i.e., an entity that poses a significant risk of involvement in the supply or diversion of items subject to the EAR to procurement networks for Russia's or Belarus's defense industry or intelligence services). The aim of these rules is to limit these two countries' access to certain items manufactured with US software or technology, even if manufactured by a non-US person outside the United States.

On May 23, 2023, BIS expanded the destination scope of the FDP Rule to the temporarily occupied Crimea region of Ukraine to make it more difficult for items to be procured for Russia's use in Crimea in support of its military aggression in Ukraine.¹⁴²

SDN-Related End-User Controls

Effective March 21, 2024, BIS expanded "luxury goods" sanctions against Russian and Belarusian oligarchs and malign actors to implement license requirements on exports, reexports and transfers (in-country) of all items subject to the EAR

¹⁴⁰ Press Release of the US Department of Commerce dated December 21, 2022, available [here](#).

¹⁴¹ Press Release of the US Department of Commerce dated February 23, 2024, available [here](#).

¹⁴² 88 Fed. Reg. 33422 (May 23, 2023).

involving a person blocked under any of 14 OFAC-administered sanctions programs, including seven program identifiers related to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.¹⁴³

Prior to this rule, the EAR had imposed licensing restrictions on exports, reexports and transfers (in-country) of "luxury goods" in which Russian or Belarusian oligarchs or "malign actors" blocked under seven of these Russia-related sanctions program identifiers—[BELARUS], [BELARUS-EO14038], [RUSSIA-EO14024], [UKRAINE-EO13660], [UKRAINE-EO13661], [UKRAINE-EO13662] and [UKRAINE-EO13685]—served as parties to the transaction. Among other changes, the March 2024 rule expands the license requirement to all items subject to the EAR, which encompasses all previously identified "luxury goods," and moves the relevant regulatory contents from previous § 746.10(a)(2) into a consolidated single section of the EAR under § 744.8.

Importantly, BIS notes that these license requirements under § 744.8 apply even to any reexportation or transfer (in-country) transaction that is not subject to regulation by OFAC, including due to the fact that the transaction does not involve US persons or the US financial system, thus ensuring that the US government can restrict such activity.¹⁴⁴ Additionally, there is a prohibition on the use of any license exceptions to overcome these license requirements, although the EAR authorization requirements will take into account OFAC general licenses and exemptions to ensure consistency, and a restrictive presumption of denial review policy will apply to license applications involving these persons as parties to the transaction.¹⁴⁵

Violations and Temporary Denial Orders

Since March 2022, BIS has identified numerous commercial and private aircraft that have flown into Russia in apparent violation of the EAR and notified the public that providing any form of service to these aircraft requires authorization.¹⁴⁶ There are now a total of 184 aircraft identified on the list for apparent violations of US export controls.

BIS has issued Temporary Denial Orders ("TDOs") to various airlines for their ongoing export violations of Russia-related export controls,¹⁴⁷ including to

¹⁴³ 89 Fed. Reg. 20107 (Mar. 21, 2024). The program identifiers are: [BELARUS], [BELARUS-EO14038], [RUSSIA-EO14024], [UKRAINE-EO13660], [UKRAINE-EO13661], [UKRAINE-EO13662], [UKRAINE-EO13685], [FTO], [SDGT], [NPWMD], [ILLCIT DRUGS-EO14059], [SDNT], [SDNTK] and [TCO].

¹⁴⁴ *Id.* at 20109.

¹⁴⁵ *Id.*

¹⁴⁶ Press Release of the US Department of Commerce dated March 18, 2022, available [here](#).

¹⁴⁷ Three Russian Airlines (Aeroflot, Azur Air and UTair) on April 7, 2022; Aviastar on April 21, 2022; Rossiya Airlines on May 20, 2022; Open Joint Stock Company Belavia Belarusian Airlines ("Belavia") on June 16, 2022; Nordwind Airlines, Pobeda Airlines and S7 Airlines on June 24, 2022; and URAL Airlines JSC on October 13, 2022. On September 12, 2025, BIS authorized certain activities of Belavia, including flights (i.e., exports and reexports) of certain Belavia aircraft to and from any destination, servicing, maintaining and/or refurbishing certain Belavia aircraft, and export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) of certain equipment, supplies and materials going to or for the use of certain Belavia aircraft, subject to certain terms and limitations. See BIS Letter to Belavia (Sept. 12, 2025), available [here](#).

Smartavia on May 16, 2023.¹⁴⁸ TDOs terminate the right of these entities to participate in transactions subject to the EAR, including exports and reexports from the United States. The TDOs are issued for 180 days and may be renewed.

BIS has also issued TDOs to individuals and companies for their involvement with Russian intelligence, including a number of export violations to procure highly sensitive technology (including advanced semiconductors) for Russian military, defense sector and research institutions.¹⁴⁹

Identification of Priority Export Items

BIS and various other agencies have identified priority items that may be used by Russia and/or Belarus to further military and defense capabilities (and which may, therefore, be at higher risk of export control evasion). The items identified by BIS and other agencies are intended to assist in the risk-based screening of export-related financial transactions and include, among others, the following commodities: (i) aircraft parts/equipment; (ii) antennas; (iii) breathing systems; (iv) cameras; (v) GPS systems; (vi) inertial measurement units; (vii) integrated circuits; and (viii) oil field equipment.¹⁵⁰ In addition, 50 “Common High-Priority Items” have been identified by their “Harmonized System” codes, including various electronic integrated circuits, wireless transceiver modules and related machines, radio navigational aids, capacitors, ball and roller bearings needed for heavy vehicles or other machinery and antennae used for navigation systems and other electrical parts.¹⁵¹

On June 12, 2024, BIS indicated that it had informed over 130 US distributors of additional restrictions on shipments to known suppliers to Russia.¹⁵² BIS noted the action was taken as part of BIS’s ongoing efforts to crack down on shipment of high-priority items to Russia and the controls focused on disrupting the flow of US and foreign-produced electronic components destined to Russia through intermediaries. Concurrently, BIS stated it would more extensively target foreign companies who

¹⁴⁸ Press Release of the US Department of Commerce dated May 16, 2023, available [here](#).

¹⁴⁹ See, e.g., Press Release of the US Department of Commerce dated December 13, 2022, available [here](#).

¹⁵⁰ See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) and BIS, FIN-2022-Alert003, *FinCEN and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security Urge Increased Vigilance for Potential Russian and Belarusian Export Control Evasion Attempts* (June 28, 2022), available [here](#).

¹⁵¹ The full, updated Common High Priority List is available [here](#). See FinCEN and BIS, FIN-2023-NTC2, *FinCEN and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security Announce New Reporting Key Term and Highlight Red Flags Relating to Global Evasion of U.S. Export Controls* (Nov. 6, 2023), available [here](#); FinCEN and BIS, FIN-2023-Alert004, *Supplemental Alert: FinCEN and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security Urge Continued Vigilance for Potential Russian Export Control Evasion Attempts* (May 19, 2023), available [here](#); BIS, *Guidance to Prevent Evasion of Prioritized Harmonized System Codes to Russia*, available [here](#); BIS and partners in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK, *Exporting Commercial Goods Guidance for Industry and Academia: Russia Sanctions – Common High Priority Items List* (Sept. 26, 2023), available [here](#). See also US Department of State, *Guidance to Industry on Iran’s UAV-Related Activities* (June 9, 2023) (noting use of Iranian UAVs to enable Russia’s war in Ukraine), available [here](#).

¹⁵² Press Release of the US Department of Commerce dated June 12, 2024, available [here](#).

supply US-branded products to Russia through Entity List additions and other related actions.

Entity List

BIS has added over 1,000 entities to the Entity List in connection with Russia's invasion of Ukraine and continued military aggression.¹⁵³ The entities added are located in various jurisdictions, including Belarus, Russia, the Crimea region of Ukraine, Switzerland, Latvia, China, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Belgium, India, South Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Cyprus, Kazakhstan and the United Arab Emirates ("UAE"), and were placed on the Entity List for numerous reasons, including:

- for acquiring and attempting to acquire items subject to the EAR in support of Belarus's and Russia's militaries;
- for their continued supply to Russian military end users;¹⁵⁴
- for acquiring or attempting to acquire US-origin items related to the quantum computing sector;¹⁵⁵
- for their significant contributions to or their involvement in the Russian military and/or the defense industrial base;¹⁵⁶
- for shipping US-origin and US-branded items to Russia in contravention of US export controls;¹⁵⁷ and
- for engaging in sanction evasion.

Being placed on the Entity List applies a highly restrictive policy of denial for the review of license applications for exports, reexports and transfers (in-country) to the listed entities of all items subject to the EAR and prohibits the use of all license exceptions for such transactions.

Effective June 12, 2024, BIS also made changes to the Entity List structure to enable BIS to publish high-diversion-risk addresses, and not only entities, on the Entity List.¹⁵⁸ As a result, the Entity List now includes addresses presenting a high risk of diversion for controlled items without an associated entity name, thus triggering a license requirement for all entities using that address.

¹⁵³ The latest additions to the Entity List were published as 15 CFR 744 on December 11, 2024, available [here](#).

¹⁵⁴ Press Release of the US Department of Commerce dated June 28, 2022, available [here](#).

¹⁵⁵ Press Release of the US Department of Commerce dated September 30, 2022, available [here](#).

¹⁵⁶ Press Release of the US Department of Commerce dated December 8, 2022, available [here](#); Press Release of the US Department of Commerce dated October 6, 2023, available [here](#); Press Release of the US Department of Commerce dated December 6, 2023, available [here](#).

¹⁵⁷ Press Release of the US Department of Commerce dated August 23, 2024, available [here](#).

¹⁵⁸ 87 Fed. Reg. 51644 (June 18, 2024).

To date, BIS has included addresses in Hong Kong and Türkiye associated with significant transshipment of sensitive goods to Russia or a significant number of entities whose activities risk violating the EAR.¹⁵⁹

Oil Refining Sector

On March 2, 2022, BIS issued two rules targeting Russia's oil refining sector.

The first rule builds on existing restrictions put in place on the Russian deepwater oil and gas exploration and extraction industries in 2014 by imposing a policy of denial on such items and applying similarly stringent restrictions on a wide variety of items necessary for refining oil. The purpose of this new rule is to limit Russia's ability to raise revenue from the sale of refined products, including gasoline that it can use to support its military efforts.¹⁶⁰

The second rule adds 91 new parties in 10 countries¹⁶¹ to the Department of Commerce's Entity List based on their involvement in, contributions to, or other support of the Russian security services, military and defense sectors and military and/or defense research and development efforts.¹⁶²

Iranian UAVs

In response to investigations indicating that pieces of Iranian UAVs were found on the battlefield in Ukraine, in some cases with US-branded "parts" and "components," BIS issued a new rule on February 24, 2023, imposing new export control measures on Iran.¹⁶³

The export control measures include:

- requiring licenses for a subset of EAR99 items, including semiconductors that are destined for Iran, regardless of whether a US person is involved in the transaction;
- establishing a new list (Supplement No. 7 to part 746) identifying these EAR99 items by HTS-6 Code to allow BIS and other US government agencies to track and quantify these exports;
- creating a new "Iran FDP Rule" specific to Iran for items in certain categories of the Commerce Control List and EAR99 items identified in the new supplement; and

¹⁵⁹ *Id.* at 51647-51648; 89 Fed. Reg. 68544.

¹⁶⁰ 87 Fed. Reg. 12856 (Mar. 8, 2022).

¹⁶¹ These entities are located in: Russia (81), United Kingdom (3), Estonia (3), Spain (2), Malta (2), Kazakhstan (1), Latvia (1), Belize (1), Singapore (1) and Slovakia.

¹⁶² 87 Fed. Reg. 13048 (Mar. 8, 2022).

¹⁶³ 88 Fed. Reg. 12150 (Feb. 27, 2023).

- revising the existing Russia/Belarus FDP rule to cover EAR99 items that have been found in UAVs containing parts and components branded as US or US-origin.

On May 19, 2023, BIS supplemented the Iran FDP Rule by expanding the list of items requiring a license for export or reexport to Iran to include various electrical parts of machinery or apparatus not elsewhere specified or included in the EAR.¹⁶⁴

On February 27, 2024, and pursuant to E.O. 13224, OFAC added two companies that own and operate a vessel on behalf of Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics ("MODAFL"), which "continues to facilitate the delivery of Iranian weapons, most notably unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), to Russia in support of its war of aggression in Ukraine."¹⁶⁵ In a related action, OFAC designated Generation Trading FZE, a UAE-based front company used by Iran's MODFAL to facilitate the sale of sample UAV models, UAV parts and related ground stations to support UAV production in Russia.¹⁶⁶

BIS Guidance to Financial Institutions on Compliance with the EAR

On October 9, 2024, BIS issued guidance providing best practice recommendations for financial institutions to ensure compliance with the EAR, noting that financial institutions' responsibilities under the EAR have increased significantly following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, among other reasons.¹⁶⁷ This BIS guidance is relevant for both US and non-US financial institutions in light of the EAR's so-called "commodity jurisdiction," which means that US export controls compliance obligations generally apply to any person, including non-US persons, dealing in items subject to the EAR. BIS's guidance sets out expectations for financial institutions regarding risk-based customer due diligence and transaction monitoring for potential violations or evasion of US export controls, including, among other steps, screening against lists of Russian or Belarusian military-intelligence end users or entities that have shipped Common High Priority List items to Russia since 2023 and monitoring for red flags related to Russia-related export control evasion.

¹⁶⁴ 88 Fed. Reg. 33422 (May 23, 2023).

¹⁶⁵ Press Release of the US Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Targets Vessel Shipping Iranian Commodities Valued at over \$100 Million for Iran's Ministry of Defense," dated February 27, 2024, available [here](#).

¹⁶⁶ Press Release of the US Department of the Treasury, "On Second Anniversary of Russia's Further Invasion of Ukraine and Following the Death of Aleksey Navalny, Treasury Sanctions Hundreds of Targets in Russia and Globally," dated February 23, 2024, available [here](#).

¹⁶⁷ See BIS, *Bureau of Industry and Security Issues New Guidance to Financial Institutions on Best Practices for Compliance with the Export Administration Regulations* (Oct. 9, 2024), available [here](#).

EU Sanctions

Since February 23, 2022, the EU has introduced multiple tranches of sanctions in response to events in Ukraine, which will have a profound and wide-ranging impact on trade between Russia and the EU. These sanctions can be broadly categorized as follows:

- **Financial sanctions**
 - **Asset freezes and travel bans:** targeting prominent Russian businessmen, Russian banks and Russian state-owned institutions. The asset freeze regime has also targeted individuals in Belarus considered to be assisting Russia in its military actions in Ukraine.
 - **“Any transaction” prohibition:** a sanctions regime different from asset freeze, which targets certain Russian state-owned-entities, crypto asset services providers, financial institutions, **RDIF and its affiliates**, and Russian persons litigating against EU counterparties in Russia and prohibits entering into any transactions with them.
 - **Financial sector sanctions:** including expanded capital market restrictions, restrictions preventing Russian persons from accessing certain financial services and credit rating services within the EU, restrictions on physically taking euros into Russia and restrictions on dealing with the Russian Central Bank’s assets and reserves.
 - **Targeted investment restrictions:** including restrictions on public (*i.e.*, EU government) financing for trade or investment in Russia, restrictions on investing in companies operating in the Russian energy or mining sectors, and a restriction on investing, participating or contributing to projects that are co-financed by the Russian Direct Investment Fund.
- **Trade sanctions**
 - **Export restrictions:** for dual-use goods and technology, goods and technology that contribute to Russia’s military or technological enhancement or industrial capacity, various energy, refining, aviation and maritime goods and technology, and luxury goods.
 - **Import restrictions:** on a wide range of what are deemed to be revenue generating goods, ranging from Russian origin steel and coal to various other common export products.

- **Intellectual property:** a prohibition on accepting certain intellectual property registration applications from Russian applicants.
- **Ukrainian cultural property restrictions:** on the purchase, import, transfer, sale, supply or export of Ukrainian cultural property illegally removed from Ukraine.
- **Trade restrictions for non-government controlled areas of Ukraine:** EU-imposed import and investment restrictions, as well restrictions on export of transport, telecom and energy goods and provision of certain services on Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kerson regions of Ukraine that are not controlled by the government of Ukraine.
- **Oil price cap:** prohibiting maritime transport of Russia-origin oil and oil products to third countries, unless it falls under a certain price limit set by the EU, UK and US.
- **Transport restrictions:** Russian air carriers are cut off from operating with the EU, and transport undertakings with Russian ownership cannot operate in Europe.
- **Russian ports, locks and airports restrictions:** the EU prohibited entering into any transactions with listed Russian ports, locks and airports.
- **Media restrictions:** prohibiting the broadcast of or contribution to the broadcast of a number of key Russian stations.
- **Professional services restrictions:** prohibiting EU persons from providing a range of services, from accounting and legal services to engineering and IT consultancy services, and certain types of industrial software and software for banking.
- **Trust services restrictions:** prohibiting provision of services to trusts with Russian beneficiaries.

These restrictions have been complemented by unprecedented direct report requirements applicable to EU operators and a strong push from the EU Commission for EU Member States to increase enforcement activities in relation to these sanctions regimes.

Financial Sanctions

The most significant new restrictions imposed by the EU consist of measures targeting Russian entities' and individuals' access to EU financial services. These include the expansion of the previously existing EU capital market restrictions and

the introduction of a range of novel restrictions that work to cut Russia off from the European financial markets, and business with Europe more generally.

The impact of these restrictions is amplified though the EU issuing guidance which confirms that EU nationals working for a non-EU subsidiary of an EU company are personally bound by the sanctions and can therefore be held personally liable for participating in transactions that breach EU sanctions. Furthermore, decisions made by foreign subsidiaries that need to be cleared by their EU parent companies may also fall within the scope of EU sanctions.

Asset Freezes and Travel Bans

The EU has imposed a number of asset freezes and travel bans, targeting prominent Russian businessmen, Russian banks, Russian state-owned institutes and Russian political figures. The asset freezes have also targeted persons in Belarus considered to be assisting in Russia's actions in Ukraine, persons in Iran supplying drones to Russia, and Russian persons allegedly involved in military and defense sector, as well as disinformation and propaganda. The EU also expanded the listing criteria for asset freeze designations to include those who facilitate circumvention of sanctions. On June 23, 2023,¹⁶⁸ this circumvention-based listing ground was extended to apply to persons and entities taking steps to significantly frustrate EU sanctions against Russia. The EU Council clarified that this designation ground aims to target third-country operators not bound by EU sanctions measures. Indicators of significant frustration could include (but are not limited to): (i) the main activity of a third country operator consisting of purchasing restricted goods in the EU that reach Russia; (ii) the recent creation of a company for purposes related to restricted goods reaching Russia; or (iii) a drastic increase in the turnover of a third-country operator involved in such activities.

On February 24, 2025, the EU introduced two new asset freeze designation grounds aimed at natural or legal persons:¹⁶⁹

- that own, control, manage or operate “shadow fleet” vessels that transport crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, or that otherwise provide material, technical or financial support to the operations of such vessels; or
- forming part of, supporting materially or financially, or benefitting from Russia's military and industrial complex, including by being involved in the development, production or supply of military technology and equipment.

In total, asset freezes and travel bans have been imposed on over 1,745 individuals and over 585 entities since February 21, 2022. As of December 16, 2022, EU Member

¹⁶⁸ Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1215 of 23 June 2023, available [here](#).

¹⁶⁹ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/390 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

States reported EUR 18.9 billion of frozen assets located in their jurisdictions. The most prominent individuals and entities sanctioned by the EU include:¹⁷⁰

Financial institutions	State-owned enterprises	Prominent business figures	Political figures
VEB	SOGAZ	Alisher Usmanov	Vladimir Putin
Bank Rossiya	RDIF	German Khan	Sergei Lavrov
PSB	United Shipbuilding Corporation	Igor Sechin	All members of the State Duma
Otkritie	PJSC United Aircraft Corporation	Roman Abramovich	Deputy Ministers
Sovcombank	PJSC United Aircraft Corporation	Andrei Kostin	146 members of the Russian Federation Council
Novikombank	(“United Aircraft Corporation”)	Mikhail Fridman	Members of the Russian National Security Council
VTB	FGUE Atomflot (“Atomflot”)	Gennadiy Timchenko	Senior military leaders
National Settlement Depository (“NSD”)	PJSC Alrosa	Dmitry Mazepin	
Sberbank	JSC Sovcomflot	Andrey Melnichenko	
Credit Bank of Moscow	PJSC Surgutneftegas	Oleg Deripaska	
JSC Far Eastern Bank (“Far Eastern Bank”)		Petr Aven	
Alfa-Bank		Herman Gref	
JSC Tinkoff Bank (“Tinkoff Bank”)		Said Kerimov	
Rosbank		Alexey Mordashov	
Russian National Reinsurance Company		Victor Rashnikov	
Alfa Insurance		Alexei Kuzmichev	
		Andrei Skoch	
		Igor Kesaev	
		Igor Altushkin	
		Vladimir Yevtushenkov	

On April 13, 2022, the EU amended its asset freeze regime. Asset freezes do not apply to funds or economic resources made available by organizations and agencies that are pillar-assessed by the Union and with which the Union has signed a financial framework partnership agreement for humanitarian purposes, provided that the provision of such funds or economic resources is necessary for exclusively humanitarian purposes in Ukraine. Furthermore, the relevant government bodies of Member States can now grant specific or general authorizations to release or make available funds or economic resources that are necessary for exclusively humanitarian purposes in Ukraine. An authorization will automatically be granted if

¹⁷⁰ For further information, see our Russian Billionaires Table at Annex A.

a relevant government body does not respond to a request for such an authorization within five days of receipt by giving a negative decision, making a request for information or making a notification for additional time.

On July 21, 2022, the EU imposed an obligation for EU asset frozen persons to report their assets located in any Member State to the competent authority of that Member State within six weeks of the asset freeze being imposed. Where an asset freeze has already been imposed, the asset frozen person must report their assets before September 1, 2022. Failure to do so will be considered a circumvention of EU sanctions (which may, in turn, mean that the assets are confiscated if later identified by EU authorities). On February 25, 2023, EU introduced a new obligation to provide the following information to EU Member State authorities within two weeks of acquiring it: (i) information on the frozen funds or funds of an asset frozen persons which were not treated as frozen, and (ii) information on any assets belonging to an asset frozen person that were moved, transferred or altered two weeks before listing of the relevant person.

Furthermore, persons and entities must now report information they hold about asset frozen persons or entities, such as account information and amount of frozen assets, to the Member State in which they are located or resident.

On December 16, 2022, the EU introduced a new derogation to combat food insecurity. This allows Member States to unfreeze the assets of and to make funds and economic resources available to individuals playing a significant role in the international trade of agricultural and food products, including fertilizers and wheat.

Russian nationals have also been prohibited from holding any positions in the governing bodies of EU critical infrastructures and entities.

Starting from June 23, 2023, the EU Member State authorities may also authorize release of frozen funds belonging to a designated person or provision of services to a designated person, so long as this is strictly necessary to set up, certify or evaluate a firewall. Under a “firewall,” the EU understands an arrangement that (i) removes the control of a designated person over the assets of a non-listed entity incorporated in the EU and (ii) ensures that no further funds or economic resources will accrue for the benefit of a designated person.

On September 13, 2023, the EU removed asset freeze sanctions from three Russian businessmen (Aleksandr Shulgin, Farkhad Akhmedov and Grigory Berezkin) and one deceased Russian military official. Removal of Aleksandr Shulgin is a response to the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union on September 6, 2023, where the Court agreed that the EU has no basis to maintain sanctions against

Aleksandr Shulgin.¹⁷¹ The EU has not published any official reasoning for removal of the other Russian businessmen.

On December 18, 2023, the EU made a number of changes to its asset freeze regime. In particular, the EU extended its listing criteria (i) to cover entities and individuals who benefit from the compulsory transfer of ownership of, or control over, entities established in Russia that were previously owned or controlled by EU entities, and (ii) to provide that deceased asset frozen persons can now remain asset frozen where there is a likelihood that the assets could still be used to finance the war in Ukraine.¹⁷²

The EU also introduced new derogation grounds, allowing (i) the frozen funds to be released where an EU Member State has determined that it is in the public interest to deprive an asset frozen person or entity of the frozen funds, assuming that any compensation is frozen; (ii) sale or use of shares in, or assets of, Russian entities where the ownership or control by an EU individual of that entity has been compulsorily transferred by the Russian government, in order to enable payment, consideration or compensation arising in the context of such compulsory transfer; (iii) payments by the newly designated Alfa Insurance under its insurance programs; (iv) the sale and transfer by June 30, 2024, of proprietary rights directly or indirectly owned by certain sanctioned Russian businessmen, including Mikhail Fridman, Petr Aven, Gennady Timchenko and Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, and sanctioned Russian entities JSC VO Technopromexport and LLC VO Technopromexport; and (v) winding down of transactions with JSC Alabuga until June 20, 2024.

On December 18, 2023, the EU also requested that EU Member State authorities appoint, by October 31, 2024, national authorities competent to identify and trace, where appropriate, the funds and economic resources of designated persons to prevent sanctions breaches and circumvention.

On January 3, 2024, the EU imposed an asset freeze on PJSC Alrosa, the world's largest diamond mining company, and its CEO.¹⁷³

On February 23, 2024, the EU imposed asset freezes on 106 individual and 88 entities, with a strong focus on Russia's military-industrial complex.¹⁷⁴

On June 24 and 28, 2024, the EU imposed asset freezes on 71 persons and 51 entities, including Ural Airlines, Volga Dnepr Group and Volga Dnepr Airlines.¹⁷⁵

Furthermore, the EU introduced a new licensing ground to release funds that were frozen as a result of involvement of a designated intermediary bank during a transfer

¹⁷¹ Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in case T-364/22, available [here](#).

¹⁷² Council Regulation (EU) 2023/2873 of 18 December 2023, available [here](#).

¹⁷³ Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/195 of 21 December 2023, available [here](#).

¹⁷⁴ Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/753 of 23 February 2024, available [here](#).

¹⁷⁵ Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1746 of 24 June 2024, available [here](#), and Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1842 of 28 June 2024, available [here](#).

of those funds from Russia to the EU, provided that the transfer of funds (i) is between two non-designated persons, (ii) is carried out using accounts in non-designated credit institutions and (iii) does not involve making available funds to designated persons or result in the circumvention of EU sanctions. The EU also introduced a licensing ground to release a payment that was frozen as a result of a transfer from Russia to the EU initiated through or from a designated legal entity, provided that the transfer of payment (i) is between two non-designated persons (where the beneficiary of the released payment is a national or resident of the EU, the European Economic Area (“EEA”) or Switzerland) and (ii) does not involve making available funds to designated persons or circumvention of EU sanctions. These two new licensing grounds do not apply to funds frozen in the central securities depositories.

On October 14, 2024, the EU designated on the asset freeze list Iranian airlines, procurement and production firms involved in the supply of UAVs to Russia.

Notably, the EU designated NSD on the EU asset freeze list on June 3, 2022, long before the US and UK designations. Unlike OFAC, the EU Commission has not yet responded to the measures taken by the Russian authorities to remove NSD from the custodial chain for shares of Russian issuers that are held by foreign investors from “hostile states”; these measures were interpreted by OFAC as an attempt to undermine the effect of Western sanctions on NSD.

On December 16, 2024, the EU designated 54 persons and 30 entities, including oil shipping companies, commercial airline UTAIR, a private jet company that serviced flights between Russia and the EU, and Chinese and Hong Kong entities supplying drone components and microelectronic components to Russia.¹⁷⁶

On December 16, 2024, the EU also introduced a new licensing ground to release cash balances frozen by Euroclear and Clearstream at the participant accounts of NSD or any other Russian asset frozen entity. This applies in scenarios where NSD has debited a cash amount from Euroclear’s or Clearstream’s own accounts at NSD under a law, decree, regulation, judicial or administrative decision or any other measure attributable to Russia, without the prior consent of Euroclear or Clearstream. In response, Euroclear and Clearstream can release cash balances from NSD’s or another asset frozen person’s accounts and use such balances to meet legal obligations to Euroclear and Clearstream participants.¹⁷⁷

On February 24, 2025, the EU designated 48 individuals and 35 entities on the asset freeze list, including Russian defense entities, electronics manufacturers and research institutes, companies operating Russia’s “shadow fleet” and a Chinese firm specializing in producing satellite imagery.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/3182 of 16 December 2024, available [here](#).

¹⁷⁷ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/3182 of 16 December 2024, available [here](#).

¹⁷⁸ Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/389 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

On May 20, 2025, the EU designated 17 individuals and 58 entities on the asset freeze list, including Russian defense entities, electronics manufacturers, shipping companies, UAV manufacturers and companies operating Russia's "shadow fleet." This action included asset freeze designation of a major Russian energy company, PJSC Surgutneftegas. The EU also designated on the asset freeze list a number of Chinese, Israeli and UAE entities involved in the supply of industrial goods, electronics, UAV, helicopter and drone components and oil shipping.¹⁷⁹ Many of these designations were made under the new asset freeze designation ground included in the 16th package of EU sanctions and target those supporting Russia's military and industrial complex.

On July 18, 2025, the EU designated 14 individuals and 41 entities on the asset freeze list, including Indian refinery Nayara Energy Limited and entities located in the UAE, Azerbaijan, China, Hong Kong, Mauritius and Singapore.¹⁸⁰

New Asset Freeze Regime—Russia's Hybrid Threats

On October 8, 2024, the EU enacted Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's broader politically destabilizing activities ("Russia Hybrid Threats Regime"). The new regime authorizes the imposition of asset freeze sanctions on persons, entities or bodies responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefitting from actions by or policies of the Russian government that undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability, security, sovereignty or independence in the EU, in its Member States, in any international organization or in any third country.¹⁸¹

On December 16, 2024, the EU made its first designations under the new Russia Hybrid Threats Regime. These designations include 16 individuals and three entities from Russian intelligence and disinformation networks.¹⁸²

On May 20, 2025, the EU made further designations under the Russia Hybrid Threats Regime, adding to the UK asset freeze list 22 individuals and six entities, such as Russian media companies, a radio frequency regulator and a server hosting provider.¹⁸³

On May 20, 2025, the Russia Hybrid Threats Regime was also expanded to provide a framework for a broader range of EU sanctions restrictions, which could indicate that the EU seeks to establish grounds to impose additional sanctions on Russia without needing to link such restrictions to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The new framework:¹⁸⁴

¹⁷⁹ Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/933 of 20 May 2025, available [here](#).

¹⁸⁰ Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1476 of 18 July 2025, available [here](#).

¹⁸¹ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 of 8 October 2024.

¹⁸² Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/3188 of 16 December 2024, available [here](#).

¹⁸³ Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/965 of 20 May 2025, available [here](#).

¹⁸⁴ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/964 of 20 May 2025, available [here](#).

- Extends asset freeze designation grounds to include the facilitation of or involvement in certain targeted activities.
- Introduces a prohibition on engaging, directly or indirectly, in any transaction relating to or involving any listed tangible asset. These assets include vessels, aircraft, real estate, ports, airports and physical elements of digital and communication networks that (i) are used in activities of a destabilizing character attributable to or benefitting the Russian government, such as damage to critical infrastructure, international air, land and marine traffic, espionage, transfer of weapons or military personnel and manipulation of information, or (ii) are owned, chartered or operated by, or used on behalf of, a person designated under the Russia Hybrid Threats Regime. So far, no assets have been added to the list.
- Introduces a prohibition on engaging, directly or indirectly, in any transaction with:
 - listed non-EU credit or financial institutions or crypto assets services providers involved in transactions that facilitate activities by, or otherwise provide support to; or
 - listed entities providing technical or operational assistance to:

persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities falling under the Russia Hybrid Threats Regime. So far, no entities have been added to the list.
- Introduces restrictions for listed Russian media companies, including: (i) a prohibition for European operators to broadcast or to enable, facilitate or otherwise contribute to broadcasting any content by the listed Russian media companies; (ii) the suspension of any broadcasting license or authorization, transmission or distribution arrangement for such listed Russian media companies; and (iii) a prohibition to advertise products or services in any content produced or broadcast by such listed Russian media companies. So far, no entities have been added to the list.

On June 26, 2025, and July 15, 2025, the EU made further asset freeze designations under the Russia Hybrid Threats Regime. These designations target the state-owned Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network, persons associated with it, and persons and entities engaged in Russian propaganda and spreading disinformation.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁵ Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1444 of 15 July 2025, available [here](#); Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1278 of 26 June 2025 available [here](#).

Ownership and Control

On July 3, 2024, the EU Council updated the EU Best Practices for the Effective Implementation of Restrictive Measures (the “EU Best Practices”) and clarified in which cases an entity owned or controlled by a designated person can become targeted by EU asset freeze sanctions.¹⁸⁶

- The ownership threshold for imposition of asset freeze sanctions has been changed from “more than 50% of the proprietary rights” to “50% or more of the proprietary rights.” The EU ownership test, thus, aligns with the approach of the United States to automatic extension of US blocking sanctions.
- The EU Best Practices reconfirmed that the aggregated ownership of two or more designated minority shareholders that meets the 50% threshold will be considered for extending EU asset freeze sanctions to their subsidiary.
- The EU Best Practices have not materially changed the control test—it continues to be based on a non-exhaustive list of control criteria, such as a power to appoint the majority of the board of directors, or a power to control the majority of voting rights. However, the EU Best Practices have clarified that the control criterion of exercising dominant influence over an entity includes “de facto” dominant influence.
- The EU Best Practices offer a list of control red flags, such as (i) a designated person holding a non-majority interest in an entity which is the largest among other shareholders, (ii) a designated person retaining a buy back right under favorable conditions after selling the asset, (iii) a transfer of shares shortly before or after designation of the shareholder, (iv) use of trusts and shell companies to create a needlessly complex corporate structure, or (v) close connections between the new owner and the previous designated owner or involvement of third parties with suspiciously broad authority.

The “Any Transaction” Prohibition

All transactions with certain state-owned entities are now prohibited, unless they are strictly necessary for the purchase, import or transport of fossil fuels and certain metals and minerals, as well as natural gas and oil, including refined petroleum products. This includes transactions with legal persons, entities or bodies established outside the EU that are 50% or more owned by these state-owned entities. The relevant state-owned entities are:

- | | |
|-------------------------------|---------------|
| • OPK Oboronprom | • Almaz-Antey |
| • United Aircraft Corporation | • Kamaz |
| • Uralvagonzavod | |

¹⁸⁶ EU Council - Update of the EU Best Practices for the effective implementation of restrictive measures, No. 11623/24 of 3 July 2024, available [here](#).

- Rosneft
- Transneft
- Gazprom Neft
- Russian Regional Development Bank
- Rostec (Russian Technologies State Corporation) JSC PO Sevmash
- Sovcomflot
- United Shipbuilding Corporation
- Russian Maritime Register of Shipping

These restrictions form a novel form of EU sanctions that go beyond a typical EU asset freeze and, in some ways, are closer to the US blocking sanctions concept.

Furthermore, EU nationals are prohibited from holding any posts on the governing bodies of all Russian state-owned or controlled legal persons, entities or bodies.

On July 18, 2025, the EU introduced an exemption from the “any transaction” prohibition for EU entities that act on behalf of, or at the direction of, the listed state-owned Russian entities, provided that: (i) competent authorities have imposed a public trusteeship or similar public firewall measure on such an entity; or (ii) a similar firewall measure is authorized by competent authorities in order to ensure these entities’ continued functioning and compliance with restrictive measures.¹⁸⁷ This amendment addresses the controversies that have arisen as a result of EU authorities imposing trusteeships on European subsidiaries of certain Russian state-owned companies, including Rosneft.

On June 24, 2024, the EU created a framework for applying “any transaction” prohibitions against (i) non-EU credit or financial institutions and entities providing crypto assets services involved in transactions that facilitate the supply of certain prohibited categories of goods to Russia, (ii) entities acting on behalf or at the direction of entities falling within category (i) and (iii) persons who lodged a claim before a Russian court against an EU person to obtain an injunction, order, relief, judgment or other court decision in connection with any transaction the performance of which has been affected by Russia-related sanctions.¹⁸⁸

On February 24, 2025, the EU expanded these restrictions by prohibiting “any transactions” with non-EU credit or financial institutions and entities providing crypto assets services that: (i) are involved in frustrating sanctions imposed on certain Russian vessels that contribute to Russia’s capacity to wage war against Ukraine; or (ii) circumvent the Oil Price Cap.¹⁸⁹ So far, no person has been designated under this new framework. On July 18, 2025, the EU expanded this “any transaction” prohibition to target the following listed persons: (i) non-EU credit or financial institutions and entities providing crypto assets services that are significantly frustrating EU trade or financial sanctions targeting Russia; (ii) non-EU credit or financial institutions and entities providing crypto assets services that

¹⁸⁷ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 of 18 July 2025, available [here](#).

¹⁸⁸ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 of 24 June 2024, available [here](#).

¹⁸⁹ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

support Russia's aggression against Ukraine, including by processing transactions or providing export financing for trade operations that frustrate trade sanctions targeting Russia; and (iii) other non-EU entities significantly frustrating sanctions targeting Russian oil exports and the Russian "shadow fleet."¹⁹⁰ The prohibition has also been extended to entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of any of the listed credit or financial institutions and other entities. The EU has so far used these new designation grounds to impose sanctions on two Chinese banks.

On July 18, 2025, the EU also imposed the following new "any transaction" prohibitions:

- A prohibition to engage, directly or indirectly, in any transaction in connection with the natural gas pipelines Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2, with regard to the completion, operation, maintenance or use of the pipelines. The prohibition also applies to any transaction connected to financing for the completion, operation or use of these pipelines.¹⁹¹
- A prohibition to engage in any transaction with (i) RDIF; (ii) a legal person, entity or body owned or controlled by RDIF; (iii) a listed legal person, entity or body established outside the EU in which an entity in (i) or (ii) has made, directly or indirectly, a significant investment; (iv) a listed legal person, entity or body established outside the EU providing investment services or other financial services to any entity in (i), (ii) or (iii); and (v) a legal person, entity or body acting on behalf of or at the direction of an entity referred to in (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv).¹⁹² The EU has listed several entities under point (iii): VizorLabs LLC, Kama (Atom) JSC, BitRiver LLC and LABADVANCE LLC.

Until December 31, 2026, EU sanctions authorities may authorize transactions strictly necessary for the divestment and withdrawal from Russia or the wind-down of business activities in Russia associated with the above RDIF-related entities.

- An extension of the existing SWIFT messaging system ban to a full transaction ban against targeted Russian banks and any entity established in Russia that is more than 50% owned by such listed entity. The list of entities includes all banks that were previously subject to a ban on using the SWIFT messaging system and an additional 22 previously un-listed Russian banks.¹⁹³

¹⁹⁰ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 of 18 July 2025, available [here](#).

¹⁹¹ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 of 18 July 2025, available [here](#).

¹⁹² Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 of 18 July 2025, available [here](#).

¹⁹³ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 of 18 July 2025, available [here](#).

Financial Sector Sanctions

Expansion of Capital Market Restrictions: EU capital market restrictions have been in force since 2014, when they were first imposed on a number of Russian banks, military manufacturers and oil and gas companies (e.g., Sberbank, VTB, VEB, GazpromNeft and Transneft). Very broadly, these restrictions prevent persons subject to EU jurisdiction from dealing with transferable securities (including crypto assets) and money market instruments issued by targeted entities and offering new loans or credit to targeted entities.

The EU's expansion of these restrictions applies in three main ways:

- The EU added a number of targets to its capital market restriction list, with restrictions applying to transferable securities and money market instruments issued after April 12, 2022. These now additionally target: (i) banks that are deemed to be supporting the Russian government (Alfa Bank, Otkritie, Bank Rossiya and Promsvyazbank); (ii) state owned manufacturers (Almaz-Antey, Kamaz, Novorossiysk Commercial Sea Port, Rostec, Russian Railways, JSC PO Sevmash, Sovcomflot, United Shipbuilding Corporation and Russian Maritime Register of Shipping); and (iii) the Russian government and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
- The EU tightened the restrictions on entities previously targeted by EU capital market restrictions (e.g., by removing the minimum maturity period for affected transferable securities, money market instruments and loans).
- The EU also restricted the listing and provision of services of shares of a legal person, entity or body established in Russia and with over 50% public ownership on EU trading venues from April 12, 2022.

EU capital market restrictions originally included an exemption for (i) loans or credit for non-prohibited imports or exports of goods and non-financial services between the EU and any third state; (ii) emergency funding to meet solvency and liquidity criteria for more than 50% owned subsidiaries of listed entities; and (iii) drawdown or disbursements made under a contract concluded before February 26, 2022. On December 18, 2023, the EU added a requirement that EU persons must notify the EU Member State authorities within three months of the date of any such exempted loan, credit, drawdown or disbursement.¹⁹⁴

Financial Services Restrictions Targeting Russian Persons: The EU has implemented unprecedented restrictions targeting all Russian nationals and residents and Russian companies, entities and bodies ("Russian Persons").

¹⁹⁴ Council Regulation (EU) 2023/2878 of 18 December 2023, available [here](#).

- There is a prohibition on the acceptance of deposits exceeding EUR 100,000 from Russian Persons, except for nationals of a Member State, the EEA or Switzerland or natural persons having a temporary or permanent residence permit in a Member State, the EEA or Switzerland. Member State authorities may authorize the acceptance of certain types of deposits, for instance (i) deposits which are necessary for non-prohibited cross-border trade in goods and services between the EU and Russia; and (ii) deposits intended exclusively for the payment of fees or service charges for the routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or economic resources.
- The EU also banned the provision of crypto-asset wallet, account or custody services to Russian Persons, regardless of the total value of those crypto assets. The prohibition does not apply to nationals of a Member State, the EEA or Switzerland or natural persons having a temporary or permanent residence permit in a Member State, the EEA or Switzerland. Similar authorizations from a Member State authority, as for deposit restrictions above, are available for the crypto-assets related services. On December 18, 2023, the EU prohibited Russian nationals or residents from owning or controlling, or holding any posts in the governing bodies of, the EU providers of crypto-asset wallet, account or custody services, after January 18, 2024.¹⁹⁵
- The holding of accounts of or provision of services for Russian Persons by the EU Central Securities Depositories ("CSD") is prohibited in relation to any transferable securities issued after April 12, 2022.
- Selling securities or units in collective investment undertakings and providing exposure to such investments denominated in Euro and all official currencies of the EU Member States issued after April 12, 2022, to Russian Persons is prohibited. The prohibition does not apply to nationals of a Member State, the EEA or Switzerland or natural persons having a temporary or permanent residence permit in a Member State, the EEA or Switzerland. On June 23, 2023, this prohibition was expanded to transferable securities denominated in any other currency and issued after August 6, 2023.
- Diplomats, other Russian officials and business people are no longer able to benefit from visa facilitation provisions.
- EU entities that are more than 40% directly or indirectly owned by a Russian entity, national or resident must report on a quarterly basis, from May 1, 2024, all fund transfers above EUR 100,000 out of the EU. From July 1, 2024, credit and financial institutions must also report, on a twice-a-year basis, information on all

¹⁹⁵ Council Regulation (EU) 2023/2878 of 18 December 2023, available [here](#).

fund transfers out of the EU exceeding a cumulative amount of EUR 100,000 initiated for such entities.¹⁹⁶

As part of these changes, the EU also expanded the anti-circumvention provisions to prevent non-Russian Persons acting as substitutes for Russian Persons for this purpose.

Euro Cash Restrictions: The sale, supply, transfer or export of banknotes denominated in Euro and all official currencies of EU Member States to Russian persons, including the government and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, or for use in Russia, is prohibited. A small number of Member States authorizations are included, such as for diplomatic services.

On February 24, 2025, the EU exempted banknotes used for civil society and media activities that promote democracy, human rights and rule of law in Russia and rely on funding from the EU, Member States or “partner countries” (this exemption supplemented already existing exemptions for personal use by persons travelling to Russia and for diplomatic purposes).¹⁹⁷

SWIFT and SPFS Restrictions: The EU cut off the following Russian banks from the international SWIFT messaging system:

<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Otkritie• Novikombank• PSB• Bank Rossiya• Sberbank• Credit Bank of Moscow• Ak Bars Bank• Bank Uralsib• Tochka Bank• National Reserve Bank• Roseximbank• Bank SINARA• Primsotsbank	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Sovcombank• VEB• VTB• Joint Stock Company Russian Agricultural Bank (JSC Rosselkhozbank)• BBR Bank• RNKO Platezhnyy Konstruktor• Peterburg’s Settlement Centre• Kuznets Business Bank• MIR Business Bank• Bank Kuban Kredit¹⁹⁸
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As noted above, on July 18, 2025, the ban on accessing SWIFT has been converted into an “any transaction” prohibition.¹⁹⁹

Since 2014, the Russian government has attempted to develop an alternative to the SWIFT financial messaging system called the System for Transfer of Financial

¹⁹⁶ Council Regulation (EU) 2023/2878 of 18 December 2023, available [here](#).

¹⁹⁷ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

¹⁹⁸ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

¹⁹⁹ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 of 18 July 2025, available [here](#).

Messages (“SPFS”). On June 24, 2024, the EU prohibited (i) EU entities operating outside Russia from connecting to the SPFS and (ii) any EU person from engaging in any transactions with specified non-Russian persons who use the SPFS.²⁰⁰

On February 24, 2025, the EU imposed “any transaction” bans on Bank BelVEB, Belgazprombank and VTB Bank (PJSC) Shanghai Branch on the basis that they use SPFS. The EU also introduced a special derogation ground, allowing EU persons to enter transactions with Bank BelVEB if necessary for: (i) the repayment of guaranteed export credits; (ii) transactions strictly necessary for divestment from Russia or the wind-down of business activities in Russia by August 26, 2025, which were covered by export credit guarantees by an EU Member State; or (iii) the execution of contracts concluded before February 25, 2025, until August 26, 2025, or until their expiry date, whichever is earlier, for beneficiaries located in the EU.²⁰¹

Restrictions on Dealing with the Central Bank of Russia for Currency Services: The EU has imposed a ban on transactions that relate to the management of reserves and assets of the Russian Central Bank, including transactions with any legal person, entity or body acting on its behalf such as the Russian National Wealth Fund.

On December 16, 2024, the EU clarified the obligations of CSDs with respect to Russian Central Bank assets and reserves that are immobilized as a result of EU sanctions, prohibiting their management. In particular, CSDs will not be liable for managing in good faith the CBR’s assets and reserves, and cash balances stemming from them, unless it is proved that such action was a result of negligence.²⁰²

Restrictions on Credit Rating Services: EU prohibited the provision of credit ratings and access to any subscription services related to credit rating activities to Russian nationals, residents and entities.

Investment Restrictions

A number of sanctions relating to investments have also been imposed, as follows:

- It is prohibited to invest, participate or otherwise contribute to projects co-financed by the Russian Direct Investment Fund.
- An authority may authorize, under certain conditions, an investment participation in or contribution to projects co-financed by the Russian Direct Investment Fund if it determines that it is due under contracts concluded before March 2, 2022.

²⁰⁰ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 of 24 June 2024, available [here](#).

²⁰¹ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

²⁰² Council Regulation (EU) 2024/3187 of 16 December 2024, available [here](#).

- It is prohibited to provide public (i.e., EU governmental) financing or financial assistance for investment in or trade with Russia, with some limited exemptions (for example, for agricultural trade). On February 24, 2025, the EU tightened this restriction by removing a previous exemption permitting public financing or financial assistance up to the total value of EUR10,000,000 per project benefiting EU SMEs (however, an EU person may still apply for a license to continue providing such financing).²⁰³
- It is prohibited to invest in entities operating in the energy sector in Russia. On June 24, 2024, the wording used for this prohibition was expressly extended to apply to investments in projects under construction for the production of liquified natural gas (“LNG”).²⁰⁴ An authority may authorize, under certain conditions, such an investment participation where it is deemed necessary to ensure critical energy supply within the EU or transport fossil fuels from or through Russia into the EU. An authorization may also be granted for activities necessary to operate a deep-water offshore gas project in the Mediterranean Sea in which an entity targeted by the EU “any transaction” prohibitions is a minority shareholder, if such project is controlled and operated by an EU entity.²⁰⁵
- It is prohibited to invest in entities that are operating in the Russian mining or quarrying sector. On February 24, 2025, the EU tightened this restriction by removing an exemption for mining and quarrying activities involving certain critical raw materials (however, an EU person may still apply for a license in such circumstances).²⁰⁶
- It is prohibited to award or continue the execution of public contracts within the scope of the public procurement directive to or with a Russian person or entity; an entity more than 50% owned by a Russian person or entity; or to a person or entity acting on the behalf or at the direction of a Russian person or entity. An authority may authorize such an investment or participation for contracts related to nuclear power, space programs, strictly necessary goods and services, diplomacy, natural gas and oil and certain other metals and minerals. It is prohibited to provide direct or indirect support (including financing) under an EU, European Atomic Energy Community (“Euratom”) or Member State national program to any Russian entity that is over 50% publicly owned or controlled, subject to certain exemptions. On June 24, 2024, this prohibition was expanded to apply to prohibit financial support that is provided to any entities established in Russia and their subsidiaries.²⁰⁷

²⁰³ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

²⁰⁴ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 of 24 June 2024, available [here](#).

²⁰⁵ Council Regulation (EU) 2023/2878 of 18 December 2023, available [here](#).

²⁰⁶ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

²⁰⁷ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 of 24 June 2024, available [here](#).

- It is prohibited for European political parties, NGOs and media service providers to receive donations or financing from the Russian government, as well as Russian entities with more than 50% public ownership and their non-EU subsidiaries.²⁰⁸

Trade Sanctions

Export Restrictions

The EU implemented a number of sanctions restricting Russian access to EU goods and technologies, including the following groups of export restrictions:

- energy sector and oil refinery-related products;
- an expansion of the restrictions on dual-use goods and technology;
- advanced technology;
- aircraft;
- goods that contribute to the enhancement of Russian industrial capacities;
- luxury products; and
- oil tankers.

Energy Sector and Oil Refinery-Related Products: The EU has significantly strengthened restrictions on the provision of certain goods and technology that are suited to certain categories of exploration and production projects to any person or entity in Russia or for use in Russia, in both cases including its Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf. Since August 1, 2014, the EU has required exporters to have licenses before exporting these goods and technologies to Russian persons. The new requirements prohibit selling, supplying, transferring and exporting these goods and technologies except for narrow exemptions and prohibits provision of related financing or financial assistance. The energy-related prohibition was later extended to also apply to goods and technology that are suited for oil refining and liquefaction of natural gas.

On June 23, 2023, the EU extended this restriction to cover the sale, licensing or transfer of intellectual property rights or trade secrets related to energy sector and oil refining goods to any person or entity in Russia or for use in Russia.²⁰⁹

On December 18, 2023,²¹⁰ the EU clarified that the related prohibition on providing technical assistance, brokering services and financing does not extend to the provision of insurance or reinsurance to EU entities in relation to their activities

²⁰⁸ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 of 24 June 2024, available [here](#).

²⁰⁹ Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1214 of 23 June 2023, available [here](#).

²¹⁰ Council Regulation (EU) 2023/2878 of 18 December 2023, available [here](#).

outside the energy sector in Russia until June 20, 2024. After that date, provision of such insurance and reinsurance services requires an authorization.²¹¹

On June 24, 2024, the EU prohibited the direct and indirect sale, supply, transfer or export of goods, technology and services used for the completion of liquefied natural gas projects (with the restriction giving the example of “terminals and plants”) to Russian persons. The prohibition includes a ban on the provision of direct or indirect technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance in relation to these goods. The ban took effect on September 26, 2024, for contracts entered into before June 25, 2024.²¹² On February 24, 2025, this prohibition was expanded to include the direct and indirect sale, supply, transfer or export of goods, technology and services used for the completion of crude oil projects in Russia, including exploration and production projects.²¹³ The restriction, however, does not apply to oil production projects with regular commercial production established prior to February 25, 2025.

On February 24, 2025, the EU prohibited the sale, supply, transfer or provision, directly or indirectly, of listed types of software relating to oil and gas exploration and production projects, to any person or entity in Russia or for use in Russia, including its Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf.²¹⁴ The prohibition includes a ban on the provision of direct or indirect technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance in relation to the restricted software, and a prohibition on selling or licensing intellectual property rights or trade secrets related to such software. The EU authorized provision of the restricted software for execution until May 26, 2025, of contracts concluded before February 25, 2025.²¹⁵

Dual-Use Goods: The sale, supply, transfer or export to Russia of dual-use goods and technology, including the provision of related technical services, brokering services, financing or financial assistance is now prohibited (with some exemptions).

The EU prohibited transit through Russia of EU-exported dual-use goods and technology to avoid circumvention.

On June 23, 2023, the EU extended this restriction to cover the sale, licensing or transfer of intellectual property rights or trade secrets related to dual-use goods and technology to any person or entity in Russia or for use in Russia.

On December 16, 2024, the EU added 32 entities to the list of persons supporting Russia’s military-industrial complex that are subject to tighter export restrictions in relation to dual-use goods and goods that contribute to the technological

²¹¹ Council Regulation (EU) 2023/2878 of 18 December 2023, available [here](#).

²¹² Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 of 24 June 2024, available [here](#).

²¹³ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

²¹⁴ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

²¹⁵ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

enhancement of Russia's defense and security sectors. Some of these entities are located in China, India, Iran, Serbia and the UAE and have been involved in the circumvention of trade restrictions or have engaged in the procurement of sensitive items used for Russian military operations, like UAVs and missiles.²¹⁶ On March 20, 2025, the EU added an additional 31 entities to the list of persons supporting Russia's military-industrial complex that are subject to tighter export restrictions in relation to dual-use goods and goods that contribute to the technological enhancement of Russia's defense and security sectors. Some of these entities are located in China, Hong Kong, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, India, Serbia and Vietnam and have been involved in the circumvention of export restrictions, including with respect to UAVs or computer numerical control machine tools.²¹⁷ **On July 18, 2025, the EU expanded the list by adding 26 entities, including entities from China, Hong Kong and Türkiye.**²¹⁸

On February 24, 2025, the EU revised exemptions and licensing grounds for the dual-use goods export restrictions. Most importantly, the EU removed an exemption for goods meant for personal use of persons traveling to Russia and transformed an exemption for software updates and consumer communication devices (e.g., consumer grade smartphones and laptops) into a licensing ground.²¹⁹ The EU also added further types of goods and technology to the list of restricted dual-use goods, such as computer numerical control machine tools and video-game controllers.

Advanced Technology and Maritime Technology: In addition, the sale, supply, transfer or export to Russia of goods and technology that might contribute to Russia's military and technological enhancement, or the development of the defense and security sector (including semiconductors), including the provision of related technical services, brokering services, financing or financial assistance is also prohibited (with some exemptions).

The above prohibitions include, among other things, the following goods and technology:

- coal and coke of coal, chemicals and goods that can be used for capital punishment, torture or other inhumane treatment;
- electronics, specialized vehicles, machine parts and spare parts for trucks and jet engines, as well as goods for the construction sector that can be directed to Russia's military, such as antennas or cranes; and

²¹⁶ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/3187 of 16 December 2024, available [here](#).

²¹⁷ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/931 of 20 May 2025, available [here](#).

²¹⁸ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 of 18 July 2025, available [here](#).

²¹⁹ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

- electronic components used in Russian weapons systems retrieved on the battlefield, such as drones, missiles and helicopters, as well as specific rare earth materials, electronic integrated circuits and thermal cameras.

There is also a ban on the sale and supply of maritime navigation goods and technology, regardless of whether it originated in the EU, to any natural or legal person in Russia, for use in Russia, or for use on Russian-flagged vessels subject to a humanitarian exemption. This ban also applies to the provision of technical assistance, brokering services, provision, manufacture and maintenance of these goods, as well as financing the sale and supply of these goods or related services.

The sale, supply, transfer or export of civilian firearms and their components and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts is also prohibited.

On June 23, 2023, the EU prohibited transit via the territory of Russia of goods and technology which contribute to Russia's military and technological enhancement or to the development of its defense and security sector unless certain exemptions apply or licenses are obtained.

Further, the EU extended this restriction to cover the sale, licensing or transfer of intellectual property rights or trade secrets related to military and security enhancement goods and technology, maritime equipment and firearms to any person or entity in Russia or for use in Russia.

Finally, a new licensing ground allows persons to request an authorization to deal with military and security enhancement goods intended for the exclusive use and under the full control of the authorizing Member State and to fulfill its maintenance obligations in areas which are under a long-term lease agreement between that Member State and the Russian Federation.

The EU maintains a List of Economically Critical Goods, which tracks industrial goods targeted by EU restrictive measures that had anomalous trade flows via certain third countries to Russia (*i.e.* those that experienced at least a 100% increase in exports).²²⁰ The list was last updated on October 18, 2023. The EU also maintains the List of Common High Priority Items, which identifies a number of sanctioned dual-use and advanced technology items found in battlefields in Ukraine (and therefore known to be critical for the Russian military).²²¹

On December 18, 2023, the EU introduced a “no Russia clause” that requires EU exporters, from March 20, 2024, to contractually prohibit reexportation to and use in Russia of common high-priority items or firearms, if such items are sold, supplied,

²²⁰ List of Economically Critical Goods (Oct. 18, 2023), available [here](#).

²²¹ List of Common High Priority Items (Sept. 22, 2023), available [here](#).

transferred or exported to a third country, with the exception of the “partner countries” (i.e., US, Japan, UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Switzerland, Lichtenstein and Iceland²²²). This restriction did not apply to the execution until January 1, 2025, of contracts concluded before December 19, 2023, or until their expiry date, whichever is earlier. The list of the common high-priority items included in the relevant EU regulation is comprised of the dual-use and advanced technology items found in battlefields in Ukraine, which were previously identified by EU guidance. On February 22, 2024, the EU Commission issued FAQs on the application of the “no Russia clause.” In particular, the FAQs clarified what could serve as an adequate remedy for a “no Russia clause” depending on the risk category of the jurisdiction.²²³ On June 24, 2024, the EU introduced an exemption to the “no Russia clause” for contracts relating to certain machines, machine tools and parts. Furthermore, the EU introduced a requirement that EU persons contractually prohibit their commercial counterparts in third countries from using, or allowing the use of, the intellectual property or trade secrets transferred by EU persons to such counterparties, in connection with common high priority items to be sold, supplied or exported to Russia or for use in Russia.²²⁴

On February 23, 2024, and June 24, 2024, the EU significantly expanded the list of entities targeted by military and dual-use export restrictions, adding companies from China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, India, Serbia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Türkiye and the UAE. These companies were identified as supplying restricted equipment to Russia and face additional restrictions on their ability to purchase dual-use goods, military goods and technological enhancement goods from EU counterparties.²²⁵ As part of the same package, the EU also expanded its list of restricted military and technological enhancement goods by adding components for the development and production of UAVs. On February 24, 2025, the EU expanded restrictions on entities targeted by military and dual-use export restrictions by prohibiting financing or financial assistance, technical assistance, brokering services or other services, as well as sale, licensing or transfer of intellectual property rights and trade secrets that relate to the restricted goods and their provision to the targeted entities.²²⁶

From December 26, 2024, EU persons who sell common high-priority items must undertake a proportionate assessment of risks of reexportation of their goods to Russia or for use in Russia, keep such assessment up to date and implement proportionate policies to mitigate such risks. The same requirement applies to any non-EU subsidiary that is owned or controlled by an EU parent if that subsidiary sells common high-priority items. This requirement does not apply to EU persons

²²² Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 of 24 June 2024, available [here](#).

²²³ Frequently asked questions concerning the “No reexport to Russia” clause and sanctions adopted following Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine (Feb. 22, 2024), available [here](#).

²²⁴ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 of 24 June 2024, available [here](#).

²²⁵ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/745 of 23 February 2024, available [here](#).

²²⁶ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

who sell common high priority items only within the EU and “*partner countries*.”²²⁷ Starting from February 24, 2025, these risk mitigation measures also applied to certain goods that do not fall within the common high-priority goods category, such as various types of switchers and generating sets.²²⁸

On February 24, 2025, the EU revised exemptions and licensing grounds for export restrictions targeting goods and technology which might contribute to Russia’s military and technological enhancement. Most importantly, the EU removed an exemption for goods meant for personal use of persons travelling to Russia and changed an exemption for software updates and consumer communication devices (e.g., consumer grade smartphones and laptops) into a licensing ground.²²⁹

On February 24, 2025, the EU also added additional types of goods and technology to the list of goods and technology that might contribute to Russia’s military and technological enhancement, such as computer numerical control machine tools and video-game controllers.²³⁰

On May 20, 2025, the EU expanded the list of items that might contribute to Russia’s military and technological enhancement or to the development of its defense and security sector by including chemicals and equipment used in the production of printed circuit boards and spare parts for machine tools.²³¹ On July 18, 2025, the EU further expanded the list of items that might contribute to Russia’s military and technological enhancement or to the development of its defense and security sector by including additional computer numerical control machines and constituent chemicals for propellants.²³²

On July 18, 2025, the EU also introduced a requirement to obtain an authorization for the export of goods and technology that might contribute to Russia’s military and technological enhancement to any third country other than Russia, if the exporter has been informed by the competent authority of the Member State that the items in question are or may be intended for any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia.²³³ This new measure does not substitute a prohibition on exporting restricted items to Russia indirectly, but rather provides Member States with discretion to use one of the mechanisms (i.e., authorization process or breach enforcement) to prevent restricted goods from being sent to Russia.

²²⁷ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 of 24 June 2024, available [here](#).

²²⁸ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

²²⁹ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

²³⁰ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

²³¹ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/932 of 20 May 2025, available [here](#).

²³² Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 of 18 July 2025, available [here](#).

²³³ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 of 18 July 2025, available [here](#).

On July 18, 2025, the EU revised restrictions relating to dealings with goods and technology included in the Common Military List of the European Union (“Common Military List”), which were previously implemented through a combination of local EU Member State legislation and EU sanctions regulations. The EU currently prohibits the: (i) purchase, import or transfer, directly or indirectly, of the goods and technology listed in the Common Military List into the EU if they originate in Russia or are exported from Russia; (ii) sale, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, of the goods and technology listed in the Common Military List, whether or not originating in the EU, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia; and (iii) provision of technical assistance, brokering and other services, financing and financial assistance with respect to the restricted military goods and technology.²³⁴

Aircraft: There are three restrictive measures currently in place in relation to aircraft and the aviation sector.

- prohibition on the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods and technology suited for use in the aviation and space industry, including the sale of all aircraft, spare parts and equipment to Russian airlines, including aircraft and drone engines and their parts.
- prohibition on the provision of related technical and financial assistance, including the overhaul, repair, inspection, replacement, modification or defect rectification of an aircraft or component, with the exception of pre-flight inspection.
- prohibition on the provision of insurance and reinsurance, and maintenance services, related to those goods and technology.

On June 23, 2023, the EU extended this restriction to cover the sale, licensing or transfer of intellectual property rights or trade secrets related to aviation goods to any person or entity in Russia or for use in Russia.

The EU also prohibited the transit of aviation goods and technology through Russia, unless a license is obtained. This includes a new licensing ground that allows requesting an authorization to deal with aviation goods intended for the exclusive use and under the full control of the authorizing Member State and in order to fulfill its maintenance obligations in areas which are under a long-term lease agreement between that Member State and the Russian Federation.

Goods That Enhance Russia’s Industrial Capacity: The EU has banned the sale, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, of goods that could contribute to the enhancement of Russian industrial capacities, regardless of whether they

²³⁴ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 of 18 July 2025, available [here](#).

originate in the EU, to any person or entity in Russia or for use in Russia, including the provision of technical services, brokering services, financing or financial assistance in relation to the above. The restrictions cover such items as hydrogen, sulphates, nitrites, paints, film, asphalt, synthetic rubber, etc.

On June 23, 2023, the EU extended this restriction to include the sale, licensing or transfer of intellectual property rights or trade secrets related to these goods to any person or entity in Russia or for use in Russia.

On December 18, 2023, the EU prohibited the transit of goods that enhance Russia's industrial capacity via the territory of Russia.²³⁵

In addition to the above trade restrictions, on June 23, 2023, the EU adopted a licensing ground allowing authorization of sale, supply, transfer, export or transit through Russia of dual-use, military enhancement, maritime goods and technology, or goods and technology enhancing Russia's industrial capacities, or the provision of related technical assistance, brokering services or other services, financing or financial assistance, for the operation and maintenance of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipelines and associated infrastructure. A license also may be obtained to provide auditing services, engineering services, legal advisory services, technical testing and analysis services for the operation and maintenance of the CPC pipelines and associated infrastructure.

On February 23, 2024, the EU expanded the list of restricted goods that enhance Russia's industrial capacity by adding all types of electrical transformers, static converters and inductors.²³⁶

On February 24, 2025, the EU added additional goods to the list of goods that could contribute to the enhancement of Russia's industrial capacities, including certain minerals, chemicals, glass materials and fireworks.²³⁷

On July 18, 2025, the EU further expanded the list of goods that might contribute to the enhancement of Russian industrial capacities by adding various types of machinery, chemicals and plastic. In parallel, the EU expanded the list of items subject to the prohibition on transit via the territory of Russia.²³⁸

Luxury Products: The sale, supply, transport or export of luxury goods with a value of over EUR 300 to any person or entity in Russia or for use in Russia is prohibited, subject to certain diplomatic and consular exemptions. On June 23, 2023, the EU extended this restriction to include a prohibition on providing technical services, brokering services, financing or financial assistance, or other services in relation to

²³⁵ Council Regulation (EU) 2023/2878 of 18 December 2023, available [here](#).

²³⁶ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/745 of 23 February 2024, available [here](#).

²³⁷ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

²³⁸ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 of 18 July 2025, available [here](#).

the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of luxury products. Furthermore, it is now also prohibited to sell, license or transfer intellectual property rights or trade secrets related to luxury goods to any person or entity in Russia or for use in Russia.

On June 23, 2023, the EU imposed a prohibition to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, listed sensitive goods and technology to any natural or legal person, entity or body in one of the specifically determined third countries, as well as a prohibition to provide technical assistance, brokering services or other services, financing or financial assistance, or transfer intellectual property or trade secrets in respect of such goods or technology. The EU promised to impose these sanctions on third countries which systematically and persistently failed to prevent the sale, supply, transfer or export to Russia of such sensitive goods and technology. The EU has not yet identified any third countries or goods and technology as the target of these restrictions.

Oil Tankers: On December 18, 2023, the EU prohibited the sale or other transfer of ownership of tankers used for the transport of crude oil and petroleum, whether or not originating in the EU, to Russian entities and individuals or for use in Russia. On December 18, 2023, the EU also required notice from EU persons with respect to any sale or other transfer of ownership of oil tankers to any third country.²³⁹ On February 19, 2024, the EU Commission published a notification form for such tanker sales to third countries.

Import Restrictions

EU implemented a number of sanctions restricting Russia's ability to receive revenues from selling goods produced or extracted in Russia to the EU, including the following groups of import restrictions:

- iron and steel products;
- goods that generate significant revenues for Russia;
- coal or other fossil fuels;
- oil and petroleum products;
- limited restrictions on LNG;
- gold; or
- diamonds.

Import of Iron and Steel Products and Coal: The EU prohibited the import and transport of iron and steel products, coal and other fossil fuels²⁴⁰ that originate in Russia or have been exported from Russia, as well as the purchase of iron and steel

²³⁹ Council Regulation (EU) 2023/2878 of 18 December 2023, available [here](#).

²⁴⁰ On June 23, 2023, restrictions on coal and other fossil fuels were consolidated within the restrictions on goods that generate significant revenues for Russia.

products that are located or originate in Russia. This includes a ban on providing related technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance. On September 30, 2023, the ban on import or purchase of iron and steel processed in a third country incorporating iron and steel products originating in Russia came into effect (with an exception for particular types of iron and steel which become subject to this ban later). Starting from December 18, 2023, importers are required to provide evidence of the country of origin unless the product is imported from Norway or Switzerland.²⁴¹ On February 23, 2024, the United Kingdom was added to the list of authorized partner countries.²⁴²

Goods That Generate Significant Revenues for Russia: The EU banned the purchase, import and transfer, directly or indirectly, of goods that generate significant revenues for Russia and originate in Russia or are exported from Russia. This includes a ban on providing related technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance.

On September 12, 2023, the EU Commission clarified that the prohibition on import of revenue generating goods from Russia to the EU applies to personal items and vehicles of persons temporarily traveling from Russia to the EU. The EU Commission urged EU Member State authorities to pay particular attention to motor vehicles registered in Russia, as they are goods prone to circumvention and, otherwise, apply import restrictions to personal items of the travelers in a proportionate and reasonable manner.²⁴³ Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania announced that they would ban vehicles with Russian license plates from entering their territories.²⁴⁴

On December 18, 2023, the EU authorized import of revenue-generating goods, including vehicles, that are intended for the personal use of persons travelling to the EU or of their immediate family members. The amendment also clarifies that the restriction applicable to incoming vehicles from Russia does not prevent vehicles with Russian license plates from being registered in a Member State, so long as the vehicle was already in the EU on December 19, 2023.²⁴⁵

²⁴¹ Council Regulation (EU) 2023/2878 of 18 December 2023, available [here](#).

²⁴² Council Regulation (EU) 2024/745 of 23 February 2024, available [here](#).

²⁴³ EU Commission, Frequently Asked Questions, “Import, Purchase & Transfer of Listed Goods” (Sept. 12, 2023), available [here](#).

²⁴⁴ Associated Press, “Baltic states ban vehicles with Russian license plates in line with EU sanctions interpretation” (Sept. 13, 2023), available [here](#); Associated Press, “Finland joins Baltic neighbors in banning Russian-registered cars from entering their territory” (Sept. 15, 2023), available [here](#); Associated Press, “Poland imposes EU ban on all Russian-registered passenger cars” (Sept. 17, 2023), available [here](#).

²⁴⁵ Council Regulation (EU) 2023/2878 of 18 December 2023, available [here](#).

On February 24, 2025, the EU expanded the revenue generating goods restriction to cover imports of primary aluminum originating from Russia or exported from Russia.²⁴⁶

Oil and Petroleum Products: The EU has imposed a prohibition on the import or transfer, directly or indirectly, of crude oil or petroleum products if they originate in Russia or are exported from Russia. This includes a prohibition on an EU Member State selling crude oil delivered by pipeline from Russia to Member States or third parties. Importantly, EU Commission guidance has clarified that this general prohibition only applies when the relevant crude oil or petroleum is being imported into, or is destined for, the EU.

The ban applied from December 5, 2022, to one-off transactions for near-term delivery, concluded and executed before that date, or to the execution of contracts for the purchase, import or transfer of crude oil-related goods concluded before June 4, 2022, provided the relevant national competent authority has been notified. The ban applied from February 5, 2023, for similar transactions for petroleum-related products on the same terms.

The ban does not apply to seaborne crude oil and petroleum products, provided that they originate from outside Russia, are not owned by a Russian person and are only loaded in or transported through Russia. Further, the ban does not apply to crude oil that is delivered by pipeline from Russia to Member States.

The ban contains provisions to allow seaborne crude oil from Russia to be imported if the supply of crude oil by pipeline from Russia to a landlocked Member State is interrupted for reasons outside the control of that state, until the supply is resumed or crude oil delivered by pipeline is sanctioned. The oil exploration ban, ban on energy sector investments, ban on port access, ban on road transport and the public concession contract ban were also all amended to specify that they do not apply to crude oil or petroleum products already prohibited by this new ban.

On December 16, 2024, the EU extended Croatia's authority to license the purchase, import or transfer of vacuum gas oil of Russian origin until December 31, 2025. The EU also clarified that the prohibitions on import of Russian-origin oil into the EU will start applying to imports to and sales in Czechia from June 5, 2025.²⁴⁷

On July 18, 2025, the EU prohibited the purchase, import or transfer, directly or indirectly, into the EU petroleum products obtained in a third country, of crude oil originating in Russia. The EU also prohibited the provision of technical assistance,

²⁴⁶ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

²⁴⁷ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/3187 of 16 December 2024, available [here](#).

brokering services, financing and financial assistance, insurance and re-insurance services relating to such restricted petroleum trades.²⁴⁸

The EU will require importers to provide evidence of the country of origin of the crude oil used for the refining of the final product, unless the product is imported from a “partner country” (i.e., Canada, Norway, the UK, the US or Switzerland). Petroleum products imported from third countries that were net exporters of crude oil in the previous calendar year shall be considered to have been obtained from their domestic crude oil and not from crude oil originating from Russia, unless Member State authorities have reasonable grounds to doubt this.²⁴⁹

On July 18, 2025, the EU terminated the exemption for Czechia to receive crude oil by pipelines from Russia.²⁵⁰

LNG: On June 24, 2024, the EU introduced the following limitations for import of Russian LNG into the EU:²⁵¹

- A prohibition on the provision of reloading services in the EU for the purposes of transshipment operations of LNG originating in Russia or exported from Russia. The prohibition includes a ban on the provision of direct or indirect technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance relating to these reloading services. A license can be obtained to provide reloading services for the transshipment of Russian LNG to a Member State if necessary to ensure the energy supply in such Member States.

Furthermore, Member States may introduce rules and guidance by December 26, 2024, requiring enhanced due diligence requirements for the identification of reloading services provided for the purpose of transshipment operations; the previous business practices of shippers; the time between the unloading and reloading; indications of direct commercial connections between the unloading and reloading, including the purchase of new unloading and reloading services in bundle; and the country of registration of the economic operators involved. On February 24, 2025, the EU introduced an exemption for reloading services that are necessary for the transport of LNG originating in Russia or exported from Russia between ports of the same EU Member State, including from the mainland of the EU Member State to its outermost regions.²⁵²

- A prohibition on the direct and indirect purchase, import or transfer of LNG originating in Russia or exported from Russia through EU LNG terminals that

²⁴⁸ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 of 18 July 2025, available [here](#).

²⁴⁹ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 of 18 July 2025, available [here](#).

²⁵⁰ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 of 18 July 2025, available [here](#).

²⁵¹ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 of 24 June 2024, available [here](#).

²⁵² Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

are not connected to the interconnected natural gas system. The prohibition includes a ban on the provision of direct or indirect technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance in relation to these goods. Starting from February 24, 2025, EU persons may apply for a license authorizing import or transfer of LNG originating in Russia or exported from Russia through EU LNG terminals that are not connected to the interconnected natural gas system, if the LNG is purchased, imported or transferred from a connected terminal in another EU Member State for purposes of ensuring energy supply.²⁵³

- On July 18, 2025, the EU allowed competent authorities of any EU Member State that is not directly connected to the interconnected natural gas system of another EU Member State and that received the first commercial supply of its first long-term natural gas supply contract after July 20, 2025, to authorize the purchase, import or transfer of LNG originating in Russia or exported from Russia, after having determined that the purchase, import or transfer is used to ensure its energy supply.²⁵⁴

Gold: The EU imposed a ban on imports of gold if it originates in Russia and has been exported from Russia into the EU or to any third country after July 22, 2022. This includes a prohibition on importing certain gold products processed in third countries if the gold used was exported from Russia after July 22, 2022. There are exemptions for gold necessary for official diplomatic missions or personal use. This prohibition also includes a ban on providing related technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance.

Diamonds: On December 18, 2024, the EU imposed a ban on direct and indirect imports of diamonds and products incorporating diamonds (both non-industrial natural and synthetic diamonds) originating in or exported from Russia, as well as diamonds and products incorporating diamonds of any origin that transited via Russia into the EU, after January 1, 2024.²⁵⁵ From March 1, 2024, it is prohibited to import products incorporating diamonds, processed in a third country, that consist of Russian-origin or exported diamonds of or above 1 carat. Finally, from September 1, 2024, it is also prohibited to import products incorporating diamonds, processed in a third country, that consist of Russian-origin or exported diamonds of or above 0.5 carat or 0.1 gram per diamond. The diamonds import ban also prohibits providing related technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance.

The EU also introduced a traceability mechanism that took effect from January 1, 2024, which requires importers to provide evidence of the country of origin of the diamonds or products incorporating diamonds. From September 1, 2024, the

²⁵³ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

²⁵⁴ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 of 18 July 2025, available [here](#).

²⁵⁵ Council Regulation (EU) 2023/2878 of 18 December 2023, available [here](#).

traceability evidence needs to include a corresponding certificate certifying that the diamonds are not mined, processed or produced in Russia.

On June 24, 2024, the EU clarified that the diamond import prohibition does not apply to rough diamonds imported from Russia prior to January 1, 2024, on the basis that there are “considerable stocks” of diamonds held outside Russia that no longer provide revenue to Russia but that may need to be exported for processing or imported after processing. The ban does not apply to temporary imports or exports of jewelry for repairs, auctions and trade fairs. Furthermore, the indirect import ban on Russian diamonds processed in third countries does not apply to jewelry incorporating such diamonds until the G7 coordinates to ban such imports.²⁵⁶

On February 24, 2025, the EU clarified the requirement for a certificate of origin for diamonds and explained that such a certificate should comply with the Kimberley Process certification scheme for international trade in rough diamonds.²⁵⁷

Intellectual Property Restrictions

EU intellectual property offices and other similar institutions are prohibited from accepting certain intellectual property registration applications from Russian nationals or natural persons residing in Russia, or Russian entities, including if jointly filed by such Russian persons and entities with one or more non-Russian natural or legal person resident or established outside of Russia.²⁵⁸

Ukrainian Cultural Property

On June 24, 2024, the EU prohibited the direct and indirect purchase, import, transfer, sale, supply or export of Ukrainian cultural property goods and other goods of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific or religious importance where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the goods have been removed from Ukraine without the consent of their legitimate owner or have been removed after March 1, 2014, in breach of Ukrainian or international law. EU sanctions also prohibit the provision of technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance for such transactions with Ukrainian cultural property.²⁵⁹

Non-Government Controlled Areas of Ukraine

The EU has imposed trade restrictions on the DPR, LPR, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions of Ukraine. These restrictions broadly mirror the wide-ranging trade sanctions that affect the Crimea and Sevastopol and consist of:

- import bans on goods from these territories, including a prohibition on ancillary services such as insurance for such imports;

²⁵⁶ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 of 24 June 2024, available [here](#).

²⁵⁷ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

²⁵⁸ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 of 24 June 2024, available [here](#).

²⁵⁹ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 of 24 June 2024, available [here](#).

- investment restrictions relating to this region;
- restrictions on the provision of certain listed transport, telecommunications, energy and oil and gas related goods, and any associated technical or financial services;
- a ban on certain services for the construction and engineering services industries in the region; and
- a prohibition on providing service directly related to tourism in this region.

Oil Price Cap

EU sanctions prohibit maritime transport and related technical assistance, brokering services or financial assistance for maritime transport of Russian crude oil (as of December 5, 2022) or Russian petroleum products (as of February 5, 2023) (the “EU Third Country Shipment Restriction”) to third countries or between third countries.

The EU introduced a “price cap derogation” allowing the provision of Russian crude oil or petroleum products otherwise restricted under the EU Third Country Shipment Restriction if these are purchased at or below the G7 pre-established price cap.

From December 5, 2022, the EU capped the price of crude oil, petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals that originate in or are exported from Russia at USD\$60 per barrel.²⁶⁰ From February 5, 2023, the EU capped the price of petroleum products traded at a discount to crude oil at USD\$45 per barrel and the price of petroleum products traded at a premium to crude oil at USD\$100 per barrel. As described above, crude oil or petroleum products that originate in or are exported from Russia and are purchased at or below the agreed price cap are exempted from prohibitions in place. The functioning of the price cap mechanism is reviewed every two months to respond to developments in the market, and the price cap is set at least 5% below the average market price for Russian oil and petroleum products, calculated on the basis of data provided by the International Energy Agency.

The EU Oil Price Cap determines three “tiers” of actors in the oil supply chain depending on whether they routinely know the price paid in their ordinary course of business and their role in the oil supply transactions. The three “tiers” have different scope of price attestation, due diligence and reporting requirements in accordance with the EU Oil Price Cap. To support compliance with the price caps and attestation requirements, on December 18, 2023, the EU required that service providers with no access to the purchase price per barrel collect itemized price

²⁶⁰ See Commission Consolidated FAQs on the Implementation of Council Regulation No 833/2014 and Council Regulation No 269/2014, Oil Price Cap Guidance, [available here](#). Press Release of the Council of the EU “Russian oil: EU agrees on level of price cap” (Dec. 3, 2022), [available here](#); Press Release of the Council of the EU “EU agrees on level of price caps for Russian petroleum products” (Feb. 4, 2023), [available here](#); and Q&As of the European Commission “G7 agrees oil price cap to reduce Russia’s revenues, while keeping global energy markets stable” (Dec. 3, 2022), [available here](#).

information for ancillary costs as provided by operators further up the supply chain of Russian crude oil or petroleum product trade. The itemized price information must be provided upon request to counterparties within 30 days of a request being made and to competent authorities. The EU Commission clarified that, as of February 20, 2024, attestations should be provided/collected “*per voyage*” and should be obtained within 30 days of each lifting or loading of Russia oil or petroleum products. This requirement does not apply to financial institutions providing general financing, reinsurers and reinsurance brokers.²⁶¹

The Council also introduced an emergency clause allowing the transport of oil and petroleum products beyond the price cap or the provision of technical assistance, brokering services or financing or financial assistance related to the transport, when these are necessary for the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or the environment, or as a response to natural disasters. A further exemption covers trading in Russian-origin oil and petroleum products that originate in a third country and are only being loaded in, departing from or transiting through Russia, provided that both the origin and the owner of those goods are non-Russian.

On December 18, 2023, the EU introduced a requirement for the Commission and EU Member States to periodically share information about vessels and entities “of concern,” that is, vessels and entities engaging in deceptive practices while transporting Russian crude oil and petroleum products.²⁶²

On February 24, 2025, the EU prohibited temporary storage and placement of crude oil and petroleum products originating in Russia or exported from Russia under the free zone procedure in the territory of the EU, regardless of their price.²⁶³ This restriction does not apply to seaborne crude oil and petroleum products that originate in a third country and are only being loaded in, departing from, or transiting through Russia.

On July 18, 2025, the EU introduced a dynamic procedure to modify the price cap for Russian crude oil depending on the average market price. The EU Commission will monitor price assessments of Russian crude oil provided by authorized reporting agencies and calculate the average market price of the Russian crude oil over a period of 22 weeks starting as of July 15, 2025, and for an equivalent period of 22 weeks every six months thereafter. Based on this, the EU Commission will set the price cap that shall be equal to the average market price for Russian crude oil minus 15%.

²⁶¹ Council Regulation (EU) 2023/2878 of 18 December 2023, available [here](#); See also FAQs on sanctions against Russia and Belarus, with focus on the following provision: Article 3n of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (Jan. 26, 2024), available [here](#).

²⁶² Council Regulation (EU) 2023/2878 of 18 December 2023, available [here](#).

²⁶³ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

Should the newly calculated price vary by 5% or less from the applicable price cap, the price cap shall not be amended.

Starting from September 3, 2025, the oil price cap per barrel will be decreased to USD\$47.60 per barrel. Those who entered into contracts before July 20, 2025, can discharge those contracts at the previous price cap of USD\$60 until October 18, 2025. Going forward, each time the price cap is amended, prior contracts that are compliant with the existing price cap should benefit from a transitional period of 90 days.²⁶⁴ By April 15, 2026, and every six months thereafter, the EU Commission shall assess the functioning of the oil price cap and coordinate with the Price Cap Coalition.

Transport Restrictions

The EU imposed a ban on Russian air carriers and non-Russian aircraft owned, chartered or otherwise controlled by any Russian entity or individual from landing, taking off or flying over EU territory. On June 24, 2024, the EU extended this prohibition to ban aircraft from landing in, taking off from or overflying the territory of the EU where the aircraft are used for a non-scheduled flight and with regard to which a Russian natural or legal person is in a position to effectively determine the place or time of their take-off or landing (e.g., a business jet flight to a conference or a holiday destination). Furthermore, aircraft operators are now also obliged to provide, upon request of a competent authority, information on the beneficial ownership of the aircraft and the person chartering the aircraft, as well as information about passengers and crew members.²⁶⁵ On February 24, 2025, the EU prohibited listed air carriers operating domestic flights within Russia, or selling, supplying, transferring or exporting aircraft or aviation goods or technology to a Russian air carrier or for flights within Russia, to land in, take off from or overfly the EU. Similar restrictions apply to any entity owned or controlled by such air carriers.²⁶⁶ The EU has not yet designated any air carriers under the new restriction. The EU also introduced a derogation ground for certain unmanned aircraft used for private non-commercial and non-corporate flights carried out within the territory and airspace of the EU for recreational purposes.²⁶⁷

Starting from June 24, 2023, the EU stopped providing access to ports and locks in the territory of the EU by any vessel (i) performing ship-to-ship transfers in violation of the oil import restrictions and oil price cap or (ii) illegally interfering with, switching off or otherwise disabling its shipborne automatic identification system at any point of the voyage.

²⁶⁴ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 of 18 July 2025, available [here](#).

²⁶⁵ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 of 24 June 2024, available [here](#).

²⁶⁶ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

²⁶⁷ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

The EU also imposed a ban on Russian vessels accessing EU ports and locks, subject to certain exemptions. This includes a ban on vessels that changed their flag or registration from Russia to another nation after February 24, 2022.

Road transport undertakings established in Russia are prohibited from transporting goods by road within the EU (except between Kaliningrad and Russia), except for mail transport, and certain other exemptions. On June 23, 2023, this restriction was extended to apply to trailers or semi-trailers registered in Russia, including where those trailers or semi-trailers are hauled by trucks registered in other countries. On June 24, 2024, this prohibition was extended to ban EU entities owned 25% or more by a Russian natural or legal person from being admitted to become a road transport undertaking that transports goods by road within the territory of the EU, including in transit. Furthermore, as of July 26, 2024, it is prohibited for any EU road transport undertaking established after April 8, 2022, that is owned 25% or more by a Russian natural or legal person to transport goods by road in the EU. EU road transport undertakings must supply information on their ownership structures upon request by competent national authorities.²⁶⁸ On February 24, 2025, the EU prohibited road transport undertakings established in the EU before April 8, 2022, to change their capital structure in a way that increases the share of a Russian natural or legal person to 25% or more.²⁶⁹

The EU banned the direct or indirect provision of technical assistance, brokering services or financing or financial assistance related to the transport (including through ship-to-ship transfers) to third countries of crude oil or petroleum products that originate in Russia or that have been exported from Russia. The prohibition does not apply to the transport of crude oil or petroleum products that originate from a third country and are only being loaded in, departing from or transiting through Russia, provided that both the origin and the owner of those goods are non-Russian.

On June 24, 2024, the EU created a list of vessels that contribute to Russia's capacity to wage war against Ukraine (e.g., by assisting prohibited exports to Russia or imports from Russia or contributing to the development of Russia's energy sector). These vessels are prohibited from accessing EU ports, anchorage zones and locks, and EU persons cannot import, purchase, sell, transfer or supply such listed vessels, provide any financial assistance, including insurance, or technical assistance to the listed vessels, nor can they operate or crew such vessels or provide flag registration.²⁷⁰

On December 16, 2024, the EU added 52 vessels to the list of vessels that contribute to Russia's capacity to wage war against Ukraine (e.g., by assisting prohibited exports to Russia or imports from Russia or contributing to the development of Russia's

²⁶⁸ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 of 24 June 2024, available [here](#).

²⁶⁹ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

²⁷⁰ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 of 24 June 2024, available [here](#).

energy sector). These vessels are prohibited from accessing EU ports, anchorage zones and locks, and EU persons cannot provide financial or technical services to these vessels.²⁷¹ On May 20, 2025, the EU added 189 vessels to this list.²⁷² On July 18, 2025, the EU added 105 vessels to this list.²⁷³

Russian Ports, Locks and Airports

On February 24, 2025, the EU prohibited engaging in any transactions, directly or indirectly, with listed Russian ports, locks and airports that are involved in transportation of goods used for Russia's warfare in Ukraine, maritime transportation of oil and petroleum from Russia or of Russian origin by Russia's "shadow fleet," certain prohibited exports to Russia and imports from Russia, or violation, circumvention or significant frustration of EU sanctions against Russia.²⁷⁴

Transactions with Russian ports and locks are exempted from the restriction, if they are necessary for: (i) maritime safety and humanitarian purposes; (ii) the purchase, import or transfer of natural gas, certain crucial metals and iron ore from or through Russian into the EU, EEA, Switzerland or Western Balkans; (iii) the purchase, import or transfer of oil and petroleum products originating or exported from Russia (unless prohibited by the Oil Price Cap or restrictions on oil and petroleum imports into the EU), or non-Russian oil and petroleum products transiting through Russia from third countries; (iv) the purchase, import or transfer of pharmaceuticals, medical, agricultural and food products, unless prohibited by EU sanctions; (v) transactions necessary for operation and safety of existing, and completion of new, civil nuclear capabilities. Exemptions for transactions with Russian airports are mostly limited to humanitarian purposes, the purchase of pharmaceuticals, agricultural, medical and food products, emergency situations, diplomatic missions and personal travel.²⁷⁵

The list of banned Russian ports and airports includes the largest Russian industrial ports, such as Ust-Luga, Novorosiysk and Primorsk, and international airports, including Moscow-based Vnukovo airport.²⁷⁶

On July 18, 2025, the EU exempted from the ban imposed on Russian ports transactions for the purchase, import or transfer of coal originating from a third country that is only being loaded in, departs from or transits through Russia, provided that both the origin and owner of the goods are non-Russian.²⁷⁷ The EU also exempted from the ban imposed on Russian airports transactions for the establishment, operation, maintenance, fuel supply, retreatment, safety and

²⁷¹ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/3187 of 16 December 2024, available [here](#).

²⁷² Council Regulation (EU) 2025/931 of 20 May 2025, available [here](#).

²⁷³ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 of 18 July 2025, available [here](#).

²⁷⁴ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

²⁷⁵ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

²⁷⁶ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

²⁷⁷ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 of 18 July 2025, available [here](#).

continuation of design, construction and commissioning of civil nuclear capabilities.²⁷⁸

Media Restrictions

The EU imposed specific Russia-related restrictions related to broadcasting. Specifically, it is prohibited for operators to broadcast or to enable, facilitate or otherwise contribute to the broadcasting of any content by the listed legal persons, entities or bodies, including through transmission or distribution by any means such as cable, satellite, IP-TV, internet service providers, internet video-sharing platforms or applications, whether new or pre-installed. It is also prohibited to advertise products or services in any content produced or broadcast by the media outlets listed below. In addition, any broadcasting license or authorization, transmission and distribution arrangement with the following entities must be suspended:

- | | | |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| • RT–Russia Today English | • Katehon | • First Channel |
| • RT–Russia Today UK | • RT–Russia Today France | • Oriental Review |
| • RT–Russia Today Germany | • RT–Russia Today Spanish | • New Eastern Outlook |
| • RT–Arabic | • Sputnik | • Voice of Europe |
| • NTV/NTV Mir | • Sputnik Arabic | • RIA Novosti |
| • Rossiya 1 | • REN TV | • Izvestija |
| • RT Balkan | • Fondsk | • Rossiiskaja Gazeta ²⁷⁹ |
| • Tsargrad | • Lenta | • NewsFront |
| • Eurasia Daily | • Krasnaya Zvezda (TV Zvezda) | • RuBaltic |
| • Strategic Culture Foundation | | • SouthFront ²⁸⁰ |

Services Restrictions

The EU imposed a prohibition on directly or indirectly providing the following services to the government of Russia or to legal persons, entities or bodies established in Russia:

- accounting, auditing, book-keeping or tax consulting services;
- business and management consulting or public relations services;
- architectural and engineering services;
- IT consultancy services;
- legal advisory services, unless strictly necessary for the exercise of the right of defense in judicial proceedings and the right to an effective legal remedy;

²⁷⁸ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 of 18 July 2025, available [here](#).

²⁷⁹ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1428 of 17 May 2024, available [here](#); Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1776 of 24 June 2024, available [here](#).

²⁸⁰ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

- advertising, market research and public opinion polling services;
- technical testing and analysis services;
- provision of software
 - for enterprise management;
 - for industrial design and manufacture; and
 - with certain uses in the banking and financial sector; and
- construction services.²⁸¹

Starting from December 18, 2023, the prohibition also extends to provision of technical assistance, brokering and other services, financing or financial assistance related to such restricted services.²⁸² As of February 24, 2025, the prohibition further extends to selling, licensing or transferring intellectual property rights or trade secrets related to the enterprise management and industrial design and manufacturing software and provision of such software to any legal persons in Russia.²⁸³

Until September 30, 2024, the ban did not apply to the provision of services intended for the exclusive use of legal persons, entities or bodies established in Russia that are owned by, or solely or jointly controlled by a person from the EU, EEA, Switzerland or one of the “partner countries” (i.e., US, Japan, UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Switzerland, Lichtenstein and Iceland). After June 20, 2024, the exemption stopped being automatic and requires an authorization from EU authorities.²⁸⁴ On June 24, 2024, the EU clarified that this prohibition does not apply to the provision of services by EU nationals who have resided in Russia since before February 24, 2022, to entities or bodies established in Russia that are owned by, or solely or jointly controlled by a person from the EU, EEA, Switzerland or one of the “partner countries.”²⁸⁵

National competent authorities may make exceptions where these services are necessary for humanitarian purposes or for civil society activities that directly promote democracy, human rights or the rule of law in Russia.

Trusts-Related Services

The EU prohibited the registering, providing a registered office, business or administrative address and providing management services to a trust or similar legal arrangement: where the trustor or beneficiary is a Russian national, resident or entity or is more than 50% owned by a Russian national, resident or entity; or where the entity or person is acting under the control or at the direction of a Russian

²⁸¹ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

²⁸² Council Regulation (EU) 2023/2878 of 18 December 2023, available [here](#).

²⁸³ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

²⁸⁴ Council Regulation (EU) 2023/2878 of 18 December 2023, available [here](#).

²⁸⁵ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 of 24 June 2024, available [here](#).

national, resident or entity. This prohibition includes a prohibition to act as, or arrange for another person to act as, a trustee, nominee shareholder, director, secretary or a similar position, for a trust or similar legal arrangement.

National competent authorities may authorize a person to act as a trustee nominee, shareholder, director or secretary for a trust or similar legal arrangement, provided that the service provider does not accept or make available any funds or economic resources or otherwise provide benefits from assets placed in a trust, to those the ban applies to. If Member States grant such an authorization, they must notify the EU Commission.

On June 23, 2023, the EU also expanded the notification requirements for trade sanctions. EU Member States now need to inform other EU Member States about denials of authorization. If a Member State faces a request for license for an essentially identical transaction, it must consult with the Member State that issued the original denial. A divergent decision on such authorization should be explained in detail to other EU Member States. Further, any EU natural or legal persons shall supply any information which would facilitate the implementation of the relevant sanctions to the competent authority of the Member State where they are resident or located within two weeks of acquiring this information. Such person also is required to cooperate with the competent authority in any verification of the provided information.

Russia Divestments

EU businesses may require licenses to divest of their holdings in Russia. The main reason is that the EU Commission has taken a view that any transfer of restricted goods or transfer of control over an entity holding such restricted goods in Russia to a new buyer, is a prohibited transaction requiring an authorization.

A previous set of licensing grounds for divestment transactions expired on December 31, 2024. The EU's plan to extend the licensing grounds for a further period faced pushback and was the subject of significant press speculation in the course of preparing the 15th package of the Russia-related sanctions. The EU ultimately renewed the divestment licensing grounds, which is available until December 31, 2025.²⁸⁶

In the recitals to the new regulation, the EU, for the first time, pushed EU entities to divest from Russia as soon as possible (although this has not been formulated as a mandatory requirement).

The EU also extended until December 31, 2025, an authorization for EU persons to wind down joint ventures with Russian state-owned entities targeted by the "any transaction prohibition" and a licensing ground to participate in divestment of such

²⁸⁶ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/3187 of 16 December 2024, available [here](#).

Russian state-owned entities from their interests in EU entities. The EU also extended, until June 30, 2025, a licensing ground for the divestment of three designated Russian businessmen (namely Arkady Rotenberg, Boris Rotenberg and Gennady Timchenko) from their EU holdings (assuming that any proceeds of such sales or transfers remain frozen).

Extension of Belarusian Sanctions

The EU has also imposed further sanctions on Belarus in connection with Belarus's apparent collaboration with Russia in relation to Russia's actions in Ukraine:

- More than 150 Belarusian individuals and entities related to the Belarus defense and military sector, government, judiciary or propaganda, as well as those involved in illegal transportation of Ukrainian children, have been added to the asset freeze list since 2022. Some recent designations relate to violations of human rights in Belarus rather than collaboration with Russia.
- On June 29, 2024, the asset freeze designation grounds for Belarusian persons were expanded to include persons facilitating circumvention of sanctions or otherwise significantly frustrating sanctions.²⁸⁷ On February 24, 2025, the EU introduced further designation grounds for persons who form part of, support, materially or financially, or benefit from the military and industrial complex of Belarus, including by being involved in the development, production or supply of military technology and equipment.²⁸⁸
- Further restrictions related to the trade of goods used for the production or manufacturing of tobacco products, mineral fuels, bituminous substances and gaseous hydrocarbon products, potassium chloride products, wood products, cement products, iron and steel products and rubber products have been introduced.
- Restrictions on the export of dual-use goods and technology and on the provision of related services, as well as restrictions on exports of certain goods and technology that might contribute to Belarus's military, technological, defense and security development, together with restrictions on the provision of related services, have also been introduced.
- On August 3, 2023, the EU imposed similar export restrictions on aviation and firearm goods and technology. The EU also added certain semiconductor and electronics goods to the list of restricted goods and technology deemed to contribute to Belarus's military and technological enhancement. In parallel, the EU introduced additional licensing grounds applicable to some of these products,

²⁸⁷ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1865 of 29 June 2024, available [here](#).

²⁸⁸ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/392 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

which, for example, include a license for goods necessary for production at a Belarus joint venture majority owned by an EU investor.

- In the same sanctions package, the EU adjusted certain other export licensing grounds and exemptions, including by introducing a new license allowing wind down of telecom service operations in Belarus through February 6, 2024.²⁸⁹
- On June 29, 2024, the export and import restrictions targeting Belarus were to a great extent harmonized with restrictions imposed on Russia:²⁹⁰
 - New restrictions on the sale, supply, transfer, export or transit of (i) goods that could contribute to the enhancement of Belarusian industrial capacities, (ii) maritime navigation goods and technology, (iii) goods and technology suited for use in oil refining and liquefaction of natural gas and (iv) certain luxury goods, whether or not originating in the EU, to any Belarusian legal or natural person or for use in Belarus. The EU also imposed restrictions on the provision of financing, financial or technical assistance, brokering or other services relating to such goods and technology.
 - Further, on June 29, 2024, the EU prohibited the transit via Belarus of (i) dual-use goods and technologies, (ii) goods and technology that might contribute to Belarus's military and technological enhancement or to the development of its defense and security sector, (iii) goods that could contribute to the enhancement of Belarusian industrial capacities, (iv) firearms, firearm parts and essential components and ammunition, (v) goods and technology suited for use in aviation or the space industry and (vi) certain machinery, in each case that were exported from the EU.
 - In respect of the above new and expanded export restrictions (except for machinery exports), the EU also prohibited the sale, license or transfer in any other way of intellectual property rights or trade secrets relating to the respective goods to any Belarusian legal or natural person or for use in Belarus.
 - As of June 29, 2024, restrictions on the purchase, import or transfer of (i) crude oil and (ii) goods that allow Belarus to diversify its sources of revenue (e.g., certain aircraft engines, jet fuels, oxidation inhibitors and static dissipater additives) if they originate in or are exported from Belarus. The EU also prohibited provision of financing, financial or technical assistance, brokering or other services relating to such restricted goods.

²⁸⁹ Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1594 of 3 August 2023, available [here](#).

²⁹⁰ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1865 of 29 June 2024, available [here](#).

- As of June 29, 2024, restrictions on the purchase, import or transfer of gold if it originates in Belarus and has been exported from Belarus into the EU or to any third country after July 1, 2024.²⁹¹ Furthermore, the EU restricted the purchase, import or transfer of gold products processed in third countries that incorporate the prohibited Belarusian gold. The EU sanctions also restrict provision of financing, financial or technical assistance, brokering or other services relating to the prohibited gold.
- From July 1, 2024, restrictions on the purchase, import or transfer of certain diamonds and products incorporating diamonds if they (i) originate in Belarus and have been exported from Belarus into the EU or to any third country or (ii) originate elsewhere but transited via Belarus.²⁹² The EU sanctions also restrict provision of financing, financial or technical assistance, brokering or other services relating to the prohibited diamonds.
- On July 18, 2025, the EU revised restrictions relating to dealings with goods and technology included in the Common Military List, which were previously split between local EU Member State legislations and EU sanctions regulations. This amendment ensured that exports and imports of, and ancillary services for, goods included in the Common Military List are prohibited with respect to Belarus at the EU level.²⁹³
- On July 18, 2025, the EU expanded the list of goods that may contribute to Belarus's military or technological enhancement by adding certain chemical precursors to energetic materials, spare parts for machine tools, computer numerical control machines and chemicals for propellants. The EU also expanded the list of goods that might contribute to the enhancement of Belarusian industrial capacities, by adding certain machinery, chemicals and plastic.²⁹⁴
- On July 18, 2025, the EU also introduced a requirement to obtain an authorization for the export of goods and technology that might contribute to Belarus's military and technological enhancement to any third country, if the exporter has been informed that the items in question are or may be intended for any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Russia.²⁹⁵ This new measure provides more flexibility for an EU Member State in finding ways to prevent restricted goods from being sent to Belarus.
- On February 24, 2025, the EU prohibited selling, supplying, transferring or providing, directly or indirectly, listed types of software relating to oil and gas

²⁹¹ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1865 of 29 June 2024, available [here](#).

²⁹² Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1865 of 29 June 2024, available [here](#).

²⁹³ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1472 of 18 July 2025, available [here](#).

²⁹⁴ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1472 of 18 July 2025, available [here](#).

²⁹⁵ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1472 of 18 July 2025, available [here](#).

exploration and production projects to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus.²⁹⁶

- Restrictions on transactions related to the management of reserves as well as of assets of the Central Bank of Belarus, including transactions with legal persons or entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of the Central Bank.
- Restrictions on the listing and provision of services on EU trading venues for the transferable securities of any legal person, entity or body established in Belarus and with over 50% public ownership. This ban applied from April 12, 2022.
- Restrictions on the provision of public financing or financial assistance for trade with, or investment in, Belarus, unless:
 - it is a result of a binding financing commitment established prior to March 10, 2022;
 - it is for trade in food, and for agricultural, medical or humanitarian purposes.

Since February 24, 2025, the EU does not exempt from this restriction the provision of public financing or financial assistance up to the total value of EUR 10,000,000 per project benefitting EU SMEs (however, an EU person may apply for a license to continue providing such financing).²⁹⁷

- Restrictions on accepting deposits over EUR 100,000 from Belarusian nationals or residents, or legal persons or entities established in Belarus, or (starting from February 24, 2025) legal persons, entities or bodies established outside the EU and whose proprietary rights are directly or indirectly owned more than 50% by Belarussian nationals or residents. On February 24, 2025, the EU also prohibited the provision of crypto-asset wallet, account or custody services to Belarussian nationals, residents or entities. Finally, starting from March 26, 2025, the EU prohibits Belarussian nationals and residents from owning or controlling, or holding any posts in the governing bodies of, EU entities that provide crypto-asset wallet, account or custody services.²⁹⁸
- Restrictions on the provision of certain core and ancillary services for transferable securities issued after April 12, 2022, to Belarusian nationals or residents, or any legal person or entity established in Belarus, by EU CSDs. This ban does not apply to EU nationals or any person with a temporary or permanent residence permit in the EU.

²⁹⁶ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/392 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

²⁹⁷ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/392 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

²⁹⁸ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/392 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

- Restrictions on the sale, supply, transfer or export of banknotes denominated in Euro and any official currencies of the EU Member States to Belarus or to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus, including the government and the Central Bank of Belarus, or for use in Belarus. This ban does not apply where such a sale, supply, transfer or export of banknotes is necessary for:
 - personal use of individuals traveling to Belarus or members of their immediate families traveling with them;
 - the official purposes of diplomatic missions, consular posts or international organizations in Belarus enjoying immunities in accordance with international law; or
 - civil society activities that directly promote democracy, human rights or the rule of law in Belarus and receive public funding from the EU, EU Member States or “partner countries.”²⁹⁹
- Restrictions on the provision of specialized financial messaging services used to exchange financial data (SWIFT) to Belagroprombank, Bank Dabrabyt, Development Bank of the Republic of Belarus and Belinvestbank (Belarusian Bank for Development and Reconstruction) or to entities established in Belarus whose proprietary rights are more than 50% owned by these entities. On July 18, 2025, the EU converted these restrictions into a prohibition to engage, directly or indirectly, in any transaction with listed legal persons, entities and bodies (including the banks already cut off from SWIFT and any entities designated in the future), or with any legal person, entity or body established in Belarus that is more than 50% owned by such listed entity.³⁰⁰
- As of June 29, 2024, restrictions on acquiring any new or extending any existing participation in, granting loans or credit to or creating any new joint ventures with any entity operating in the energy sector in Belarus. The EU Member State authorities may authorize, under certain conditions, such an investment where (i) it is deemed necessary for ensuring critical energy supply within the EU or transporting fossil fuels from or through Belarus into the EU, or (ii) it concerns an entity in the Belarus energy sector that is owned by an EU parent entity.³⁰¹
- Prohibition on road transport undertakings established in Belarus transporting goods by road within the EU, except for mail transport, and certain other exemptions. On June 29, 2024, the EU extended this prohibition to ban EU entities 25% or more owned by Belarusian natural or legal persons from being admitted to become road transport undertakings that transports goods by road within the territory of the EU, including in transit. After August 2, 2024, any EU

²⁹⁹ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/392 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

³⁰⁰ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1472 of 18 July 2025, available [here](#).

³⁰¹ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1865 of 29 June 2024, available [here](#).

road transport undertaking owned 25% or more by a Belarusian natural or legal person is prohibited from transporting goods by road within the territory of the EU, including in transit.³⁰² On February 24, 2025, the EU prohibited road transport undertakings established in the EU before April 8, 2022, from changing their capital structure in a way that increases the share of a Belarusian natural or legal person to 25% or more.³⁰³

- As of June 29, 2024, restrictions on providing:
 - accounting, auditing, including statutory audit, bookkeeping or tax consulting services, or business and management consulting or public relations services;
 - construction,³⁰⁴ architectural and engineering services, legal advisory services and IT consultancy services;
 - market research and public opinion polling services, technical testing and analysis services and advertising services;
 - certain software for the management of enterprises and software for industrial design and manufacture; or
 - technical assistance, brokering or other services, financing or financial assistance in relation to the services listed above

to Belarus or its government, public bodies or its corporations or agencies, as well as natural or legal persons acting on their behalf.³⁰⁵

On June 29, 2024, the EU allowed Member States to authorize the release of asset frozen funds or provision of restricted services in order to set up a firewall that: (i) removes a Belarusian-listed person's control of assets belonging to an EU non-listed entity; and (ii) ensures that no further funds or economic resources accrue to the benefit of the Belarusian-listed person.³⁰⁶

EU Guidance

For the first time, the EU's sanctions packages against Russia have been accompanied by extensive FAQs, which are updated on a regular basis and have at least touched on every aspect of this sanctions regime.³⁰⁷ Many of the answers provided by the EU in this document will likely apply equally to all other EU

³⁰² Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1865 of 29 June 2024, available [here](#).

³⁰³ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/392 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

³⁰⁴ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/392 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

³⁰⁵ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1865 of 29 June 2024, available [here](#).

³⁰⁶ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1865 of 29 June 2024, available [here](#).

³⁰⁷ Commission Consolidated FAQs on the Implementation of Council Regulation No 833/2014 and Council Regulation No 269/2014, available [here](#).

sanctions regimes, making this an invaluable source for interpreting EU sanctions restrictions more broadly.

The EU has also published a number of additional guidance documents that, although not forming part of the Russia FAQs, set out important clarifications on the intended application of the Russia sanctions and best compliance practices. These guidance documents include the following:

- **Global Advisory on Russia Sanctions Evasion of the Multilateral REPO Task Force:** describes the types of Russian sanctions evasion techniques, such as transfer of beneficial ownership to family members and close associates, purchase of real estate to hold value, use of complex ownership structures helping to avoid identification or use of third-party jurisdictions and false trade information to get access to prohibited goods.³⁰⁸
- **Guidance on Firewalls:** describes ring-fencing “safeguards” that a non-designated EU entity may implement to prevent a designated person from exercising control over an entity and to ensure that an EU entity may continue operating as usual. Such “safeguards” include the removal of the designated person from the day-to-day operation and any business decision of the entity and the resulting resources and profits. The Guidance encourages EU Member States to implement a system of cross-border recognition of firewalls.³⁰⁹
- **Guidance on Enhanced Due Diligence to Shield Against Russia Sanctions Circumvention:** describes the steps of strategic sanctions risks assessment, suggests an approach to enhanced due diligence which may adequately prevent those risks from occurring, and lists circumvention red flags.³¹⁰ On February 19, 2024, this guidance was updated.
- **Advisory for the Maritime Oil Industry and Related Sectors:** draws attention to the growing “shadow” maritime oil trade by actors who try to evade price caps on crude oil and petroleum products of Russian origin or actors connected to sanctioned persons and countries. Such “shadow” trade increases maritime safety and environmental risks and makes it more challenging to hold responsible parties accountable. The advisory provides recommendations concerning specific

³⁰⁸ Global Advisory on Russia Sanctions Evasion Issued Jointly by the Multilateral REPO Task Force (Mar. 9, 2023), available [here](#).

³⁰⁹ Guidance Note – Implementation of Firewalls in cases of EU entities owned or controlled by a designated person or entity (Nov. 29, 2023), available [here](#). The EU issued its first Guidance on Firewalls for Agricultural and Food Trades in May 2023. The EU expanded the Guidance to all EU entities with links to designated persons, regardless of industry in November.

³¹⁰ European Commission Guidance for EU operators: Implementing enhanced due diligence to shield against Russia sanctions circumvention (Feb. 19, 2024), available [here](#).

best practices in the maritime oil industry to prevent and disrupt the prohibited “shadow” sanctioned trade.³¹¹

- The EU has historically published a number of EU Commission Opinions on various sanctions topics, which continue to include important guidance on concepts like the EU’s interpretation of the “ownership and control” test.

Enforcement

The enforcement provision of the Russia and Belarus sanctions has been strengthened to require Member States to impose criminal penalties where appropriate and provide measures for confiscation of the proceeds of a sanctions infringement.

On November 28, 2022, the EU Council unanimously adopted a decision to add the violation of restrictive measures to the list of EU crimes included in Article 83(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.³¹² This allows the EU to set out rules concerning the definition of a criminal breach of sanctions and the minimum penalties imposed for such a breach.

Following on from this, on December 2, 2022, the European Commission proposed a Directive³¹³ on the criminalization of sanctions violations. The next step was for the Directive to undergo a review by the European Parliament and Council per the ordinary co-legislative procedure. On June 9, 2023, the Council settled on its negotiation position and presented a revised version of the draft Directive.³¹⁴ On July 7, 2023, the Civil Liberties Committee of the European Parliament prepared a report on the draft Directive for further consideration by the European Parliament.³¹⁵ On December 12, 2023, the Council and European Parliament reached political agreement on the EU Commission’s Directive proposal. The Directive was adopted on April 24, 2024, and took effect on May 19, 2024.³¹⁶

³¹¹ Price Cap Coalition – Advisory for the Maritime Oil Industry and Related Sectors (Oct. 12, 2023), *available* [here](#).

³¹² See Press Release from the Council of the EU “Sanctions: Council adds the violation of restrictive measures to the list of EU crimes” (Nov. 28, 2022), *available* [here](#).

³¹³ See Proposal for a Directive on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures (Dec. 2, 2022), *available* [here](#); Press Release from the European Commission “Ukraine: Commission proposes to criminalize the violation of EU sanctions” (Dec. 2, 2022), *available* [here](#); and Q&As from the European Commission “Commission proposes to criminalize evasion of EU sanctions” (Dec. 2, 2022), *available* [here](#).

³¹⁴ See Press Release from the Council “EU sanctions: Council finalises position on law that aligns penalties for violations” (June 9, 2023), *available* [here](#).

³¹⁵ See REPORT on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures (July 7, 2023), *available* [here](#).

³¹⁶ Directive (EU) 2024/1226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures and amending Directive (EU) 2018/1673, *available* [here](#).

The Directive:

- defines the criminal offenses related to the violation of EU sanctions;
- standardizes the penalties for those found guilty of a defined criminal offense;
- safeguards lawyers through professional secrecy by removing any obligation to report information obtained in connection with judicial, administrative or arbitral proceedings; and
- designates concealed funds or economic resources obtained through circumvention as proceeds of crime.

EU Member States were required to implement the Directive requirements by May 20, 2025.

Starting from February 24, 2023, the EU applied expanded enforcement and anti-circumvention measures including:

- more detailed reporting obligations on funds and economic resources belonging to listed individuals and entities that have been frozen or were subject to any move shortly before the listing;
- reporting obligations to the Member States and to the Commission on immobilized reserves and assets of the Central Bank of Russia; and
- an obligation for aircraft operators to notify non-scheduled flights to their national competent authorities.

On June 24, 2024, the EU introduced a number of amendments to prevent circumvention of sanctions and enhance enforcement:³¹⁷

- The EU significantly expanded the scope of the “circumvention” offense by adding the underlined wording: “It shall be prohibited to participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the prohibitions set out in this Regulation, including by participating in such activities without deliberately seeking that object or effect but being aware that the participation may have that object or effect and accepting that possibility.”
- The EU introduced a requirement for EU persons to undertake “best efforts” to ensure that any non-EU legal person, entity or body that they own or control does not participate in activities that undermine the EU trade sanctions against Russia and EU asset freeze and trade sanctions against Belarus. “Best efforts”

³¹⁷ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 of 24 June 2024, available [here](#).

should be understood as comprising all actions that are suitable and necessary to achieve the result of preventing the undermining of sanctions so long as they are feasible for the EU person in view of its nature, its size and the relevant factual circumstances. Such circumstances include situations where the EU person, due to reasons outside of its control, such as the legislation of a third country, is not able to exercise control over a non-EU subsidiary. On February 24, 2025, the “best efforts” obligation was extended to EU asset freeze sanctions targeting Russia.³¹⁸

- EU Member States are required to take self-disclosure into account as a mitigating factor when deciding on penalties for EU sanctions violations.

On December 16, 2024, the EU introduced a prohibition on enforcing or giving effect to any injunction, order, relief, judgment or other decision of Russian courts made pursuant to Russian legislation that authorizes Russian courts to prohibit the initiation or continuation of proceedings in foreign courts or tribunals (anti-suit injunction) against Russian persons targeted by Western sanctions or in connection with disputes with non-sanctioned Russian persons that arise from any Western sanctions. In addition, EU courts and authorities will not provide assistance to any investigation in connection with, and will not give effect to any criminal punishment imposed by Russian courts for, an alleged violation of such injunction, order, relief, judgment or other decision of the Russian court.³¹⁹

On February 24, 2025, the EU authorized the Commission to exchange with the competent authorities of “partner countries” (i.e., US, Japan, UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Switzerland, Lichtenstein and Iceland) on a reciprocal basis information concerning third-country trade, transactions and operation for the purpose of preventing circumvention of sanctions targeting Russia and Belarus.³²⁰ The EU also implemented a requirement for EU Member State authorities, including enforcement, customs and financial intelligence authorities, to exchange information with the Commission and competent authorities of their or other EU Member States, in particular where they detect instances or attempts of breach or circumvention of sanctions.³²¹

Frozen Assets

On February 12, 2024, the EU adopted a regulation clarifying the obligations of CSDs holding assets and reserves of the Central Bank of Russia that are immobilized as a result of EU sanctions.

³¹⁸ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

³¹⁹ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/3187 of 16 December 2024, available [here](#).

³²⁰ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#); Council Regulation (EU) 2025/390 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#); Council Regulation (EU) 2025/392 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

³²¹ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#); Council Regulation (EU) 2025/390 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#); Council Regulation (EU) 2025/392 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

The CSD holding such assets and reserves with a total value exceeding EUR 1 million must apply the following rules regarding cash balances accumulating exclusively due to the EU sanctions:

- account for such cash balances separately;
- register revenues accruing from or generated by such cash balances separately in the financial accounts;
- not dispose of the net profits determined in respect of such revenues by way of distribution in the form of dividends or otherwise for the benefit of any third party, until the EU decides to contribute such profits to the EU budget to support Ukraine and its recovery and reconstruction; and
- supervisory authorities may authorize releases of a part of the net profits in view of complying with statutory capital and risk-management requirements.

A CSD must report to the EU Commission and to their national supervisory authorities, by June 30 of each year, on the total amount of cash balances, revenues and net profits resulting from the assets and reserves of the Central Bank of Russia on their accounts.³²²

Potential financial contributions to Ukraine may be in the future channeled through the Ukraine Facility on which the EU Council and the European Parliament reached a provisional agreement on February 6, 2024. The Ukraine Facility will pool the EU's budget support to Ukraine into one single instrument to support Ukraine in the course of 2024-2027.³²³

On May 21, 2024, the Council adopted a set of legal acts ensuring that the CSDs holding Russian sovereign assets and reserves of more than EUR 1 million make a financial contribution from their corresponding net profits accumulating since February 15, 2024, for further military support to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility (the EU's off-budget instrument to support worldwide peace initiatives) (90%), as well as for support of Ukraine's defense industry capacities and reconstruction needs with EU budgetary programs (10%). This allocation is reviewed annually, with the first review scheduled before January 1, 2025.³²⁴

On October 24, 2024, the EU established the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, through which revenues originating from frozen Russian assets in the EU will be

³²² Council Regulation (EU) 2024/576 of 12 February 2024, available [here](#).

³²³ Press Release, "Ukraine Facility: Council and Parliament agree on new support mechanism for Ukraine" 9 Feb. 6, 2024), available [here](#).

³²⁴ Press Release, "Extraordinary revenues generated by immobilised Russian assets: Council greenlights the use of net windfall profits to support Ukraine's self-defence and reconstruction" (May 21, 2024), available [here](#).

used to repay macro-financial assistance loans provided by the EU and bilateral loans provided by G7 partners.³²⁵

Recognition of Awards and Recovery of Sanctions-Related Damages in the EU Courts

Starting from June 24, 2024, EU nationals and entities are entitled to recover, in judicial proceedings before the EU Member State courts, any damages:

- incurred by such EU person as a consequence of claims lodged with courts in third countries by Russian claimants in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected by EU sanctions; or
- caused to that EU person by any Russian person who benefitted from a decision on confiscation of such EU person's assets in Russia, provided that such decision is illegal under international customary law or under a bilateral investment treaty between Russia and an EU Member State;

provided that the EU person concerned does not have effective access to the remedies under the relevant jurisdiction.³²⁶

On February 24, 2025, the EU clarified that such damages may be recovered from the designated persons or persons acting on their behalf who have lodged the claims with the courts in third countries, or from persons, entities or bodies that own or control such claimants.³²⁷

On July 18, 2025, the EU also authorized EU Member States to recover, in judicial proceedings before the EU Member State courts, any damages, including legal costs, incurred by that EU Member State as a consequence of investor-state dispute settlement proceedings brought against an EU Member State in connection with EU sanctions measures.³²⁸ The recovery of damages is possible from any Russian person that initiated, intervened or participated in the investor-state dispute settlement or that seeks to enforce any award, decision or judgement related to the investor-state dispute settlement and persons that own or control any of such dispute participants.

In each of the above damages recovery cases, if no EU Member State court has jurisdiction over such damages dispute, a court of an EU Member State that has

³²⁵ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2773 of 24 October 2024, available [here](#), and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2761 of 24 October 2024, available [here](#).

³²⁶ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 of 24 June 2024, available [here](#).

³²⁷ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#); Council Regulation (EU) 2025/390 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#); Council Regulation (EU) 2025/392 of 24 February 2025, available [here](#).

³²⁸ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 of 24 June 2024, available [here](#).

sufficient connection to that case (e.g., a court in the country of the claimant's domicile) can accept the jurisdiction and hear the case.

On July 18, 2025, the EU prohibited EU Member State courts to recognize any: (i) injunction, order, relief, judgement, arbitral award or administrative decision; (ii) request for assistance to proceedings; and (iii) penalty based on any injunction, order, relief, judgement, arbitral award or administrative decision, in each case issued outside the EU pursuant to investor-state dispute settlement proceedings against a Member State in connection with sanctions measures imposed by the EU.³²⁹ The EU also mandates EU Member States to raise any available objections to recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards that were rendered against them in such investor-state dispute settlement proceedings.³³⁰

³²⁹ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 of 18 July 2025, available [here](#).

³³⁰ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 of 18 July 2025, available [here](#).

UK Sanctions

The UK has introduced a number of Russian sanctions that broadly fall into the following categories. While these restrictions are in some ways similar to the EU restrictions, there are a number of significant differences.

- **Financial Sanctions**
 - **Asset Freezes:** an expansion of the previous asset freeze list to include a number of prominent Russian businessmen, Russian politicians and Russian banks.
 - **Financial Sector Restrictions:** including expanded capital market restrictions to all Russian persons and restrictions on dealing with Russian sovereign debt. The UK has also imposed correspondent banking restrictions and restrictions on transactions with the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and the Russian government.
 - **Broad Investment Restrictions:** including a prohibition on directly acquiring any ownership or control in an entity connected with Russia.
 - **Trust Services Restrictions:** prohibiting the provision of ongoing or new trust services to or for the benefit of a designated person or a person connected with Russia.
- **Trade Sanctions**
 - **Export Restrictions:** for dual-use and critical industry goods and technology, G7 dependency and Russia's vulnerable goods and technology, various energy, refining, aviation and maritime goods and technology, luxury goods and certain types of industrial software.
 - **Import Restrictions:** targeting iron and steel, coal, oil, oil products and LNG, revenue generating goods and gold.
 - **Trade Restrictions for Non-Government Controlled Territories of Ukraine:** the UK imposed import and investment restrictions, as well restrictions on export of infrastructure-related goods and provision of certain services on regions of Ukraine that are not controlled by the government of Ukraine.
 - **Oil Price Cap:** prohibiting maritime transport of Russian-origin oil and oil products to third countries, unless they fall under a certain price limit set by the EU, UK and US.

- **Transport Restrictions:** including aviation restrictions and restrictions on Russian vessels entering UK ports.
- **Internet Services Restrictions:** including new obligations for social media, internet access and application store providers.
- **Professional Services Sanctions:** consisting of restrictions on UK persons providing a wide range of professional services to persons based in Russia and Russian companies.

Financial Restrictions

The most significant new restrictions imposed by the UK consist of measures targeting Russian entities' and individuals' access to UK financial services. These include the expansion of the previously existing UK capital market restrictions on all Russian persons and the introduction of a range of novel restrictions that limit access of Russian persons to investments from the UK.

Importantly, the UK applies a strict liability standard to sanctions violations, which in practice means that a UK person may be held liable even in the absence of knowledge or reasonable cause to suspect the breach.

Asset Freezes

The UK has imposed asset freezes on various entities and individuals under the expanded asset freeze designation criteria, which were introduced on February 10, 2022, as discussed in a previous version of our Client Update. These criteria were later expanded to allow designations on the basis of descriptions, rather than just by name.

Asset freezes and travel bans have been imposed on over 1,610 individuals and 470 entities since February 22, 2022. OFSI clarified that it will not aggregate different designated persons' holdings in a company when assessing ownership or control, unless the holdings are subject to a joint arrangement between the designated parties or one party controls the rights of the other. Please note that asset freezes can extend to entities owned or controlled by a sanctioned individual. On November 14, 2024, the UK clarified that making funds or economic resources available to any person for the benefit of a designated person includes making funds or economic resources available for the benefit of a person that is owned or controlled directly or indirectly by them.³³¹ The UK also introduced an exemption allowing asset frozen persons to make "required payments," namely those to government bodies, such as the Financial Conduct Authority, the registrar of companies and local authorities. These payments were previously covered by general licenses allowing various tax and statutory payments, which have since been revoked. Furthermore, the UK clarified the scope and wording of reporting obligations for UK relevant firms,

³³¹ The Sanctions (EU Exit) (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 2) Regulations 2024, available [here](#).

expanded the list of relevant firms to include, for instance, art dealers and insolvency practitioners, and granted OFSI statutory powers to conduct annual reviews of frozen assets.

The most prominent individuals and entities sanctioned by the UK include:³³²

Banks and Investment Firms	State-Owned and Privately-Owned Enterprises	Prominent Business Figures	Political Figures
Alfa-Bank	Rostec	Alisher Usmanov	Vladimir Putin
Gazprombank	United Aircraft Corporation	German Khan	Sergei Lavrov
VTB	Tactical Missiles Corporation	Igor Sechin	400 members of the State Duma
VEB	UralVagonZavod	Roman Abramovich	Members of the Russian Federation Council
Otkritie	United Shipbuilding Corporation	Andrei Kostin	Senior military leaders
Sovcombank	SOGAZ	Mikhail Fridman	Members of the Russian Security Council
Sberbank	RDIF	Gennadiy Timchenko	Elvira Nabiullina
Bank Saint Petersburg	PJSC Aeroflot	Herman Gref	
Bank Uralsib	PJSC Rushydro	Dmitry Mazepin	
Bank Zenit	Rostec	Andrey Melnichenko	
MTS Bank	Entities controlled by Rosatom	Petr Aven	
Credit Bank of Moscow	PJSC Severstal	Leonid Mikhelson	
PSB, UBRD	PJSC Polyus	Vladimir Potanin	
Bank Rossiya	PJSC Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works	Vladimir Yevtushenkov and his family members	
JSC Russian Argicultural Bank ("Rosselkhozbank")	USM Holdings Limited	Igor Altushkin	
SMP Bank	Nord Gold PLC	Viatcheslav Kantor	
Moscow Industrial Bank	ALNG 2		
PJSC AFK Sistema	Murmansk LNG		
JSC Dom RF	JSC Rusgazdobycha		
Tinkoff Bank (T-Bank)			

³³² For further information, see our Russian Billionaires Table at Annex A.

Banks and Investment Firms	State-Owned and Privately-Owned Enterprises	Prominent Business Figures	Political Figures
JSC Russian Regional Development Bank ("RRDB") Metallinvest Bank Novikombank Deposit Insurance Agency	PJSC Surgutneftegas PJSC Gazprom Neft JSC Siberia Airlines		

UK asset freeze sanctions also targeted Russian officials who have promoted and enforced the conscription and mobilization of citizens and criminal mercenaries to fight in Russia's war in Ukraine, senior Russian commanders and persons, including Iranian officials and entities, alleged to be involved in the production or supply of military equipment, such as drones, to the Russian government.

On May 28, 2024, OFSI expanded the asset freeze designation grounds by adding:

- a ground to designate any person who owns or controls an entity destabilizing Ukraine or undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine, or serves as a director, trustee or other manager, or holds the right, directly or indirectly, to nominate at least one director (whether executive or non-executive), trustee or equivalent of a person in the respective entity; and
- a ground to designate any person who provides financial services or makes available funds, economic resources, goods or technology to a person that is involved in obtaining a benefit from or supporting the government of Russia.

On July 31, 2024, the UK government revoked the above changes, but only to re-introduce them as a new set of amendments allowing additional time for Parliamentary scrutiny.³³³

On August 8, 2023, the UK added 19 persons to the Russian asset freeze list deemed to be supplying Russia's military. This included individuals and entities across Türkiye, Iran, the UAE, Slovakia and Switzerland.³³⁴

³³³ The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations 2024.

³³⁴ Press Release of the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office ("FCDO"), "Largest ever UK action targets Putin's access to foreign military supplies" (Aug. 8, 2023), available [here](#).

On September 29, 2023, the UK designated 10 Russian individuals and the Russian Central Election Commission for organizing recent elections in Crimea and the Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Luhansk regions.³³⁵

On November 11, 2023, the UK designated 20 individuals and nine entities operating in and supporting Russia's gold, oil and strategic sectors, including a UAE network supporting Russia's gold trades.³³⁶ On December 6, 2023, the UK designated 25 individuals and 21 entities for supplying and importing military goods to Russia, including businesses in China, Serbia, Türkiye, the UAE and Uzbekistan.³³⁷

On December 14, 2023, the UK introduced a requirement for designated persons to inform HM Treasury of the nature, value and location of their funds and economic resources in the UK or in any jurisdiction (if such designated person is a citizen of the UK or is located in the UK) and, subsequently, to provide notice about any changes to such funds or economic resources.³³⁸

On February 22, 2024, the UK added various individuals and entities to the asset freeze list, including munitions manufacturers, importers and manufacturers of machine tools, oil traders, "shadow fleet" vessels and diamond and aluminum producers.

On June 13, 2024, the UK designated on the asset freeze list MOEX, NSD and NCC. The UK also designated entities operating the Murmansk LNG and continued designating suppliers of foreign technologies to Russia, including entities from China, Israel, Kyrgyzstan and Türkiye, along with ships that transport military goods from North Korea to Russia.

On October 12, 2024, the UK general license authorizing the sale, divestment or transfer of financial instruments held at NSD, as well as the payment of safe-keeping fees, expired.

OFSI recognized that the measures taken by the Russian authorities to remove NSD from the custodial chain for shares of Russian issuers that are held by foreign investors from "hostile states" undermine UK sanctions imposed on the NSD. OFSI noted that the government is exploring options to further clarify its position on the NSD-related sanctions.

³³⁵ Press Release of the FCDO, "UK announces new sanctions in response to Russian sham elections in Ukraine" (Sept. 29, 2023), available [here](#).

³³⁶ Press Release of the FCDO, "UK cracks down on gold and oil networks propping up Russia's war economy" (Nov. 8, 2023), available [here](#).

³³⁷ Press Release of the FCDO, "UK hits military suppliers propping up Russia's war machine" (Dec. 6, 2023), available [here](#).

³³⁸ The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 4) Regulations 2023, available [here](#).

On October 28, 2024, the UK designated three Russian agencies and three individuals for their involvement in interference activities through propaganda.³³⁹

On November 25, 2024, the UK designated two insurance companies linked to the Russian “shadow fleet.”³⁴⁰

On November 7, 2024, the UK designated Chinese, Turkish and Kazakh entities for supplying military goods to Russia, as well as several mercenary groups.³⁴¹

On February 24, 2025, the UK designated 66 persons and entities, including JSC Siberian Airlines and Kyrgyzstan-based OJSC Keremet Bankas, as well as producers and suppliers of machine tools, electronics and dual-use goods for Russia’s military, including microprocessors used in weapons systems.³⁴²

On May 9, 2025, the UK designated nine persons and entities on the UK asset freeze list, including a major insurer, Soglasie Insurance Company.³⁴³

On May 20, 2025, the UK designated 82 persons and entities on the UK asset freeze list. This round of designations heavily targeted Russian shares registrars and financial infrastructure, including the Deposit Insurance Agency, St. Petersburg Currency Exchange and Petersburg Settlement Centre.³⁴⁴

On May 28, 2025, the UK designated one person and six entities, including the Market Special Depository.

On June 17, 2025, the UK designated ten persons and entities on the UK asset freeze list, including operators of “shadow fleet” vessels and two UK residents operating a shadowy network of shell companies.³⁴⁵

On July 21, 2025, the UK imposed asset freeze sanctions on two entities enabling Russia’s illicit shadow fleet oil trade—Intershipping Services LLC, responsible for registering shadow fleet vessels under the Gabonese flag, and Litasco Middle East

³³⁹ Press Release of the FCDO, “UK sanctions Putin’s interference actors” (Oct. 28, 2024), available [here](#).

³⁴⁰ Press Release of the FCDO, “UK imposes new wave of sanctions to choke Russian oil revenues as Foreign Secretary arrives in Italy for G7” (Nov. 25, 2024), available [here](#).

³⁴¹ Press Release of the FCDO, “UK strikes at the heart of Putin’s war machine” (Nov. 7, 2024), available [here](#).

³⁴² Press Release of FCDO, “UK announces largest sanctions package against Russia since 2022” (Feb. 24, 2025), available [here](#).

³⁴³ FCDO Policy Paper. “Russia sanctions targets” (May 9, 2025), available [here](#).

³⁴⁴ Press Release of the FCDO, “UK announces major sanctions in support of Ukraine” (May 20, 2025), available [here](#).

³⁴⁵ Press Release of the FCDO, “UK turns the screw on Putin as allies unite behind Ukraine” (June 17, 2025), available [here](#).

DMCC (linked to Russian oil company Lukoil) for its ongoing role in moving large volumes of Russian oil on shadow fleet vessels.³⁴⁶

On August 20, 2025, the UK imposed asset freeze sanctions on persons participating in Russia's attempts to avoid sanctions by exploiting Kyrgyz financial systems and crypto networks.³⁴⁷

On September 12, 2025, the UK imposed asset freeze sanctions on 30 entities and persons involved in supplying electronics, chemicals and explosives to Russia that are used to manufacture missiles and other weapons systems.³⁴⁸

Financial Sector Restrictions

Expanded Capital Markets Restrictions: The updated UK sanctions regime expands the UK capital market restrictions to all "*persons connected with Russia*," but only in relation to shares and transferable securities issued on or after March 1, 2022. Secondary trading of Russian transferable securities and money market instruments issued before this date is thus still permitted.

The restrictions also cover the provision of new loans to Russian connected persons after March 1, 2022 (other than individuals). The loan restrictions were later expanded to cover a broader range of non-Russian entities ultimately owned by persons connected with Russia.

"*Persons connected with Russia*" means persons ordinarily resident in Russia, persons who are physically located in Russia and Russian entities. These capital market restrictions also apply to entities more than 50% owned by a person connected to Russia, though there is a general exemption for persons who were not, as of March 1, 2022, domiciled in Russia or owned by entities or persons based outside of Russia. In practice, this means that any entities owned by an individual in Russia will also be subject to these UK capital market restrictions.

The exemption for UK-incorporated subsidiaries of entities targeted by the original UK capital market restrictions (e.g., Sberbank and VTB) has been removed. The UK has also removed the "non-restricted trade" exemption for loans made to any persons subject to UK capital market restrictions.

³⁴⁶ Press Release of the FCDO, "UK hammers Putin's energy revenues with fresh sanctions" (July 21, 2025), available [here](#).

³⁴⁷ Press Release of the FCDO, "UK targets sanctions circumvention and crypto networks exploited by Russia" (Aug. 20, 2025), available [here](#).

³⁴⁸ Press Release of the FCDO, "UK ratchets up pressure on Putin's military machine as Foreign Secretary travels to Kyiv", available [here](#)

Other Financial Sector Restrictions: The UK imposed the following other Russia-related financial sector sanctions:

- Restrictions on correspondent banking relationships and processing of sterling payments to, from or via specifically designated persons or a credit or financial institution that is owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such designated person. On December 14, 2023, the UK expanded this restriction to payments in all currencies and to catch the involvement of such designated persons at any stage in the payment chain.³⁴⁹
- Restrictions prohibiting provision of financial services for the purpose of foreign exchange reserve and asset management to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. Starting from December 14, 2023, relevant firms (e.g., financial institutions, accountants) are required to inform the Treasury if they know or have a reasonable cause to suspect that they hold funds or economic resources of such entities.³⁵⁰
- Prohibitions on exporting banknotes denominated in sterling or any official currencies of the EU Member States to or for use in Russia.
- Suspension of the Bank of England's legislative duty to make a decision in relation to a notification of third-country resolution action in respect of a designated person or entities owned or controlled by a designated person.

Investment Restrictions

The UK also imposed a prohibition on all new UK outward investment into Russia, which include the following activities (partially overlapping with the capital market restrictions):

- Directly acquiring any ownership interest in land located in Russia.
- Indirectly acquiring any ownership interest in land located in Russia for the purpose of making funds or economic resources available directly or indirectly to a person connected with Russia.
- Directly acquiring any ownership or control in an entity connected with Russia. An entity connected with Russia means one that is established or constituted under the laws of, or domiciled in, Russia.
- Indirectly acquiring any ownership or control in an entity connected with Russia for the purpose of making funds or economic resources available directly or

³⁴⁹ The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 4) Regulations 2023, available [here](#).

³⁵⁰ The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 4) Regulations 2023, available [here](#).

indirectly to a person connected with Russia, or for the benefit of a person connected with Russia.

- Directly or indirectly acquiring any ownership or control in an entity, other than a person connected with Russia, for the purpose of making funds or economic resources available directly or indirectly to a person connected with Russia, or for the benefit of a person connected with Russia.
- Directly or indirectly establishing any joint venture with a person connected with Russia.
- Opening a representative office or establishing a branch or subsidiary in Russia.
- Providing investment services related to any of the above activities.

There are three key exemptions to the Russian investment prohibition. These are:

- A grandfathering provision allowing contractual obligations to be concluded if those obligations arose before July 19, 2022. This exemption includes a reporting obligation to notify HM Treasury no later than five working days before the activity is carried out.
- Secondary trading of transferable securities issued by Russian companies is permitted where the relevant shares are already listed on a recognized regulated market.
- The third exemption applies to freely tradeable shares issued by non-Russian entities, unless they were issued for the purpose of making funds or economic resources available directly or indirectly to a person connected with Russia, or for the benefit of a person connected with Russia.

Trust Related Services

New Regulations were introduced to prohibit the provision of ongoing or new trust services to or for the benefit of a designated person or a person connected with Russia. The trust services ban exempts provision of trust services to or for the benefit of a person connected with Russia pursuant to an ongoing arrangement under which the services were provided immediately before December 16, 2022.

The trust services restrictions extend not only to beneficiaries of trusts but also to potential beneficiaries under trust documents and persons who are not beneficiaries on paper but are reasonably expected to obtain or be able to obtain a significant financial benefit from such trust or similar arrangement.

Trade Sanctions

On October 10, 2024, the newly formed Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation (“OTSI”) has been granted new civil enforcement powers for breaches of trade sanctions.³⁵¹

Export Restrictions

The UK imposed a number of sanctions restricting Russian access to UK goods and technologies, including the following groups of export restrictions:

- critical industry quantum computing and advanced materials goods and technology;
- dual-use, military, defense and security goods and technology;
- oil, gas and refining related goods and technology;
- aviation and maritime goods and technology;
- G7 dependency and Russia’s vulnerable goods and technology; and
- luxury goods

Critical Industry, Dual-Use, Defense and Security Goods and Technology: As compared to EU sanctions, the UK dual-use and critical industry trade restrictions generally mirror the EU’s trade restrictions on dual-use goods and advanced technology goods, such as manufacturing equipment for microprocessors. In addition to it, the UK prohibited the export of certain restricted military goods and technology to or for use in non-government controlled Ukrainian territory with a few exceptions, including for non-military use for a non-military end user and humanitarian assistance; this includes making these goods available to a person connected with or for use in non-government controlled Ukrainian territory. On April 20, 2023, the UK significantly expanded the list of the critical-industry goods and technologies, adding such items as rare earth metals and compounds and continuous flow reactors. The UK has also expanded the list of defense and security goods, adding various irritating chemical substances and mixtures.

On April 24, 2025, the UK further expanded the list of critical-industry goods and technologies, adding certain vehicles, metals and plastic.³⁵²

Oil, Gas and Refining-Related Goods and Technology: The UK also prohibited export of oil and gas extraction and oil refining related goods to or for use in Russia. While oil refining technologies have already been subject to this restriction,

³⁵¹ See our Debevoise Update, “OTSI: New Trade Sanctions Enforcement Powers,” available [here](#).

³⁵² The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2025, available [here](#).

technologies relating to oil and gas extraction have been included in the scope of the restriction on April 24, 2025.³⁵³ These sanctions include a prohibition on supplying restricted goods from a third country to Russia, making them available to a person connected with Russia or transferring restricted technology to a place in Russia or to a person connected with Russia. The prohibition also applies to the provision of related technical assistance, financial services, funds and brokering services related to these goods and technology.

Aviation and Maritime Goods and Technology: UK trade restrictions cover aircraft, including providing associated technical assistance, financial services and broking services. However, there is an exemption for aircraft flying out of the UK on regular scheduled services, which appears to be intended for future use for civilian passenger aircraft to be able to fly out of the UK to Russia and not be restricted as an export. The UK has also restricted Russian aircraft from entering UK airspace. Further, the UK prohibited providing technical assistance relating to aircraft and ships to a designated person, subject to certain safety exemptions. Finally, the UK prohibited the export of jet fuel and fuel additives to, or for use in, Russia. However, UK aviation-related restrictions do not include the broad EU-equivalent of ancillary overhaul inspection or parts replacement, which were sanctioned by the EU.

The UK also prohibited the export of maritime goods and technology for the placing on board of Russian-flagged vessels.

G7 Dependency and Russia's Vulnerable Goods: The UK prohibited the export of "G7 dependency and further goods" and "Russia's vulnerable goods" to or for use in Russia, as well as supply or delivery of such items from a third country to a place in Russia or to a person connected with Russia. These goods include a wide range of items and are listed in Schedules 3E and 3I of the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. On April 20, 2023, the list of "G7 dependency and further goods" was further expanded to add certain iron and steel products, coal, coke and semi coke of coal, peat, glass, certain motors, engines, machinery and pumps. The UK also expanded the list of "Russia's vulnerable goods," adding a wide range of machinery, containers and electronics.

Starting from April 24, 2025, the UK also prohibits the transfer of "G7 dependency and further technology" and "Russia's vulnerable technology" to a place in Russia or to a person connected with Russia.³⁵⁴ The prohibition also applies to the provision of related technical assistance, financial services, funds and brokering services related to these goods and technology.

³⁵³ The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2025, available [here](#).

³⁵⁴ The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2025, available [here](#).

On April 24, 2025, the UK also expanded the lists of “Russia’s vulnerable goods and technology” and “G7 dependency goods and technology” by adding various chemicals, electronics, and machinery.³⁵⁵

Luxury Goods: The UK has also prohibited export of luxury goods to Russia or for use in Russia. This includes a prohibition on supplying luxury goods from a third country to Russia and making luxury goods available to a person connected with Russia. On December 14, 2023, the UK also prohibited the provision of technical assistance, financial services and funds, as well as brokering services, for prohibited exports of luxury goods.³⁵⁶

On December 7, 2023, the UK National Crime Agency issued an alert³⁵⁷ to UK financial sector, transportation and logistics providers to inform them of common techniques suspected to be in use to evade sanctions on the export of high-risk goods, which Russia is using in the battlefield in Ukraine.

Import Restrictions

The UK implemented a number of sanctions restricting Russia’s ability to receive revenues from selling goods produced or extracted in Russia to the UK, including the following groups of import restrictions:

- goods and technology that generate significant revenues for Russia;
- iron and steel;
- coal and other fossil fuels;
- crude oil and oil products, liquified natural gas;
- gold; and
- diamonds.

Revenue Generating Goods: The UK prohibited the import of revenue generating goods that originate in, or are consigned from, or located in, Russia. On April 20, 2023, the UK substantially restructured the prohibition and divided the revenue generating goods into two categories: (i) revenue generating goods that are prohibited from being imported into the UK (the pre-existing list with significant expansions) and (ii) a new list of revenue generating goods, which are prohibited from being supplied both to the UK and to any third country. The ban also prohibits

³⁵⁵ The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2025, available [here](#).

³⁵⁶ The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 4) Regulations 2023, available [here](#).

³⁵⁷ UK National Crime Agency (“NCA”) Red Alert, “Exporting High-Risk Goods” (Dec. 7, 2023), available [here](#).

the provision of technical assistance, financial services and funds and brokering services relating to revenue generating goods.

The second category of the revenue generating goods has brought the UK sanctions closer to the scope of similar EU sanctions. The UK has also introduced an exception from these trade sanctions for the second category of revenue generating goods, if they were lawfully imported to the UK or the Isle of Man or if they are located in Russia and are used by the UK person or their immediate family members for a personal purpose.

Iron and Steel: The UK prohibited the import of iron and steel products that originate or are consigned from Russia and acquisition of such iron and steel products, directly or indirectly, regardless of whether they are meant to enter the UK. This also includes a prohibition on directly or indirectly supplying or delivering iron and steel products from a place in Russia to a third country. The UK also prohibits the provision of technical assistance, financial services and funds in relation to iron and steel products. On April 20, 2023, the UK imposed an import ban on iron and steel products processed in a third country using Russian iron or steel products. This ban came into effect on September 30, 2023. The ban includes a prohibition on providing related technical assistance and financial and brokering services. The UK provided exception from the prohibition for the iron and steel goods lawfully imported to the UK or the Isle of Man.

On December 14, 2023, the UK expanded the list of iron and steel products to include pig iron, ferro-alloys and ferrous products. These import restrictions does not apply to goods consigned from Russia before December 15, 2023, and imported into the UK before January 14, 2023.³⁵⁸

Further, the UK exempted from the import restriction (i) all targeted iron and steel products which were exported from Russia before they became the target of export restrictions and which are not to be released for free circulation in the UK or Isle of Man; and (ii) ancillary services in relation to iron and steel originating in Russia where those products were exported from Russia before they became banned.³⁵⁹

Coal and Coal Products, Oil and Oil Products: The UK prohibited the import of Russian oil and oil products, coal or coal products and LNG. These prohibitions include a prohibition on acquiring these goods, directly or indirectly, where they originate in or are located in Russia with the intention of having the goods enter the

³⁵⁸ The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 4) Regulations 2023, available [here](#).

³⁵⁹ The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 4) Regulations 2023, available [here](#).

UK. The prohibition also applies to the provision of related technical assistance, financial services, funds and brokering services related to these goods.

On April 20, 2023, the UK removed the prohibition on the direct or indirect supply and delivery of the oil and oil products, coal and coal products, as well as the first category of the revenue generating goods (regardless of the origin) from a place in Russia to the UK (LNG was originally not subject to such restriction). With respect to gold, supplies and deliveries of the Russian-origin gold from third countries to the UK were removed from the scope of prohibition as well. These actions included the removal of the prohibition to provide related technical assistance, financial services, funding and brokering services for the relevant supplies.

Gold: The UK also prohibited the import of gold (including gold jewelry) where that gold has been exported from Russia and originates in Russia. It is also prohibited to acquire gold, directly or indirectly, where it originates in or is located in Russia with the intention of having it enter the UK. The prohibition also applies to the provision of related technical assistance, financial services, funds and brokering services related to these goods.

On November 8, 2023, the UK National Crime Agency issued an alert³⁶⁰ to financial institutions, gold dealers and lawyers warning that Russia is laundering sanctioned gold to mask its origin so that it can be hidden in supply chains and sold in the UK and around the world for the purpose of circumventing sanctions. The alert describes circumvention typologies that may be used for trading in different forms of gold.

Metals: On December 14, 2023, the UK prohibited the import of metals which are consigned from Russia and the acquisition, directly or indirectly, of metals originating in or located in Russia.³⁶¹ The UK also prohibited supplying or delivering such metals from a place in Russia to a third country. The prohibited metals include, among others, copper, nickel, aluminum, lead, zinc and molybdenum. The UK provided an exception from the prohibition for metals lawfully imported to the UK or the Isle of Man.

The new import restriction does not apply to metals consigned from Russia before December 15, 2023, and imported into the UK before January 14, 2024. Further, the UK exempted from the import prohibition metals which were exported from Russia before the amendments took effect and which are not to be released for free circulation in the UK or the Isle of Man.

Diamonds: On December 14, 2023, the UK prohibited the import of diamonds (both natural and synthetic) and diamond jewelry which are consigned from Russia. These

³⁶⁰ NCA Red Alert, "Gold-based Financial and Trade Sanctions Circumvention" (Nov. 8, 2023), available [here](#).

³⁶¹ The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 4) Regulations 2023, available [here](#).

prohibitions include a prohibition on acquiring diamonds and diamond jewelry, directly or indirectly, which originate in or are located in Russia. The UK also prohibited supplying or delivering diamonds or diamond jewelry from a place in Russia to a third country. The prohibition applies to the provision of related technical assistance, financial services, funds and brokering services related to these goods. The UK provided an exception from the prohibition for diamonds and diamond jewelry lawfully imported to the UK or the Isle of Man.³⁶²

On March 1, 2024, the UK imposed similar import restrictions on diamonds that originate in Russia and are processed in a third country. The restrictions does apply to any diamonds equal to or larger than 1 carat, starting from March 1, 2024, and to any diamonds equal to or larger than 0.5 carat, starting from September 1, 2024.³⁶³ On April 24, 2025, the UK imposed further import restrictions on synthetic diamonds of at least 0.5 carats that were manufactured in Russia and processed in a third country.³⁶⁴

The UK imposed additional duties of 35 percentage points on a range of goods including platinum, palladium, nickel, silicon, antibiotics and more.

Non-Government Controlled Territories of Ukraine

Existing trade embargos on Crimea were expanded to also apply to Donetsk and Luhansk, subject to an exemption for the performance of contractual obligations that arose before February 23, 2022, where the UK government has been notified of such performance. Starting from June 20, 2023, similar sanctions apply to Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions.

Provision of Software

On April 24, 2025, the UK introduced restrictions on “sectoral software and technology,” which include:

- Business enterprise software and technology, such as software for resources planning, customer relationship management, business intelligence and supply chain management;
- Industrial design software and technology, such as software for building information modeling and computer aided design and manufacturing software; and
- Oil and gas related software and technology, such as oil and gas exploration and production software, reservoir simulation software, drilling and hydraulic fracturing software and software for production management.

³⁶² The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 5) Regulations 2023, available [here](#).

³⁶³ The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2024, available [here](#).

³⁶⁴ The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2025, available [here](#).

UK sanctions prohibit making available or transferring such “sectoral software and technology” to a person connected with Russia or for use in Russia, and providing technical assistance, financial services, funds, or brokering services in connection with arrangements relating to such “sectoral software and technology.”³⁶⁵

Oil Price Cap

The UK imposed a broadly similar Oil Price Cap as the EU.

In particular, the UK prohibits maritime transportation from Russia to a third country or between third countries of oil (from December 5, 2022) and petroleum products (from February 5, 2023), if the price per barrel exceeds the agreed price caps (i.e., \$60 for oil, \$45 for discount-to-crude petroleum products and \$100 for premium-to crude petroleum products).³⁶⁶ The UK also prohibits provision of financial services or other ancillary services relating to such maritime transportation.

Similar to the EU, the UK Oil Price Cap determines three “tiers” of actors in the oil supply chain depending on whether they routinely know the price paid in their ordinary course of business and their role in the oil supply transactions.³⁶⁷ The three “tiers” have different scope of price attestation, due diligence and reporting requirements.³⁶⁸ On December 20, 2023, the UK introduced increased reporting requirements for insurers, ship owners, ship management companies and some other “Tier 3A” and “Tier 3B” market participants, which take force on February 19, 2024.³⁶⁹ Similar to the EU, on February 19, 2024, the UK introduced a requirement to provide/collect attestations on oil price for each voyage and share itemized ancillary costs information within 30 days of such request.³⁷⁰

All entities involved in the Oil Price Cap trades must keep accurate, complete and English-readable electronic or paper records of their activities undertaken under the relevant license. The use of the UK Oil Price Cap exemption may in practice be more administratively burdensome than the equivalent EU mechanism.³⁷¹

UK Oil Price Cap restrictions do not apply where oil and petroleum products originate from a country other than Russia, there is no ownership by a person connected with Russia and only loading in, departing from or transiting through Russia is concerned. Further exemptions apply where a maritime transportation of

³⁶⁵ The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2025, available [here](#).

³⁶⁶ See GL INT/2022/2469656, available [here](#).

³⁶⁷ See GL INT/2022/2469656, available [here](#).

³⁶⁸ See OFSI’s list of reporting forms, available [here](#).

³⁶⁹ UK Maritime Services Ban and Oil Price Cap, Industry Guidance, available [here](#).

³⁷⁰ General License – Oil Price Cap INT/2024/4423849, available [here](#).

³⁷¹ For more information on the UK Oil Price Cap, see HM Treasury’s guidance, available [here](#); the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy’s guidance, available [here](#); OFSI’s blog posts, available [here](#) and [here](#).

oil or petroleum products is required to prevent serious and significant impact on human health or safety, infrastructure or the environment or to ensure supplies to EU landlocked Member States, if pipeline supplies are interrupted.

On July 18, 2025, the UK reduced the crude oil price cap from \$60 to \$47.60 starting from 23:01 on September 2, 2025. Crude oil contracts signed at the previous cap of \$60 before September 2, 2025, are subject to a 45-day wind-down period. These contracts may be fulfilled provided that the oil is offloaded at the port of destination by October 17, 2025.³⁷²

Transport Restrictions

The UK now prohibits Russian ships from entering or accessing UK ports. This prohibition applies to ships that are owned, controlled or chartered or operated by a designated person or a person connected with Russia, a ship flying the Russian flag, a ship registered in Russia or a specified ship.

The UK has also imposed a ban on Russian airlines accessing UK airspace and landing at UK airports. This ban also extends to providing insurance and reinsurance services relating to aviation, space goods or space technology to a person connected with Russia or for use in Russia. This equally applies to any aircraft owned, operated or chartered by a Russian person.

Furthermore, the UK has imposed a ban on the registration of aircraft and potential termination of registration of aircraft owned, operated or chartered by a sanctioned person.

Starting from July 31, 2024, the UK government may “specify” vessels that are involved in destabilizing Ukraine, obtaining benefits from the Russian government or circumventing sanctions by way of carrying in the interest of Russian dual use or military goods, Russian oil and oil products or other goods that could contribute to destabilizing Ukraine or undermining or threatening its territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence. Such “specification” may result in a prohibition for the “specified ship” to enter UK ports and detention of such vessel.³⁷³ In addition, Russian oil or petroleum products cannot be supplied or delivered on a “specified ship” and no financial or brokering service can be provided with respect to such “specified ship,” even if the Russian oil that it carries meets the Oil Price Cap thresholds.³⁷⁴ On October 17, 2024, the UK imposed the largest package of shipping sanctions on Russia so far, by “specifying” 18 “shadow” oil tankers and four LNG tankers.³⁷⁵

³⁷² OFSI General License INT/2024/4423849, available [here](#).

³⁷³ The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations 2024.

³⁷⁴ See OFSI General License INT/2024/4423849, as amended, available [here](#).

³⁷⁵ Press Release of the FCDO, “UK strikes at the heart of Russian energy revenues funding Putin’s war” (Oct. 17, 2024), available [here](#).

On November 25, 2024, the UK “specified” a further 30 vessels of the Russian shadow fleet responsible for transporting oil and oil products.³⁷⁶ On December 17, 2024, the UK “specified” additional 20 shadow fleet vessels.³⁷⁷

On May 20, 2025, the UK “specified” a further 101 vessels of the Russian shadow fleet responsible for transportation of Russian oil and oil products and otherwise supporting the Russian government.³⁷⁸

On June 17, 2025, and July 21, 2025, the UK “specified” a further 20 and 135 vessels of the Russian shadow fleet.³⁷⁹

On September 12, 2025, the UK “specified” a further 70 vessels of the Russian shadow fleet.³⁸⁰

Internet Services Restrictions

On April 29, 2022, the UK imposed obligations on social media providers, internet access service providers and application store providers. Social media providers must take reasonable steps to ensure that content on their platform that has been posted or shared by a designated person is not “encountered” by a UK user. A person who provides an internet access service must take reasonable steps to prevent a UK user from accessing, by means of that service, an internet service provided by a designated person. Application store providers must now take reasonable steps to prevent UK users from downloading or otherwise accessing an internet service provided by a designated person.

Furthermore, new powers have been granted to OFCOM to monitor compliance with the two restrictions above and to impose fines; it is an offense for someone to refuse to comply with an OFCOM request related to this monitoring or to otherwise obstruct or provide false information.

The UK also prohibited providing interception and monitoring services to, or for the benefit of, the Russian government.

Services Restrictions

³⁷⁶ Press Release of the FCDO, “UK imposes new wave of sanctions to choke Russian oil revenues as Foreign Secretary arrives in Italy for G7” (Nov. 25, 2024), available [here](#).

³⁷⁷ Press Release of the FCDO, “Prime Minister announces new sanctions and £35 million of emergency support for Ukraine as Russia continues to attack critical national infrastructure” (Dec. 17, 2024), available [here](#).

³⁷⁸ FCDO Policy Paper, “Russia sanctions targets” (May 9, 2025), available [here](#).

³⁷⁹ Press Release of the FCDO, “UK turns the screw on Putin as allies unite behind Ukraine” (June 17, 2025), available [here](#); Press Release of the FCDO, “UK hammers Putin’s energy revenues with fresh sanctions” (July 21, 2025), available [here](#).

³⁸⁰ Press Release of the FCDO, “UK ratchets up pressure on Putin’s military machine as Foreign Secretary travels to Kyiv”, available [here](#)

The UK prohibited the provision of certain services to a person connected with Russia, including:

- accounting and auditing services;
- business and management consulting services;
- public relations services;
- IT consultancy and design services;
- architectural services;
- engineering services;
- advertising services; and
- auditing services.

The services ban does not apply to internet access services or services that are incidental to the exchange of communications over the Internet.

Unlike the EU restrictions that extend only to Russian entities, the UK services ban applies to the provision of services to persons connected with Russia,³⁸¹ which can cover individuals receiving the benefit of the prohibited services.

The UK services ban also does not provide an exemption for Russian entities owned or controlled by UK persons or entities. However, until recently, provision of services from UK parent companies and their UK subsidiaries to their Russian subsidiaries was considered to be a licensing consideration that is consistent with the aims of the UK sanctions regime. On this basis, UK parent companies could request OFSI to issue an individual license to continue providing services to their Russian group entities. On October 31, 2024, this licensing consideration was removed. Prior to this removal, to obtain a license to provide services to a Russian subsidiary, a UK parent company would have need to demonstrate how the provision of any ongoing services aligned with the overarching purposes of UK sanctions.³⁸²

On June 23, 2023, the UK expanded service restrictions to legal advisory services. In particular, the new sanctions prohibit provision of legal advisory services to any person who is not a United Kingdom person in relation to, or in connection with, any activity which would be prohibited by sanctions regulations if performed by a United Kingdom person or in the territory of the United Kingdom. Legal advisory services include only non-contentious matters, such as advice on application and

³⁸¹ For further information, see the Export Control Joint Unit's guidance, available [here](#).

³⁸² NOTE 2024/26: update on Russia sanctions licensing for intra-corporate services (September 30, 2024), available [here](#).

interpretation of law, actions on behalf of a client in a commercial transaction and preparation of legal documents.³⁸³

On August 11, 2023, the UK Department of Business and Trade (the “DBT”) issued a general trade license that exempts the following services from the scope of the legal advisory restrictions: (i) advising on whether an action or proposed action complies with or could trigger punitive measures under any “restrictive measures” concerning Russia or non-government controlled Ukrainian territory (with “restrictive measures” covering any form of sanctions, export or import controls imposed by any jurisdiction); (ii) advising more generally on compliance with or addressing the risk of punitive measures in relation to (a) any Russia-related “restrictive measures,” (b) any Russian counter-sanctions measures that have as their object or effect the frustration of any “restrictive measures” and (c) any criminal law imposed by any jurisdiction; and (iii) advising in relation to the discharge of or compliance with UK statutory or regulatory obligations.³⁸⁴

On September 6, 2024, the legal advisory services restriction was amended to address the concerns of the legal services sector and put into legislation the exemptions that were previously provided by the DBT general trade license:³⁸⁵

- Pursuant to the amended regulation, a United Kingdom person may breach sanctions by providing legal advisory services “*knowing*” that their object or effect is to enable or facilitate any activity that would be prohibited by sanctions regulations if performed by a United Kingdom person or in the territory of the United Kingdom. This amendment narrows down the scope of violation, which could previously occur regardless of whether a United Kingdom person knew or suspected that its legal services support any prohibited conduct.
- The scope of exemptions has been expanded to cover legal advisory services relating to compliance with or discharge of obligations under any “*relevant law*” or application of punitive measures. The definition of the “*relevant law*” includes any sanctions imposed by any jurisdiction, Russian counter-sanctions and any criminal law imposed by any jurisdiction. These new exemptions substitute the DBT general trade license, which has been immediately revoked.
- The definition of “legal advisory services” has been clarified to exclude (i) proceedings before administrative agencies, courts or other duly constituted official tribunals, arbitration or mediation proceedings “*in any jurisdiction*” (previously, this exemption could be read as applying only to

³⁸³ The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations 2023, available [here](#).

³⁸⁴ General Trade License, Russia-sanctions – Legal Advisory Services, available [here](#).

³⁸⁵ The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 4) Regulations 2024.

proceedings in the United Kingdom), and (ii) legal services in connection with the management of claims under a contract of insurance or reinsurance.

General Licenses for Financial Sanctions

Since implementing its autonomous sanctions regime, the UK has been able to issue US-style general licenses for conduct that would otherwise be prohibited by sanctions (this differs from EU sanctions, which usually require a person to apply for an individual license). The following licenses related to financial sanctions have been issued and remain unexpired:

- A license relating to asset recovery by “Non-Crown Relevant Organisations”; it is of indefinite duration.
- A license allowing winding down, payments for basic needs and payments related to insolvency proceedings involving Amsterdam Trade Bank N.V, a majority-owned subsidiary of Alfa-Bank JSC, until May 12, 2030. This license was amended to permit the bankruptcy trustees of Amsterdam Trade Bank N.V. to fulfill their statutory functions.
- A license allowing UK persons to make payments to PJSC Aeroflot, JSC Rossiya Airlines, JSC Ural Airlines, Russian Railways and their subsidiaries for the purchase of tickets for passenger rail and passenger air journeys originating in or within Russia until May 23, 2026. The license also allows purchasing tickets from the South Caucasus Railway CJSC for journeys between Armenia and Georgia and within these countries until May 23, 2026.
- A license allowing UK, EU and Guernsey subsidiaries of VTB and Sberbank to make payments for their basic needs, pay reasonable fees and service charges arising from holding and maintenance of their frozen funds and economic resources and pay reasonable legal fees. The license also allows payments related to the insolvency proceedings of such subsidiaries. The license expires on April 3, 2030. On January 2, 2024, the license was amended to reflect the change of name of VTB’s EU subsidiary to OWH SE. On May 31, 2024, the license was further amended to permit a scheme of arrangement prepared by the Joint Administrators of VTB Capital plc.
- A license allowing Interim Managers and trustees to act as receivers and managers in respect of the property and affairs of a charity until May 30, 2028.
- A license allowing non-asset frozen persons to continue business operations involving civil telecommunications services and news media services, until May 30, 2026.

- A license of an indefinite duration allowing certain humanitarian organizations to provide humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and its non-government controlled areas.
- A license of indefinite duration allowing asset frozen individuals or entities to make payments to UK insurers for insurance premiums and broker commissions relating to the provision of insurance cover provided to UK properties (including employer's liability insurance) and UK vehicles, and to receive payment following successful claims against their insurance policies and various types of refunds.
- A license authorizing payments until **August 14, 2027**, to Credit Bank of Moscow, Gazprombank, Sberbank or TBank, or a subsidiary of any of these, for the purpose of making energy available for use in Mongolia.
- A license allowing Crown servants, contractors and their family members to carry out activities in their personal capacity that would otherwise be prohibited.
- A license allowing banks to take payment of bank fees from frozen accounts.
- A license authorizing UK law firms and counsels to receive payment for legal services rendered to a designated person, subject to certain conditions including a legal fee cap of £4 million and legal expenses cap of 10% (up to £400,000), until October 28, 2025 (this cap is split equally between services provided under a prior arrangement and under a new arrangement with a designated person). The cap applies to each legal advisor instructed by a designated person (in the previous version of this license, caps applied to all legal work across all legal advisors for one designated person). The caps apply to all in-house lawyers employed by a designated person as if they were, together, a single law firm. Starting from April 29, 2025, the previous similar legal fee caps have been reset.
- A license of indefinite duration authorizing designated persons (and those acting on their behalf) to make utility payments for gas and electricity supplies and gas and electricity meter-related payments for owned or rented UK properties from a frozen UK bank account.
- A license authorizing Lithuanian Railways to receive payments from Russian Railways in relation to passenger transit between Kaliningrad and other parts of Russia, until April 13, 2027.
- A license authorizing a bond issuer to restructure bonds held by designated persons, so long as funds or economic resources are not made available to the designated person, until March 27, 2026.

- A license allowing the wind-down of trust services to a designated person, until 90 days after the designation of that person.
- A license authorizing making, receiving or processing any payments, or taking any other action, in connection with the insolvency of European subsidiaries of GTLK, until July 31, 2030.
- A license of indefinite duration authorizing payments to water companies in the UK for water and sewage services by UK designated persons who own or rent properties in the UK.
- A license of indefinite duration authorizing persons who owe funds to a designated person under a court order to make payments of such funds into a court and authorizing the court to receive such payments.
- A license authorizing the use of the retail banking services of designated Russian banks, provided that the payments made or received are intended for personal use, and the total amount of outgoing payments does not exceed £50,000. The license applies until May 27, 2026.
- A license of indefinite duration authorizing designated persons (or other persons acting on behalf of such designated persons) to make payments to statutory auditors.
- A license of indefinite duration allowing visa application providers to receive and remit certain mandatory payments—such as courier services to and from the Visa Application Centre, specialist appointments to support visa application form completion, and photo, ID and biometric scanning fees—from and to designated persons (or other persons acting on their behalf).
- A license authorizing any person to make, receive or process any payments or take any other action in connection with the liquidation of East-West United Bank in Luxembourg until August 8, 2029.
- A license authorizing certain financial institutions to process payments made in 2022 from or via a designated credit or financial institution, provided the sender and intended recipient were not asset frozen, until November 6, 2025.
- A license of indefinite duration authorizing persons to make and facilitate payments in respect of UK government debt where either the legal holder or the direct or indirect recipient or beneficiary of that payment is a designated person or owned or controlled by a designated person, provided the payments are frozen.
- A license of indefinite duration authorizing a maximum of £350 per month for the first two months after designation to be made available to or for the benefit

of a designated person and to be paid by and received from the designated person for the purposes of basic needs, such as purchasing food, beverages, medicine and personal and household products.

- A license authorizing certain commodities and energy-focused international organizations to receive membership payments due from the Russian Government from its accounts held with Gazprombank, until February 20, 2030.
- A license authorizing UK nationals to purchase petrol from petrol stations owned by Gazprom Neft or its subsidiaries in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, provided the petrol is for a vehicle owned or rented by a UK national, until March 15, 2027.
- A license authorizing UK persons to continue business operations with Gazpromneft-Sakhalin LLC to the extent they relate to the Sakhalin-2 oil and gas project. The exemption for the Sakhalin-2 project applies until **June 28, 2026**.
- A license of indefinite duration authorizing a designated person to make payments to arbitrators and arbitration associations, as well as to legal representatives for the purposes of paying arbitration costs, for a value of up to £500,000 per arbitration.
- A license allowing persons to carry out activities required to enable or ordinarily incident and necessary to the transfer of assets and liabilities as part of the integration of Credit Suisse Group AG into UBS Group AG following the acquisition of Credit Suisse Group AG by UBS Group AG, until April 26, 2030.
- A license of indefinite duration, authorizing Financial Conduct Authority, the Prudential Regulation Authority, or the Bank of England to take actions in respect to designated persons as they relate to protecting consumers, ensuring prudential supervision or protecting, maintaining or enhancing the stability and integrity of the financial system of the United Kingdom.
- A license of indefinite duration authorizing UK persons to make and UK financial institutions to process any insurance payment premiums due to the Deposit Insurance Agency.
- **A license authorizing wind-down of any transaction involving Intershipping Services LLC, including closing out of any positions, until September 18, 2025. Intershipping Services LLC is the authorized representative for the Maritime Administration of the Gabonese Republic worldwide, based in the United Arab Emirates.**
- **A license of indefinite duration authorizing vessels owned or operated by, or on behalf of, the Government of the Gabonese Republic to continue business operations with Intershipping Services LLC.**

- A license authorizing wind-down of any transaction involving Litasco Middle East DMCC, including closing out of any positions, until September 18, 2025.
- A license of indefinite duration that allows non-designated persons who have made investments through designated brokers to transfer their funds to a non-designated broker (assuming that the designated broker is the only sanctioned party involved).

In 2022, OFSI received 1031 specific license applications and, as of December 6, 2022, records showed that OFSI issued 82 new or amended specific licenses under the Russia Regulations.³⁸⁶ In 2023, OFSI issued 164 specific licenses under the Russia Regulations.³⁸⁷

Belarus Sanctions Regime

On July 5, 2022, the UK extended its Belarus sanctions regime to mirror that imposed on Russia. Another major round of sanctions followed on June 9, 2023. Measures against Belarus include the following sanctions:

- Designation by description. On June 9, 2023, the UK expanded the designation criteria to be able to target a wide range of Belarus public officials and their family members. UK designated more than 130 persons and organizations in Belarus. On August 8, 2023, the UK designated six Belarus defense organizations linked to the manufacturing of military technology supporting Russia's military efforts.³⁸⁸
- Financial restrictions, including dealing with transferable securities or money-market instruments issued by and extending loans and credit arrangements to Belarus, Belarus state-owned entities and banks, as well as persons connected with Belarus. On June 9, 2023, the UK expanded the securities-related prohibition to persons acting on behalf or at the direction of the previously targeted groups. Financial sanctions imposed on Belarus also prohibit provision of financial service for Belarus's foreign exchange reserves and asset management and prohibit export to Belarus of sterling and banknotes denominated in the official currency of the EU.
- Trade sanctions, including:
 - exports of critical-industry goods, dual-use goods, interception and monitoring goods, internal repression goods, luxury goods, military goods; oil refining goods, quantum computing and advanced materials goods; tobacco

³⁸⁶ See Question for Treasury of the UK Parliament "Sanctions: Russia" (Dec. 6, 2022), available [here](#).

³⁸⁷ See OFSI Annual Review 2022 to 2023: Strengthening our Sanctions (Dec. 14, 2023), available [here](#).

³⁸⁸ Press Release of the FCDO, "Largest ever UK action targets Putin's access to foreign military supplies" (Aug. 8, 2023), available [here](#).


industry goods; goods that can be used to produce chemical and biological weapons and machinery-related goods; and

- imports of arms and related material, iron and steel products, mineral products, potash, gold, cement, wood and rubber; and
- internet services restrictions to prevent access to content of designated persons.
- Restrictions related to aircraft and ships, including a prohibition on Belarusian aircraft overflying or landing in the UK and a prohibition on Belarusian ships entering UK ports.

* * *

We are closely monitoring the situation and expect to continue to provide updates of any relevant developments. Please do not hesitate to contact us with any questions.

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ANNEX A

RUSSIAN BILLIONAIRES—US, EU AND UK SANCTIONS

This table has been prepared by reference to the Forbes 2022 World's Billionaires List.

No	Name	Industry	Wealth (USD)	US SDN List	EU Asset Freezes	UK Asset Freezes
1.	Vladimir Lisin	Steel, transport	\$18.4 bn	NO	NO	NO
2.	Vladimir Potanin	Metals	\$17.3 bn	YES	NO	YES
3.	Leonid Mikhelson	Gas, chemicals	\$14 bn	NO	NO	YES
4.	Alexey Mordashov	Steel, investments	\$13.2 bn	YES	YES	YES
5.	Mikhail Fridman	Oil, banking, telecom	\$11.8 bn	YES	YES	YES
6.	Alisher Usmanov	Steel, telecom, investments	\$11.5 bn	YES	YES	YES
7.	Gennady Timchenko	Oil, gas	\$11.3 bn	YES	YES	YES
8.	Andrey Melnichenko	Coal, fertilizers	\$11.1 bn	YES	YES	YES
9.	Vagit Alekperov	Oil	\$10.5 bn	NO	NO	YES
10.	Mikhail Prokhorov	Investments	\$10.3 bn	NO	NO	NO
11.	German Khan	Oil, banking, telecom	\$7.8 bn	YES	YES	YES
12.	Roman Abramovich	Steel, investments	\$6.9 bn	NO	YES	YES
13.	Viktor Rashnikov	Steel	\$6.6 bn	YES	YES	YES
14.	Dmitry Rybolovlev	Fertilizers	\$6.6 bn	NO	NO	NO
15.	Alexei Kuzmichev	Oil, banking, telecom	\$6 bn	YES	YES	YES
16.	Alexander Abramov	Steel, mining	\$5.5 bn	NO	NO	YES
17.	Viktor Vekselberg	Metals, energy	\$5.5 bn	YES	NO	YES
18.	Leonid Fedun	Oil	\$5 bn	NO	NO	NO
19.	Andrei Guriev & family	Fertilizers	\$4.8 bn	YES	NO ³⁸⁹	YES
20.	Andrei Skoch	Steel	\$4.7 bn	YES	YES	YES
21.	Viatcheslav Kantor	Fertilizers, real estate	\$4.6 bn	NO	NO ³⁹⁰	YES
22.	Suleiman Kerimov & family	Gold	\$4.4 bn	YES	YES	YES

³⁸⁹ Only Andrei A. Guriev (DOB: March 7, 1982), the son of Andrei G. Guriev, is designated.

³⁹⁰ Council Implementing Regulation 2025/527 (Mar. 14, 2025), available [here](#), removed Mr. Viatcheslav Kantor from the asset freeze list.

No	Name	Industry	Wealth (USD)	US SDN List	EU Asset Freezes	UK Asset Freezes
23.	Pyotr Aven	Oil, banking, telecom	\$4.3 bn	YES	YES	YES
24.	Iskander Makhmudov	Mining, metals, machinery	\$3.6 bn	YES	NO	YES
25.	Sergei Galitsky	Retail	\$3.2 bn	NO	NO	NO
26.	Zarakh Iliev	Real estate	\$3.2 bn	YES	NO	YES
27.	Sergei Popov	Banking	\$3.1 bn	NO	NO	NO
28.	Igor Kesaev	Tobacco distribution, retail	\$2.6 bn	YES	YES	YES
29.	Alexander Frolov	Mining, steel	\$2.3 bn	NO	NO	YES
30.	Alexander Svetakov	Real estate	\$2.2 bn	NO	NO	NO
31.	Tatyana Bakalchuk	Ecommerce	\$2.1 bn	NO	NO	NO
32.	Igor Makarov	Investments	\$2.1 bn	NO	NO	NO
33.	Alexander Mamut	Investments	\$2.1 bn	NO	NO	NO
34.	Egor Kulkov	Pharmaceuticals	\$2 bn	NO	NO	NO
35.	Alexander Skorobogatko	Real estate, airport	\$2 bn	NO	NO	NO
36.	Andrei Kozitsyn	Metals	\$1.9 bn	NO	YES	NO
37.	Alexander Nesis	Metals, banking, fertilizers	\$1.9 bn	NO	NO	NO
38.	Alexander Ponomarenko	Real estate, airport	\$1.9 bn	YES	YES	YES
39.	Igor Altushkin	Metals	\$1.8 bn	YES	YES	YES
40.	Farkhad Akhmedov	Investments	\$1.7 bn	NO	NO ³⁹¹	NO ³⁹²
41.	Oleg Deripaska	Aluminum, utilities	\$1.7 bn	YES	YES	YES
42.	Dmitry Kamenshchik	Airport	\$1.7 bn	NO	NO	NO
43.	Arkady Rotenberg	Construction, pipes, banking	\$1.7 bn	YES	YES	YES
44.	Vladimir Yevtushenkov	Telecom, investments	\$1.7 bn	NO	YES	YES
45.	Vasily Anisimov	Real estate	\$1.6 bn	NO	NO	NO
46.	Sergei Gordeev	Real estate	\$1.6 bn	YES	NO	NO
47.	Ivan Savvidis	Agribusiness	\$1.6 bn	NO	NO	NO
48.	Nikolai Buinov	Oil, gas	\$1.5 bn	NO	NO	YES
49.	Pyotr Kondrashev	Investments	\$1.5 bn	NO	NO	NO
50.	Yuri Shefler	Alcohol	\$1.5 bn	NO	NO	NO

³⁹¹ Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1765 (Sept. 13, 2023), *available here*, removed Mr. Farkhad Akhmedov from the asset freeze list.

³⁹² The UK removed Mr. Farkhad Akhmedov from the asset freeze list on March 19, 2025.

No	Name	Industry	Wealth (USD)	US SDN List	EU Asset Freezes	UK Asset Freezes
51.	Mikhail Shelkov	Titanium	\$1.5 bn	NO	NO	NO
52.	Elena Baturina	Investments, real estate	\$1.4 bn	NO	NO	NO
53.	Viktor Kharitonin	Pharmaceuticals	\$1.4 bn	NO	NO	NO
54.	Anatoly Lomakin	Investments	\$1.4 bn	NO	NO	NO
55.	Vadim Moshkovich	Agriculture, land	\$1.4 bn	NO	YES	YES
56.	Alexey Repik	Pharmaceuticals	\$1.4 bn	NO	NO	YES ³⁹³
57.	Denis Sverdlov	Electric vehicles	\$1.4 bn	NO	NO	NO
58.	Gavril Yushvaev	Precious metals, real estate	\$1.4 bn	NO	NO	NO
59.	Oleg Boyko	Diversified	\$1.3 bn	NO	NO	NO
60.	Mikhail Gutseriev & brother	Oil, real estate	\$1.3 bn	NO	YES ³⁹⁴	YES
61.	Yuri Kovalchuk	Banking, insurance, media	\$1.3 bn	YES	YES	YES
62.	God Nisanov	Real estate	\$1.3 bn	YES	NO	YES
63.	Albert Shigaboutdinov	Refinery, chemicals	\$1.3 bn	NO	NO	YES
64.	Rustem Sulteev	Refinery, chemicals	\$1.3 bn	NO	YES	NO
65.	Andrei Bokarev	Metals, mining	\$1.2 bn	YES	NO	YES
66.	Gleb Fetisov	Investments	\$1.2 bn	NO	NO	NO
67.	Andrei Kosogov	Banking	\$1.2 bn	NO	NO	NO
68.	Megdet Rahimkulov & family	Investments	\$1.2 bn	NO	NO	NO
69.	Andrei Rappoport	Investments	\$1.2 bn	NO	NO	NO
70.	Airat Shaimiev	Refinery, chemicals	\$1.2 bn	NO	NO	YES
71.	Radik Shaimiev	Refinery, chemicals	\$1.2 bn	NO	NO	NO
72.	Samvel Karapetyan	Real estate	\$1.1 bn	NO	NO	NO
73.	Sergei Kolesnikov	Building materials	\$1.1 bn	NO	NO	NO
74.	Andrei Komarov	Investments	\$1.1 bn	NO	NO	NO
75.	Igor Rybakov	Building materials	\$1.1 bn	NO	NO	NO
76.	Igor Yusufov	Oil & gas	\$1.1 bn	NO	NO	NO
77.	Eugene Kaspersky	Software	\$1 bn	NO	NO	NO
78.	Boris Rotenberg	Construction, pipes, chemicals	\$1 bn	YES	YES	YES
	TOTAL:			26	24	38

³⁹³ Designated as "Alexander Repik."

³⁹⁴ Only Mikhail Gutseriev is designated.

ANNEX B

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS—BLOCKING SANCTIONS OR ASSET
FREEZE DESIGNATIONS

Entity	US Regime	EU Regime	UK Regime
Absolut Bank PAO	YES	NO	NO
Ak Bars Bank	YES	NO	NO
Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Agentstvo Regionalnyi Nezavisimyi Registrator (Agency Regional Independent Registrar)	YES	NO	YES
Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Bank Agroros	YES	NO	NO
Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Depozitarnaya Kompaniya Region (Depository Company Region)	YES	NO	YES
Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Independent Specialized Depository	YES	NO	YES
Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Mezhhregionalnyi Registratorskii Tsentr (Interregional Registration Center)	YES	NO	YES
Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Natsionalnaya Spetsializirovannaya Finansovaya Kompaniya (National Specialized Financial Company)	YES	NO	YES
Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Nezavisimaya Registratorskaya Kompaniya R.O.S.T. (Independent Registrar R.O.S.T. Company)	YES	NO	YES
Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Professionalnyi Registratsionnyi Tsentr (Professional Registration Centre)	YES	NO	YES
Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Registrator Kapital (Registrar Capital)	YES	NO	YES
Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Registratsionnaya Kompaniya Tsentr Invest (Registration Company Centre Invest)	YES	NO	YES
Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Spetsializirovannyi Registrator Kompas (Specialized Registrar Compass)	YES	NO	YES
Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Surgutinvestneft	YES	NO	YES
Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Vedenie Reestrov Kompanii (Vedenie Company Registers)	YES	NO	YES
Alfa-Bank	YES	YES	YES
AO Reestr (Register)	YES	NO	YES
AO Spetsializirovannyi Depozitarii Infinitum (Specialized Depository Infinitum)	YES	NO	YES
Bank Avangard	YES	NO	NO
Bank Iturup LLC	YES	NO	NO
Bank RostFinance	YES	NO	NO
Bank Saint Petersburg	YES	NO	YES
BBR Bank Joint Stock Company	YES	NO	NO
BCS Bank AO	YES	NO	NO
Black Sea Bank for Development and Reconstruction	YES	YES	YES
Blanc Bank LLC	YES	NO	NO
Bratsky Narodny Bank JSC	YES	NO	NO
Central Bank of Russia	NO	NO	NO

Entity	US Regime	EU Regime	UK Regime
Centre for International Settlements Bank	YES	YES	NO
Centroccredit Bank	YES	NO	NO
Commercial Bank Energotransbank Joint Stock Company	YES	NO	NO
Commercial Bank Khlynov Joint Stock Company	YES	NO	NO
Commercial Bank Kremlyovskiy	YES	NO	NO
Commercial Joint Stock Bank Viking	YES	NO	NO
Corporate Finance Bank LLC	YES	NO	NO
Credit Bank of Moscow	YES	YES	YES
Dom.RF	YES	NO	YES
East West United Bank	YES	NO	NO
Evroaziatskii Registrator (Eurasian Registrar)	YES	NO	YES
Evrofinance Mosnarbank	YES	NO	NO
Expobank	YES	NO	NO
Far Eastern Bank	YES	YES	NO
Fora Bank Joint Stock Commercial Bank	YES	NO	NO
Garant Invest Bank Joint Stock	YES	NO	NO
Garantex Europe OU	YES	YES ³⁹⁵	YES
Gazprombank	YES	NO	YES
Genbank	YES	NO	YES
Home Credit & Finance Bank	YES	NO	NO
Industrial Savings Bank	YES	NO	YES
International Settlement Bank	YES	YES	YES
Interstate Bank	YES	NO	NO
Joint Stock Commercial Bank Chelindbank	YES	NO	NO
Joint Stock Commercial Bank International Financial Club	YES	NO	NO
Joint Stock Commercial Bank Modulbank	YES	NO	NO
Joint Stock Commercial Bank National Reserve Bank Joint Stock Company	YES	NO	NO
Joint Stock Commercial Bank Slavia Joint Stock Company	YES	NO	NO
Joint Stock Commercial Mortgage Bank Akibank Public Joint Stock Company	YES	NO	NO
Joint Stock Company Aktiv	YES	NO	YES
Joint Stock Company Auto Finance Bank	YES	NO	NO
Joint Stock Company Bank Accept	YES	NO	NO
Joint Stock Company Bank Finservice	YES	NO	NO
Joint Stock Company Bank United Capital	YES	NO	NO
Joint Stock Company Coalmetbank	YES	NO	NO
Joint Stock Company Commercial Bank Ural FD	YES	NO	NO
Joint Stock Company Databank	YES	NO	NO
Joint Stock Company Guta Bank	YES	NO	NO

³⁹⁵ Designated as "Garantex."

Entity	US Regime	EU Regime	UK Regime
Joint Stock Company Industria Reestr (Industry Register)	YES	NO	YES
Joint Stock Company NS Bank	YES	NO	NO
Joint Stock Company Public Trust Bank	YES	NO	NO
Joint Stock Company RDC Paritet (RDC Parity)	YES	NO	YES
Joint Stock Company Registrator Intraco	YES	NO	YES
Joint Stock Company Registry Society Status	YES	NO	YES
Joint Stock Company Royal Credit Bank	YES	NO	NO
Joint Stock Company Severgazbank	YES	NO	NO
Joint Stock Company VTB Registrar	YES ³⁹⁶	YES ³⁹⁷	YES
Joint Stock Company VTB Specialized Depository	YES ³⁹⁸	YES ³⁹⁹	YES
Joint Stock Investment Commercial Bank Eniseisk United Bank	YES	NO	NO
JSC DRAGA (Specialized Registrar Holder of the Register of Shareholders Gas Industry)	YES	NO	YES
JSC Exi Bank	YES	NO	NO
JSC Investment Group	YES	NO	NO
JSC Noviy Registrator (New Registrar)	YES	NO	YES
JSC Republican Specialregistrar Yakut Fund Center	YES	NO	YES
JSC RT Registrar	YES	NO	YES
JSC Service Reestr (Service Registry)	YES	NO	YES
JSCB Energobank	YES	NO	NO
Kamsky Commercial Bank	YES	NO	NO
Keremet Bank OJSC	YES	NO	YES
Korporativnaya Registratorskaya Kompaniya (Corporate Registrar Company)	YES	NO	YES
Lanta-Bank Commercial Bank	YES	NO	NO
Limited Liability Company Bank Orange	YES	NO	NO
Limited Liability Company Bank Round	YES	NO	NO
Limited Liability Company Depository and Corporate Technologies	YES	NO	YES
Limited Liability Company Krona Bank	YES	NO	NO
Limited Liability Company Market Fund Administration (Market Special Depository)	YES	NO	YES
Limited Liability Company Special Depository Partner	YES	NO	YES
Limited Liability Company Specialized Depository Company Garant	YES	NO	YES
Locko Bank	YES	NO	NO
Maritime Joint Stock Bank Joint Stock Company	YES	NO	NO

³⁹⁶ Joint Stock Company VTB Registrar is not designated on the OFAC SDN list, but it is majority owned by the designated VTB Bank.

³⁹⁷ Joint Stock Company VTB Registrar is not designated on the EU asset freeze list, but it is majority owned or controlled by the designated VTB Bank.

³⁹⁸ Joint Stock Company VTB Specialized Depository is not designated on the OFAC SDN list, but it is majority owned by the designated VTB Bank.

³⁹⁹ Joint Stock Company VTB Specialized Depository is not designated on the EU asset freeze list, but it is majority owned or controlled by the designated VTB Bank.

Entity	US Regime	EU Regime	UK Regime
Marshal Global	YES	NO	YES
MB Bank	YES	NO	NO
Metallurgical Investment Bank Commercial Bank	YES	NO	YES
Moscow Industrial Bank	YES	NO	YES
Moskovskii Fondovyi Tsentr (Moscow Stock Center)	YES	NO	YES
MTS Bank	YES	NO	YES
National Custodial Company Stock Closed Corporation	YES	NO	YES
National Payment Card System Joint Stock Company/ Mir National Payment System	YES	NO	NO
National Settlement Depository	YES	YES	YES
National Standard Bank Joint Stock Company	YES	NO	NO
New Moscow Bank	YES	NO	NO
NK Bank Joint Stock Company	YES	NO	NO
Novikombank	YES	YES	YES
Novosibirsk Social Commercial Bank Levoberezhny	YES	NO	NO
Obshchestvo S Ogranichennoy Otvetstvennostyu Oboronregistr (Responsibility of Oboronregistr)	YES	NO	YES
OOO Partner	YES	NO	YES
OOO Reestr RN	YES	NO	YES
OOO Registrator Garant (Registrar Garant)	YES	NO	YES
Otkritie Financial Corporation Bank	YES	YES	YES
Petersburg Social Commercial Bank	YES	NO	NO
Post Bank	YES	NO	NO
Primorsky Territorial Commercial Bank Society with Limited Liability	YES	NO	NO
Primorye Commercial Bank	YES	NO	NO
Promsvyazbank	YES	YES	YES
Public Joint Stock Commercial Bank Derzhava	YES	NO	NO
Public Joint Stock Company Bank Alexandrovsky	YES	NO	NO
Public Joint Stock Company Bank Sinara	YES	NO	NO
Public Joint Stock Company Bystrobank	YES	NO	NO
Public Joint Stock Company Finstar Bank	YES	NO	NO
Public Joint Stock Company Metkombank	YES	NO	NO
Public Joint Stock Company National Bank Trust	YES	NO	NO
Public Joint Stock Company SPB Bank	YES	NO	NO
Public Joint Stock Social Commercial Bank of Primorye Primsotsbank	YES	NO	NO
Registrar KRTS (KRC Registrar)	YES	NO	YES
Rosbank	YES	YES	NO ⁴⁰⁰
Rossita Bank	YES	NO	NO
Rossiya Bank	YES	YES	YES
Russian Agricultural Bank (Rosselkhozbank)	NO	NO	YES

⁴⁰⁰ The UK removed Rosbank from its asset freeze list on 7 March 2025.

Entity	US Regime	EU Regime	UK Regime
Russian Direct Investment Fund	YES	YES	YES
Russian Financial Corporation Bank JSC	YES	NO	NO
Russian National Commercial Bank	YES	YES	YES
Russian Public Joint Stock Commercial Roads Bank	YES	NO	NO
Russian Regional Development Bank	YES	NO	YES
Russian Standard Bank	YES	NO	NO
Russian Universal Bank	YES	NO	NO
Russki Regionalny Bank	YES	NO	NO
Saint Petersburg Exchange	YES	NO	YES
Sberbank	YES	YES	YES
SDM Bank	YES	NO	NO
Signal Invest OOO	YES	NO	NO
Sinko Bank	YES	NO	NO
SMP Bank	YES	NO	YES
SNCO Metallurg	YES	NO	YES
SOGAZ	YES	YES	YES
Solidarnost	YES	NO	NO
Sovcombank (Buycombank)	YES	YES	YES
Spetsializirovannyi Depozitarii Depo Plaza (Specialized Depository Depot Plaza)	YES	NO	YES
Spetsializirovannyi Registrator Rekom (Specialized Registrar Rekom)	YES	NO	YES
Surgutneftegasbank	YES	YES ⁴⁰¹	YES ⁴⁰²
Timer Bank	YES	NO	NO
Tinkoff Bank (currently known as T-Bank)	YES	YES	YES
Tochka Bank	YES	NO	NO
TransKapitalBank	YES	NO	NO
Tsentr Ucheta i Registratsii (Centre of the Accounting and Registration)	YES	NO	YES
TSMRBank	YES	YES ⁴⁰³	NO
Unistream Bank	YES	NO	NO
Ural Bank for Reconstruction and Development	YES	NO	YES
Bank Uralsib	YES	NO	YES
Vitabank PJSC	YES	NO	NO
Vnesheconombank (VEB)	YES	YES	YES
VTB Bank	YES	YES	YES
Waybank JSC	YES	NO	NO
Yuzhno Regionalnyi Registrator (Yuzhno Regional Registrar)	YES	NO	YES

⁴⁰¹ Surgutneftegasbank is not designated on the EU asset freeze list, but it is majority owned by the designated Surgutneftegas.

⁴⁰² Surgutneftegasbank is not designated on the UK asset freeze list, but it is majority owned by the designated Surgutneftegas.

⁴⁰³ Designated as "CMRBank."

Entity	US Regime	EU Regime	UK Regime
Zakrytoe Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Pervyi Spetsializirovannyi Depozitarii (First Specialized Depository)	YES	NO	YES
Zenit Bank	YES	NO	YES
TOTAL:	171	25	82